1-1-1975

The concept of participation in contemporary political interpretations : a critical analysis.

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THE CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL INTERPRETATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

A Dissertation Presented

By

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Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

March 1975

Political Science

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March 1975

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There is a social character to any project. I have had the benefit of the support of many diverse people and groups. Here I want to note particularly the sustained contribution of several individuals.

To the Department of Government I am grateful for its support through a Dissertation Fellowship Award in the early stages of this project. As well, I must acknowledge with deep appreciation the contribution of several women, including Jeanne Hylton, who in the early stages shared the responsibilities of my parenthood.

The members of my Dissertation Committee have provided the sustained guidance necessary to completion. To Dr. Glenn Gordon and Dr. Gordon Sutton, I am most appreciative of their probing questions and suggestive comments. To my advisor, Dr. William E. Connolly, whose approach to political inquiry opened wholly new dimensions for consideration, I am especially grateful. Throughout, he never fatigued in pointing out the need for further clarification or in offering ways for better developing arguments.

My family, Mary and Emerick Schneck and Deborah Schneck, offered encouragement and their own illuminating thoughts. Lisa has made her contribution in other ways; my hope is she may have a more just and participatory society.

The possibilities were rich, the limits were mine.

The Concept of Participation In Contemporary Political Interpretations:

A Critical Analysis (March 1975)

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"Participation" is one of a class of essentially contested concepts. Review of major contemporary political interpretations of power and possibility in the United States illuminates the wide-ranging meanings for this concept. Particularly, the revision in the liberal-pluralist conception in its criteria of application and moral point requires critical examination. Another purpose of this study is to make a case for expanding the scope and practice of participation.

The approach is contextual and follows the thesis gaining favor that implicit and explicit normative commitments both shape and flow out of any explanatory framework. It, therefore, makes sense to recognize the 'hermeneutical' or interpretive character of the sciences of man.

A vision of the participatory society derives from the ideas of Rousseau, T. H. Green, and John Dewey and provides a contrast model by which to appraise the selected interpretations. The chief feature of this model is the emphasis placed on the cognitive and affective development of the Self under participatory social arrangements. This development is fostered when all members of a community formulate, discuss, and determine common issues affecting them. Through this process the individual is encouraged to act as a moral agent and in the process social stability can be promoted.

The liberal-pluralist (e.g., Robert A. Dahl) views participation as one of many roles competing for the individual's attention in democratic society. Individuals are depicted as free to engage in a range of political forms, but this range is limited in historically-specific ways. The paradigmatic case of participation is voting. Dahl recommends expanding the settings of participation, but, because of his theory of abstract individuals, he misunderstands and rejects for the wrong reasons the fuller classical vision as a possibility. Furthermore, he fails to see why the present structure makes it irrational for some members of society to participate in the ways he prescribes, thus underscoring the inadequacy of the consensus-integration framework.

The importance of the constitutional republican interpretation (e.g., Grant McConnell and Theodore J. Lowi) is that it discloses the manipulated use of the term in the liberal-pluralist vocabulary. Participation becomes "cooptive" under present conditions and impedes socially just policy. The analysis, however, leads to the unwarranted dismissal of expanded and enriched forms of participation by assimilating the abstract conception of the individual to its theory.

The radical-liberals (e.g., Peter Bachrach and Arnold S. Kaufman) advance the self-developmental model of participation and recommend expanding the settings of participation to the workplace, the schools and universities, the neighborhoods, and elsewhere. Appraisal of this interpretation reveals that how interests are "objectively" formed is an important consideration to the participatory case.

The critical theory of Herbert Marcuse significantly shows distorted communication as a form of social control. Marcuse's work has theoretic

limitations, but his philosophy affords a synthesis with the radical-liberals who appreciate the importance of experiential settings. Extending Marcuse's insight, this study constructs a model of "repressive participation" and considers the extent to which instances of ordinary political activity approach the limiting case. "Representative participation" is activity that serves the requirements of the established apparatus of production, distribution, and consumption at the price of the cognitive and affective growth of the individual. Repressive participation closes political discourse.

This study concludes that the present forms of participation and non-participation in American society, and the forms of participation which are possible, are directly related to the language-structuring of society. Class-structuring, the fracturing of people into cultural units, is to a large extent the function of social language and who controls it. Possibilities for self-development are linked to opportunities for linguistic-conceptual development which expanded settings and enriched forms of participation help to provide.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION - THE PROBLEM OF PARTICIPATION

Elite theory, including its pluralist variant, has had a firm hold on Western social thought and practice and, if there were a reason to believe that it has been held at an unnecessarily high price in lives suffered and lost, we would probably be inclined to reexamine once again the grounds and implications of that set of ideas and judgments. Just such a reexamination has begun to take place, although it is not so clear that all relevant viewpoints are engaged as parties in the debate.

A central claim pressed against elite theory from its challengers involves the issue of the scope of participatory institutions and the place of citizenship within the modern democratic structure. The claim has usually been framed in phraseology that recognizes the individual's capacity and right to share in the decisions which affect his life. The call for expanded participatory structures, however, cannot be successfully pressed if the elite theorists are correct about the necessity and inevitability of elite structure under the conditions of advanced industrial society and the limited possibilities for human conduct on the whole. There is some reason to believe that they are mistaken on several points. Elite theorists are not correct in suggesting that a high degree of circulation among elites compensates for the imbalance of authority obtained between elites and masses, nor are they correct about the disinterested perspective of professionalized elites. More importantly, they underestimate the tendencies for extremes to develop in society from a class stratified set of arrangements, and they do not take into account the

nature and causes of revolution.[1] Finally, and most significantly, they are unconcerned with the human need for self-development and self-realization.

On the practical side of life, the subject of participation is not likely to be of interest to the individuals who have what they want, when they are enjoying a state of wealth, privilege, and power. The person who is materially well off does not need to see the interconnection between institutional structures and the character of human existence, unless he is pressed to do so. Interest in participation generally arises only when one does not enjoy such a position. The attempt to expand the scope of participation and invigorate the exercise of participant rights by all is the attempt to redress the existing distribution of burdens and benefits. The underlying premise is the importance of the development of "self", through the interactive processes of a community, for a stable and just democratic society.

This is the way interest in participation exhibited itself during the early 1960's, a time when American society looked to various groups as though it were moving more and more in an inegalitarian direction with power concentrated in an identifiable elite.[2] The civil rights effort,

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[1] The influential role of Pareto, Mosca, and Michels is being referred to here, and the developed arguments against versions of the elite interpretation are found in T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (Maryland: Penguin, 1964).

[2] C. Wright Mill's, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford, 1956) lent support to such a view. A frequently cited source on inequality has been Gabriel Kolko's Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution (New York: Praeger, 1962). Political economists such as Robert Lampman, Herbert Gans, and Thomas Weisskopf have given further attention to charting the dimensions of inequality.

the struggle for voting rights, even the reapportionment cases could be viewed as effectively symbolizing the failure of American politics to make the representative process fair and open. In the course of the decade, private and public obstruction of efforts to reshape power in a more fully participatory way became even more visible. "Participation" was captured as a hortatory word, taking on an ideological connotation. An example of this was the controversial phrase, "maximum feasible participation," in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This phrase was never clearly thought out in the terms of its organizational requirements or its political implications in a system of federal arrangements. The degree to which it nurtured a program of social action "loaded with political dynamite" went unnoticed by the ratifying congress.[3] In all its ambiguity, the phrase contributed to undelivered promises and conflict irrelevant to the matter of enabling excluded and disadvantaged groups to articulate their needs and aspirations and develop their capacities for critical appraisal. Cynicism set in towards the use of a vocabulary which expressed aspirations unfulfilled by a practice that denied and limited them.

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[3] John C. Donovan in The Politics of Poverty (New York: Pegasus, 1967) provides an account of the genesis of the controversial section, Section 202 (a)(3), of Title II, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964; see Ch. 2-3.

The political science profession did not clearly lend a hand to support the claims of expanded participation.[4] Conventional political science offered empirical support to constricted interpretations of advanced industrial society. For instance, some students of voting behavior reacted to the claim for expanded participation by arguing closely the evidence against this possibility.[5] Others pressed claims for participation in terms of a very narrow range of application.[6] In

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4 Representative of mainstream political science I would take to be the consensus perspective that is encouraged in the presidential addresses of the American Political Science Association and the dominant empirical approach that is revealed in its annual convention and Review papers. The position is enunciated in the Association's history, Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 176-180. Particularly influential in the application of this approach is the work of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center (e.g., Campbell et al. The American Voter, 1960). Not until 1969 did acknowledgment of a challenge to the behavioral approach manifest itself; see David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," a presidential address reprinted in American Political Science Review, 63 (December 1969):1051-1060.

5 Early arguments celebrating a passive citizenry were placed by, for instance, Heinz Eulau, "The Politics of Happiness," Antioch Review, (1956):259-264; and W. H. Morris Jones, "In Defense of Apathy," Political Studies, 2 (February 1954):25-37. Also, James W. Prothro and C. M. Grigg. "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, 22 (1960):276-294. Fears of a mobilized electorate were expressed in the findings of Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955) and by Herbert McCloskey's studies. The case was succintly restated by Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, "Toward Participatory Democracy?" in Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1972.

6 Paradigmatic is the approach of Robert Dahl, whose work will be discussed. It should be noted that his later work seeks a broader sense of participation than some earlier works. Also representative are V. O. Key's studies, including The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) and Alan A. Altschuler's Community Control--The Black Demand for Participation in Large American Cities (New York: Pegasus, 1970). Also, Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America - Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

failing to identify their ideological assumptions they could be accused of propping up a view of political participation which justified and gave advantage to particular dominant interests.[7]

These studies, however, overlooked possibilities. They seldom questioned the legitimacy of a political system whose electorate turned out at lower rates than most other European democratic systems, nor did they indicate any suspicion that within the non-participant population social discontents may be lurking. That they failed to ask how the quality of life for all might be fostered--especially for those for whom the question is rarely posed--meant that the relationship between social structure and human development could never be investigated. The question of the relationship between our concepts and the limits of our action derives from a different perspective than the static, a historical consensus perspective conventional political science works from; that is why the studies in political participation as voting failed to bring to life any of these considerations. It was the critics who returned to the classical democratic theory, especially the ideas of Rousseau, who reformulated the lost and vague ideal of a participant citizenship and

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[7] Such methodological limitations are considered in, for instance, Herbert J. Storing, ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York: 1962); W. C. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge: University Press, 1963), Chap. V; and Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, eds., Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967). An empirical critique of the "Apathy" thesis is provided by Lester M. Salamon and Stephen Van Evera, in "Fear, Apathy, and Discrimination: A Test of Three Explanations of Political Participation," American Political Science Review 67 (December 1973):1288-1326.

pressed it as a just claim for all members of society.[8] The proponents of this position suggested that much of the evidence for a case for participation had been lost in the narrowly confining social and economic and bureaucratic arrangements of our society; modern social conditions are such that they stultify the individual's intellectual capacities and sensibilities. Conditions were not promotive of the kind of participation that the classical democratic model required.

That many sides have deliberated on the meaning and possible role of participation makes opportune a critical analysis of the concept and reformulation of that concept in terms of its fullest practical range of application. That is, on one level, the task of this study - the elucidation and clarification of the concept of participation. As has already been implied so far, "participation" is far from having limited and specific usage and can be usefully considered to be one of a set of important, general and abstract, and internally complex concepts subject to dispute.[9]

The key for elucidating the concept is to see it in contextual

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8 The critics' paradigm is represented by, for instance, Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1968, [1958]); H. Mark Roelofs, The Tension of Citizenship (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968); The Port Huron Statement (Students for a Democratic Society, 1962); Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism--A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); and Robert J. Pranger, The Eclipse of Citizenship-Power and Participation in Contemporary Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968).

9 The significance of this characterization of certain concepts is made apparent by Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking, 1959), pp. 230-231; and William E. Connolly, "Essentially Contested Concepts in Politics" (Paper presented at American Political Association Convention, September 4-8, 1973), pp. 1-19.

terms--that is, within the interpretation of which it is an integral part. An analysis in terms of major interpretations of the United States (as a paradigmatic case of advanced industrial society) presumes the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of achieving a single broad-ranging, objective theory of human organization; and, therefore, the necessity of some delimiting perspective. Human purposes, in other words, are closely built into any view of society, and it makes sense, as Charles Taylor contends, to recognize "the unavoidably 'hermeneutical' component in the sciences of man."[10]

In this view of political inquiry two arguments are taken as persuasive: (1) Important examined and unexamined assumptions, including assessments as to ultimate value, necessitated by conditions of uncertainty and limited empirical control, shape the perspective that guides inquiry.[11] (2) These sometimes unexamined and often obtuse assumptions which make up an explanatory theory have bearing on the recommendations that flow out of an interpretation. The conceptual approach sets the range within which things can vary and also sets normative conclusions.[12] While it may not always be possible to resolve conceptual differences, and differences that involve paradigm disputes, it is possible to expose these differences and this process makes likely a more explicit awareness of the commitments

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[10] Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics (Fall 1971), pp. 3-51.

[11] William E. Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New York: Atherton, 1968), pp. 48-54.

[12] Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 3rd ser. (New York: Barnes and Nobel, 1967), pp. 25-57.

a theorist affirms or denies. At the least, it makes more difficult the distorted or manipulated use of a concept.

At one level, the purpose of this study is to show the contextual reasons for the many meanings of participation in contemporary usage and to provide an explanation in terms of theoretical and ideological differences. At another level, it seeks to make a case for expanding the scope and practice of a participatory style of politics. The value of participation is found in its two functions recognized by the classical theorists, most notably Rousseau: First, to achieve self-development, the development of the human personality in terms of its intellectual capacities and sensibilities; and secondly, to redress the imbalance of forces in society by so doing. The manifest function of social institutions, and modern political ones in particular, is to mediate the extremes for bringing social forces into balance; it is true that this function is not always realized. The effect of participating in the formulation of a collective public decision is to influence the individual's self-identity and thereby broaden his range of considerations in terms of the wider values of the community. The process of making the law helps one to see the reasons for feeling bound to the law; and this process should bind both those for and against the particular item of legislation.

The case to be persuasive must show that the two classical ends claimed on behalf of participatory structures are theoretically possible, if not actually achieved under conditions of advanced industrial society. It must indicate the extent to which participation becomes possible under various settings and with what consequences. My effort is to show that in the prevailing interpretations choices are made which exclude

this important theoretical possibility and to indicate how other interpretations enable such a possibility to unfold.

Certain premises are essential for this effort. Those which I have identified as particularly important to this enterprise are indicated in summary form to guide the reader in the line of argument taken.

(1) Political inquiry must be guided by normative considerations. Here I take my lead from classical democratic theorists who aspire to establish the conditions of self-development for all members of society. The empirical-normative dichotomy of conventional social science is rejected as unfruitful.

(2) The view of a human "science" must be broadly conceived. The behavioralists, in patterning their approach of that of the natural sciences model, have drawn their methodology too narrowly for the study of the human phenomena. Political inquiry must be closely connected to questions of political and moral philosophy.

(3) A theory of institutions and self-development is important for bringing out the interconnections between social conditions and human character. Failure to see the interdependence of individual and environment can be linked to the British empirico-utilitarian tradition which atomized subject and object. The strong connections between what happens to human personality under variable social conditions best appears in the work of Rousseau, Marx, G. H. Mead, and in the focus on understanding "action" in the more contemporary developments of pragmatic and analytic philosophy.[13]

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[13] Richard J. Bernstein in Praxis and Action - Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1971) gives an excellent exposition of this development and its significance.

(4) Examination of socio-political processes in the conventional terms of "consensus" and "conflict" may have to be reevaluated in the light of the view of man that is adopted here. Particularly, what becomes important is the identification of issues shut out of public debate and the social, political, and economic structures related to this process. In Schattschneider's sense, understanding the "mobilization of bias" in a community or polity becomes significant.

(5) The influential role of distorted communication in sustaining and extending, if not establishing, a class-divided society must be considered. Language as a social product, can shape consciousness for encouraging the development of a rational and moral being or it can be used to limit and crush that possibility. Individuals cannot be autonomous when the conditions for that state are not available; that is particularly so with highly centralized control of information.

(6) Conditions of uncertainty in our knowledge about human organization cannot be used as an excuse for political scientists failing to make recommendations for public policy. The purpose of social science, of human knowledge in general, is to guide conduct. To put this off means that decisions that must be made will be made by those less prepared or ill-prepared to consider the problem in its fullest dimensions. Analogously, non-participation is a process of decision-making by default.

I will undertake an examination of the concept "participation" in the following way:

First, I will review the classical formulation found primarily in Rousseau. Rousseau was concerned with the two aspects of participation--the settings in which it can occur and the moral features they required

on the part of the participants. Participation developed the moral virtues which were necessary for a modern social order. What is important to remember about Rousseau's standpoint, which is very unfamiliar to traditional social science, is that he was concerned with the opportunities that would allow for the development of the individual, all individuals, to their fullest capacities. In contrast, the contemporary political behavioralist begins with the assumption of the necessity of social stability and asks how it can best be achieved. Often enough, it appears as if it is achieved at the expense of at least some groups in society. Conditions of economic and social equality, solitude, and respect for persons were part of the conditions required for Rousseau's system of citizenship to work. T. H. Green made an important contribution to one side of the classical case for participation in his theory of political obligation; this theory required that the citizen put into practice a moral theory of the common good. Citizenship was not the highest state of morality for him but enabled the individual to become self-realized, a rational and moral human being. John Dewey made a considerable contribution to the institutional side of the case for participation, strongly promoting the cause of broad scale participatory institutions extending to all levels of government and society. For him they were particularly important at the community level and in educational as well as other social settings.

A second chapter will indicate the conventional position in political science toward "participation." Within this interpretation several variants are apparent, depending upon assessments made about human capacities. I take Robert Dahl's work as representative of the predominant

pluralist interpretation of the American political system. Participation in intermediary institutions is seen as important for maintaining a socially cohesive society, but participation refers to a more limited range of activities than would be encouraged by a radical position. Chiefly, Dahl is unable to deal with the problemmatic in advanced industrial society as many see it; the forms of participation that he suggests are insufficient for resolving the prevalent social conflicts, for they have not basically transformed the limiting and oppressive conditions so that the individual can freely develop and critically appraise his situation. Other social scientists deny effective participation for the mass of individuals altogether. Minimal turnout for presidential elections is regarded as a sign of a "happy" electorate, or "expanded" participation is shown to be inefficient or impractical given the scope of decisions required by the international and national scene. This position is reflected in the interpretations of Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Edward Banfield, for example. But my concern shall be primarily with the "strong" wing of the pluralists, the liberal-pluralist case for expanding opportunities to participate.

There are a set of critics of the pluralist position who correctly appraise, from the standpoint of this study, the political features of the American system but draw mistaken conclusions as to what will effectively remedy the problem. Specifically, I will examine the work of Grant McConnell and Theodore Lowi, the republican interpretation. This interpretation neglects the lead of classical theorists and suggests that participation is a purely rhetorical device with little potential consequences for realizing the public interest. Decentralization, as a

broadly open system of making as many of the political decisions as possible at local levels, is regarded as a ruse by special interests. Centralization becomes a more viable alternative. What happens to the individual personality in the way of becoming more impoverished in his capacities for critical reflection and action, under the political system McConnell and Lowi recommend, is never regarded as a topic of concern.

Another set of critics, a position which we will identify as radical-liberal, however, offers a sensible alternative to the recommendations of McConnell and Lowi. Taking their lead from Schattschneider's important effort to reveal the "mobilization of bias" in the American party and pressure group system, Bachrach and Kaufman are among the first to return to classical theory for elucidating the shortcomings of contemporary democratic theory. Bachrach makes the case for promoting the conditions for self-development and attempts to show how increased opportunities for participation in Baltimore restructure the balance of power in a more democratically favorable way. Kaufman, who is cautious about the benefits to be expected from a broadened scope of participation, nevertheless, feels that participation has a self-fulfilling effect and that it can work if it is believed that it will work. His work more clearly shows, than Bachrach's, what is required of the citizen as a moral agent.

The radical interpretation of advanced industrial society is framed in the work of Herbert Marcuse. Central to his critique is the view that social and political conditions are such that not only is the development of the personality not encouraged, it is outrightly disallowed. Marcuse's pessimism about existing society leads him to recommend a position of refusal or resistance, of non-participation. Participation

within the established framework of politics is "repressive," subject to the consequences of all delusory behavior. I will draw a model of "repressive participation," suggesting the features that make his critique of the liberal-pluralist conception such a controversial, yet, important one.

What this project attempts then, in brief, is a contextual analysis of the contemporary liberal-pluralist conception of participation in order to see to what extent it is challenged or defeated by alternative perspectives. I begin with a preliminary commitment to the ideal of a participatory society as envisioned by the classicists, but I am also alert to the historically-unique conditions of advanced industrial-capitalist society and the important functioning of elites under the social arrangements associated with industrialization, bureaucratization, and urbanization. Initially, I want to suggest the analyses of Bachrach and Kaufman and Marcuse make possible an enriched conception of participation that satisfies both the ideals of the classicists and overrides some of the limiting conditions of present social and political arrangements usually offered as significant objections to it.

I believe that the qualitatively different society that Marcuse imagines as possible would be a truly participatory society, but he has, with his version of critical theory, no leverage for developing constructive strategies for change, nor does he have an explicit moral theory. These matters are correctly identified as the weakest part of Marcuse's philosophy, but, I believe, that a convergence can be worked out between the perspectives of the radical-liberals and Marcuse through other radicals and with the important work currently being done in analytic

philosophy in terms of the concepts of "action" and "intention." The radicals, while identified with Marcuse's critique in essential ways, provide some more developed indications of structures of change. I have in mind, particularly, the work of Andre Gorz, Milton Kotler, and E. F. Schumacher and others. They have been involved, both in theory and practice, in developing participatory structures at the grassroots level, viewing these as ancillary to developing the qualitatively different society.[14] Broad-scale participation in the communities, in the schools and universities, and in other public and private institutions are seen as important experiences for awakening the perception of another way of life.

But, most significantly, it is necessary for developing the social language that is required for guiding human conduct. This is the important point, and so in the concluding chapter, I want to propose a scheme by which forms of participation and non-participation can be understood in terms of being language-constituted. This view recognizes that individuals can only participate to the limit of their linguistic ability. I find Habermas's distinction between the "purposive-rational activity" model and the "communicative interaction" model as particularly suggestive in this discussion. Attention to the role of language in social life, of communicative interaction, suggests new ways for investigating forms of participation in advanced industrial society and

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[14] See Andre Gorz, Strategy for Labor - A Radical Proposal (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) and Socialism and Revolution, Norman Denny tr. (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor, 1973); Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government: The Local Foundations of Political Life (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful-Economics as if People Mattered (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973). Also, see Hunnius, Garson, and Case, eds., Workers' Control - A Reader on Labor and Social Change (New York: Vintage, 1973).

may even, as well, go some way toward reconstituting the prevalent forms of participation now practiced.

CHAPTER II

THE CLASSICAL VISION OF ROUSSEAU, GREEN, AND DEWEY: PARTICIPATION AND THE CONCEPT OF SELF

Introduction

The classical vision of the participatory society has its roots in the French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for it was he who, in an age of social discontent and discontinuity, recognized the plight of modern man in a most prescient, meaningful, and enduring way. He identified the problem of alienation by framing the problem of human society in terms of the dynamic relationship between social structure and personality. Later in his life, Rousseau captured this insight in his Confessions, stating it as the one underlying principle from which all his work flowed. "I had attained the insight," he wrote, "that everything is at bottom dependent on political arrangements, and that no matter what position one takes, a people will never be otherwise than what its form of government makes it."[1] Framed in this way, Rousseau's work becomes a critical tool for examining and appraising the social and political arrangements of advanced industrial society.[2] But this viewpoint has not always been favored.

Rousseau always considered himself an "historian of human nature;" his concerns were precursors to those of philosophical anthropology.

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1 Quoted by Ernest Cassirer in Rousseau, Kant and Goethe--Two Essays (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970 /1945/), p. 27.

2 We would be expecting too much if we seek in his writings constructive strategies as well. The emphasis is provided by Peter Gay in his introduction to Cassirer's The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1963 /1954/), p. 27.

Yet, many whose viewpoints have not been empathetic to Rousseau on this have misunderstood and misappropriated what he wrote. Interpretations have miscast Rousseau as a totalitarian, an irrationalist, a pessimist, a utopian.[3] Having surveyed them, we are no further along in our understanding of the pervasive ills that we sense in our civilization. Another tradition is much more resourceful and acknowledges its debt.[4]

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[3] The literature is abundant and all too familiar: For instance, John W. Chapman, Rousseau: Totalitarian or Liberal? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956); George Lichtheim, "Rousseau and DeMaistre" in The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 123-128; and Judith N. Shklar, Men and Citizens - A Study of Rousseau's Social Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

[4] One must first recognize the debt of Marx to Rousseau and of all the subsequent important sociology and social psychology, including G. H. Mead's. Besides that of Cassirer, constructive interpretations to which I am indebted have been provided by G. D. H. Cole, Robert DeRathe in translation in "Rousseau, Jean-Jacques," International Encyclopedia of Social Science, 13:563-571; and by Marshall Berman's The Politics of Authenticity - Radical Individualism and the Emergence of Modern Society (New York: Atheneum, 1970). Implicit in this tradition is a fascination with concepts of a similar sort: Alienation, exploitation, and repression.

Specific efforts to make Rousseau's concepts more analytically meaningful to the contemporary period have been carried out by the following:

I. Fetcher has made Rousseau's notion of freedom more meaningful by distinguishing the independence of the natural man, the relationships of domination in civil society, and the real freedom available to all when regulated by law in which they have had a hand in making; see, "Rousseau's Concepts of Freedom in the Light of His Philosophy of History," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Nomos IV: Liberty (New York: Atherton, 1967), pp. 49-53.

Brian Barry, in the context of a discussion of the public interest, suggests the fruitfulness of Rousseau's notion of the General Will once his usage is clarified; see, "The Public Interest" in William E. Connolly, ed., The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 168-172.

George Kateb has attempted to put Rousseau's idea of the General Will in more favorable light by showing that distributive "justice," along with the concept of moral autonomy and the concept of fair play are at the center of his concerns, in "Aspects of Rousseau's Political Thought," Political Science Quarterly, 76 (1961):520-521.

Maure L. Goldschmidt persuasively challenges the claim of Rousseau's hostility to intermediary associations and contends that, "Neither as a matter of theory or of practical recommendation does he reject all intermediary associations." See, "Rousseau on Intermediary Associations" in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Nomos XI: Voluntary Associations (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 119-137.

Ernst Cassirer, who comes to Rousseau through Kant, tells us that Kant was one of the few contemporaries of Rousseau who appreciated his true ethical significance; indeed, Kant was to describe Rousseau as the Newton of the moral world.[5] Rousseau challenged his own time, and ours equally as well, with the problem of discovering those conditions that would develop morally autonomous human beings, human beings who would act in regard to each other on the basis of moral principle rather than egotistic self-interest. Trusting his deeper self, Rousseau always doubted the virtues of institutions which fanned illusions and vanities and encouraged people to give the appearance of having lived rather than really living. He had brought into focus the problem of authenticity. According to Berman: "It was only in the second generation of the Enlightenment, through Rousseau, that the search for authenticity came into its own. Rousseau gave it a personal immediacy and urgency that his age could not ignore; he forced his contemporaries to acknowledge that the self was a problem as pressing for them as it was for him. In forcing this problem to the surface of consciousness, moreover, he showed how repressive, how profoundly alien to the self the modern world really was."[6]

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[5] One passage is indicative; Cassirer in his essay, "Rousseau and Kant," writes: "What is truly permanent about human nature is not any condition in which it once existed and from which it has fallen; rather, it is the goal for which and toward which it moves. Kant looks for constancy not in what man is but in what he should be. And Kant credits Rousseau the ethical philosopher with having discerned the 'real man' beneath all the distortions and concealments, beneath all the masks that man has created for himself and worn in the course of his history...", p. 20.

[6] Berman, p. 75.

The alleged ambiguities, paradoxes, and inconsistencies fall into place in Rousseau interpretation when the philosopher is perceived as on a journey of growth himself, tracing out the range of answers to this problem of authenticity. This is the thrust of both Cassirer's and Berman's interpretations of Rousseau's radical individualism. Rousseau's work, I believe, must be appreciated as a comprehensive unity; it is as a single piece of cloth when viewed in terms of the guiding problem which demands solution.

Cassirer brings out the significance of the crystallizing and formative experience which helped to set Rousseau on this path. It occurred on the summer day in 1749 when Rousseau read about the Academy of Dijon's essay competition for which he was to submit his First Discourse. The essay question posed was: "Has the restoration of the sciences and the arts helped to purify morals?" Rousseau later recorded to a friend the moment of insight generated in him by the question he read:

> ...Oh, (Sir), if I could ever have written one fourth of what I had seen and felt under that tree, with what clarity, I should have revealed all the contradictions of the social system: With what force I should have exposed all the abuses of our institutions: With what ease I should have shown that man is naturally good, and that it is through these institutions alone that man became bad.[7]

It was a revolt, perhaps the first moment when one person's self-consciousness became political consciousness.[8] In the contemporary vocabulary of psychology, this was a conversion experience. Cassirer observes: "Indeed it was that moment which decided his fate as a

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[7] The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 47.

[8] This is the theme Berman investigates in The Politics of Authenticity, p. XXIV.

thinker. The question that suddenly confronted him focused all doubts which had previously assailed him on one point.... At a stroke, his feeling became clear and clairvoyant. Rousseau now saw where he stood; he not only felt but he judged and he condemned...."[9] Others would require such an experience as well. Rousseau's more concrete answers as to how individuals might be freed of oppressive institutions were to work themselves out in The Second Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), in Julie, or the New Heloise (1761), in Emile (1762), in the Social Contract, or The Principles of Political Right (1762), and, finally, in the Project of a Constitution for Corsica (1765) and in Considerations on the Government of Poland (1770-1771).

What Rousseau offered his age was an answer that involved a new view of man in his relation to society and God; a new view of the roles for intellect and feeling; a new view of the functions of the family, religion, and the state; and a reasoned critique of inequalities. He asks us, as well, to consider a new definition of "happiness and freedom," what Kant views as a rationalized conception of freedom.[10] Rousseau, ultimately,

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[9] The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pp. 47-48.

[10] Here, Leon Emery suggests Rousseau's meaning of happiness: "It requires a man to be fully conscious of his inner tranquility, and to know that he is exempt from distress or fear, from barren or violent passions. Happiness is the enjoyment of oneself, is an intense and harmonious emotional life; it amounts to 'pulling one's feelings close around the heart,' and enjoying to the full their ardent upswelling...." "Rousseau and the Foundations of Human Regeneration," Yale French Studies, 28 (1960-1961):6. This form of happiness required freedom: "To be free and happy, a man must bear only the chains he knows to be natural, and so does not dream of shaking off." Emery, p. 7. We will see later how closely this conception resembles the Marcusean notions of existentially necessary "sublimation" and historically unnecessary "surplus repression."

asks us to consider whether for this new Being, the price would be too high in giving up the pursuit of pleasure through power; in the loss of some areas of privacy; in the sacrifice of material benefits; in the disposition of certain belief systems; in the loss of a system of social status enjoyed and not enjoyed, and so forth. This question lies behind assessments of interpretations to be examined in this study.

The purpose of this chapter is to project a model of a participatory society that has been assaulted and deformed by the dominant positivist intellectual traditions of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. Rousseau, and after him, T. H. Green and John Dewey, renew our attention in the importance of a society established upon the basis of an intersubjectively-created sense of the common good. Rousseau in the first pages of the Social Contract has, therefore, defined a problem that still merits our consideration: "I mean to inquire if in the civil order, there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration, men being taken as they are and laws as they might be."[11]

First, a brief examination of Rousseau's critique of society in its alienation of the self will be set out to reveal the sources of modern man's troubles. I will then attempt to characterize his chief solution to the problem, the participation of all in the creation of the General Will and what this must require on the part of mortal men and women. Some major objections to this model of society will also be considered.

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[11] Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract and Discourses Tr. and intro. G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), p. 3.

Rousseau's Critique of Modern Political Society

In the preceding section we suggested that, personally and philosophically, Rousseau was concerned with defining freedom in terms of self-realization. This was the postulate which separated Rousseau from the theorists who grounded their theories of the state in necessity or utility. For, Rousseau's contribution to a theory of participatory democracy lies in the intuition of the alienating aspects of a growingly complex, stratified, and achievement-oriented society. Once making the link between the rise of artifice in man's behavior and the structure of inequality in property, power, and status, Rousseau had to go on to pose the possibility of a more rational and, therefore, valid social arrangement--one that involved a form of participation and a commitment to it that can only seem curious to many from the present-day nihilistic perspective.

The unraveling of the conception provided by the Social Contract lay in the description of the problem: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains." A metaphor more historically provocative would be difficult to conceive.

The opening paragraphs of the Contract focus on one of the chief paradoxes of social life, and one of the great social lies--the incessant claim in social discourse and behavior that man is "free," perhaps even that he has free will, and the recognition (for some at least) that such a claim only provides a comfortable illusion to his real, class-bound existence. More formally stated, Rousseau's remarks are a direct attack on the basic presuppositions of classical liberal democratic theory, which has a fairly coherent view of man in the universe as shown by C. B. Macpherson

and Steven Lukes. This is a static, mechanistic, Newtonian, first cause view of the universe in which figures the "abstract individual;" these individuals are deemed to possess, according to Lukes, "'independent centres of consciousness,' and have given, non-context-dependent interests, wants, motives, purposes, needs, etc."[12] Lukes' Individualism helpfully probes, in this context, the conflation of these several unit-ideas in classical liberal theory to make much clearer the dubious commitments the distinct ideals entail. Much of Rousseau's work, and perhaps the measure of his rhetorical capacity as well, is his ability to accomplish just that and to show the falling of the atomic view of man--to draw the tensions between appearances and realities, the disjunctions between Seeming and Being. Such disjunctions are embedded in his use of irony, the double perspective, and the apparent contradictions, and it is the source of his cynicism and hope.[13]

The arts and the sciences are the target of all that has gone wrong with man and society in the First Discourse. They have created masks behind which modern man can hide; perhaps the point may be drawn from the following passages:

> So long as government and law provide for the security and well-being of men in their common life, the arts, literature, and the sciences, less despotic though perhaps more powerful, fling garlands of flowers over the chains which weigh them down. They stifle in men's breasts that sense of original liberty, for which they seem to have been born; cause them to love their own slavery, and so make of them what is called a civilized people.

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12 Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973), pp. 138-139 and passim.

13 Roger D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 210, 211, 213.

> Human nature was not at bottom better than now; but men found their security in the ease with which they could see through one another, and this advantage, of which we no longer feel the value, prevented their having many vices. (And in a footnote in reference to the American Indian he asks: "What yoke, indeed, can be imposed on men who stand in need of nothing?")
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> Politeness requires this thing; decorum that; ceremony has its forms, and fashion its laws, and these we must always follow, never the promptings of our own nature.
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> * * *
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> We no longer dare what we really are, but lie under a perpetual restraint; in the meantime the herd of men, which we call society, all act under the same circumstances exactly alike, unless very particular and powerful motives prevent them....[14]

The arts and sciences have had the effect of corrupting man, of nurturing vices rather than virtues; there is the "appearance of all the virtues, without being in the possession of one of them."[15] Rousseau follows with an historical examination of civilizations. When culture (useless knowledge) flourished the great empires, like Egypt, Greece, Rome, and the Eastern Empire, began to crumble. Under these conditions the true virtues, which will make for an enduring and self-satisfying society, go unhonored: "A wise man does not go in chase of fortune; but he is by no means insensible to glory, and when he sees it so ill-distributed, his virtue, which might have been animated by a little emulation, and turned to the advantage of society, droops and dies away in obscurity and indigence...."[16] Surely this statement appears rhetorical, but the

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[14] The First Discourse (Cole Edition), pp. 147-149.

[15] Ibid., p. 147.

[16] Ibid., pp. 168-169.

rudiments of a critical theory of culture and personality, which will later be unfolded by Marcuse's synthesis of Marx and Freud, are here. The failure of citizenship to materialize can be found in these conditions; Rousseau's passage continues:

> It is for this reason that the agreeable arts must in time everywhere be preferred to the useful; and this truth has been but too much confirmed since the revival of the arts and sciences. We have physicists, geometricians, chemists, astronomers, poets, musicians, and painters in plenty; but we have no longer a citizen among us; or if there be found a few scattered over our abandoned countryside, they are left to perish there unnoticed and neglected.[17]

Aspects of the socialization process have had the effect of making men mean, corrupt, and miserable, rather than simple, courageous, and virtuous. Worse than this they have become specialists and are no longer comprehensivists. Man's natural being, and his natural needs, and his natural potentialities, have been usurped by artifice and artificial wants.

Man is chained, in a psychic sense, by all sorts of cultural techniques and other symbolisms, including language--but he is also chained, in a more physically real sense, by certain conditions associated with civil society. By the Second Discourse Rousseau's thought has taken on more positive and radical content, and there is the recognition of the inevitability and the necessity of society. The ornaments of culture are useful for veiling and deflecting truths and, in general, for reproducing the society itself.[18] But these are still only the manifestations of an alienating society. The root cause of its instability and of unfreedom

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[17] Ibid., p. 169.

[18] Rousseau writes: "We should see the magistrates fomenting everything that might weaken men united in society, by promoting dissension among them; everything that might sow in it the seeds of actual division,

is inequality, which has its origin in property and the first act of possession. Accompanying the structure of inequality of property come the differentials in prestige and power.

The Second Discourse is, in essence, a hypothetical account of how natural man progressed to the point where he was able to make the claim, "This is mine," and have others accept this declamation. According to Rousseau's conjectures, from this moment on the tendency towards greater and greater extremes of inequality moved inexorably onwards. Social distinctions cultivated the vices of vanity and contempt, shame and envy.[19] The distribution of property, which came with its cultivation and the division of labor, necessitated a system of justice, but there were no forces to sustain the side of equality:

> In this state of affairs, equality might have been sustained, had the talents of individuals been equal, and had, for example, the use of iron and the consumption of commodities always exactly balanced each other; but, as there was nothing to preserve this balance, it was soon disturbed; the strongest did most work; the most skillful turned his labour to best account; the most ingenuous devised methods of diminishing his labour; the husbandman wanted more iron, or the smith more corn, and, while both laboured equally, the one gained a great deal by his work, while the other could hardly support himself.[20]

Education only served to increase diversity and the distances between individuals.[21] The process generates extremes of sufficient force to demand some ameliorative solution, and thus, government is born: "All ran headlong to their chains, in hopes of securing their liberty; for they had just wit enough to perceive the advantages of political

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while it gave society the air of harmony everything that might inspire the different ranks of people with mutual hatred and distrust by setting the rights and interests of one against those of another, and so strengthen the power which comprehends them all." Second Discourse (Cole edition), pp. 267-268.

19 Ibid., p. 241.

20 Ibid., pp. 246-247.

21 Ibid., p. 251.

institutions, without experience enough to enable them to foresee the dangers.[22] "The most capable of foreseeing the dangers," according to Rousseau, "were the very persons who expected to benefit by them; and even the most prudent judged it not expedient to sacrifice one part of their freedom to ensure the rest; as a wounded man has his arm cut off to save the rest of his body."[23] It was only a few short steps to wars between nations and ultimate tyranny.

The problem of the origin of society and state which Rousseau is trying to explain, perhaps, fails to be satisfying today. Marx's historical dialectical explanation, for instance, stands out as more empirically accurate. But it is important to remember that Rousseau is also constrained by responding in the format of a problem set before him by Hobbes and Locke. The view of human nature, of reason and sentiment, and of possibility, however, were respectively distinct. Unlike the static view of human nature assumed by his predecessors, Rousseau had, through introspection, given attention to the malleability of the instincts and impulses under varying conditions. Or as, Stuart Hampshire now phrases this, "A reflective man is aware that he would have recognized, and acted from, other motives in himself if he had been born and formed in other circumstances...."[24] He could see that the human creature was innately susceptible to socialization by his environment and that language (symbolism, broadly) played a most important role.[25] The worst problem of corrupting society was that of its unhealthy competitiveness as the

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking, 1963), p. 244.

[25] Second Discourse, pp. 216-217.

feeling of "amour-propre," egoism and pride, replaced the natural feeling of "amour de soi," self-love or self-respect.[26] Under institutionalized arrangements, man became "the infinite appropriator," "the infinite consumer," to use C. B. Macpherson's opprobriative terms, as needs and wants became externalized.[27] An artificial, ascribed-status or a contrived, achievement-status system must bear the onus for stunting the growth of the complete person who can trust his own instincts and impulses to satisfy his life processes. In the long run, what Rousseau foresaw for civil society was a state of affairs very much like that of Hobbes' state of nature unless some insight could be obtained to transcend the pettiness, and the tyrannies, of the presumably urbane and cosmopolitan existence.

In attaching meaning to the socialization processes of culture and the degenerative aspects of inequality, Rousseau was able to place great significance on the impact of social arrangements in fostering the emergence of individually- and socially-harmful behavioral characteristics. Freud was to capture this same process in his distinction of the conscious and the unconscious and the role of the mechanism of repression. Culture could then be viewed in its manipulative aspects, and inequality in status,

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[26] Self-respect, for Rousseau, "is a natural feeling which leads every animal to look to its own preservation, and which guided in man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue." Egoism, which Rousseau claims has no need of existence in primitive society, "is a purely relative and factitious feeling, which arises in the state of society, leads each individual to make more of himself than of any other, causes all the mutual damage men inflict on one another, and is the real source of the 'sense of honor.'" p. 223.

[27] C. B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), Essay II, "Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology," pp. 24-38.

wealth, and power could be seen for its more pernicious effects in exciting rancorous conflict.

These insights could not have been achieved had not Rousseau held two important conceptions. The first is an evolutionary and morphological conception of social institutions, which Berman's reading discovers as much as my own. Berman says, Rousseau's was "the celebration of man's historicity."[28] Man was a structuring force in the universe, not merely a God-given object in it. The second was a genetic or developmental concept of man, such as can be followed through in the compelling work on moral development of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, and it is to be found as well in the writings of psychoanalysts such as Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Carl Rogers.[29]

These assumptions are what constituted the unique perspective of Rousseau. How did he come by them?--Perhaps, through accident in the selection of "natural" as opposed to mechanistic models. Such seems to be the apparent bias of his metaphors and analogies. As some of his commentators have pointed out, Rousseau had cut through centuries of thought and returned to the models of Plato and Aristotle. Rousseau, as De Jouvenal has significantly pointed out, was "the first great exponent of social evolution."[30]

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[28] Berman, pp. 146-149.

[29] For instance, the closeness is suggested by a consideration Rogers proposes: "Do we dare to generalize from this type of experience that if we cut through deeply enough to our organismic nature, that we find that man is a positive and social animal? This is the suggestion from our clinical experience." In On Becoming A Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 103. It must be kept clear, however, that Rousseau has both a psychology and a moral theory; this distinction seems to be confused in Rogers.

[30] Bertrand De Jouvenal, "Rousseau the Pessimistic Evolutionist,"

Rousseau's Solution: The Idea of the Social Contract

The Social Contract framed one answer to Rousseau's problem: "The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each association, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before."[31] What would seem to be enigmatic on the face, can be better understood by considering what is required of individuals and, therefore, what is gained and lost in the process.

If another sort of happiness and freedom was to be desired, a more simple and natural life of virtue, what was the course open to the individual? As many have recognized, there are two apparent solutions in the writings of Rousseau. He never seemed to consider as realistic or desirable a return to nature.[32] Perhaps a retreat to some commune might have made sense to him, but of this one cannot be certain.

There is, first, the choice of the life of "natural man" in the classical sense, the life personified by Emile who is reared in a carefully determined environment in isolation from society. Emile becomes forever the "amiable foreigner." The significance of his isolation was to show the corrupting strength of existing institutions, which was

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Yale French Studies, 28 (1961-1962):83. And Masters, p. 223, for his interpretation of the important role of history in Rousseau's thought. Cf. Shklar's interpretation which takes Rousseau to be a-historical and sees him as engaging in the construction of a timeless utopia, Men and Citizens, chap. 1.

[31] The Social Contract (Cole edition), pp. 13-14.

[32] Appendix to the Second Discourse (Cole edition), pp. 281-282.

abundantly evident in the very inauthentic and mutilated self Julie became in La Nouvelle Heloise. That this could be a seriously considered alternative does not seem probable to me, and this is Berman's account as well: "Authentic action would have to be interaction. Only through unity with others could the uniqueness of the self emerge."[33] But, there was "a profound contradiction between the human need for mutuality and the social tendency to convert all human relations into mutual exploitation...," and so Rousseau's partial hope was that the romantic relationship would provide a kind of paradigm, in the sharing of meanings and a trust of motives, for the kind of interaction that was more broadly required for a larger community.[34] According to the account, then, political consciousness accrued in steps. First was the internal awareness that came with anxiety. Next came the attempt to capture and realize one's identity with and through another; this was the experience of "the authentic person." One's self-identity had to be confirmed by others: "What they would not recognize, he could not assert."[35] Finally came the broader kind of authenticity derived as a participating member of a community. This was the experience of "the authentic citizen."

This last stage was the second model that Rousseau pursued in his political, as opposed to fictionalized, writings. It figures as strongly in his practical pieces intended as guides to action, his writings for Poland and Corsica, as it does in the Contract. This is the model of a society of an active, participating, moral citizenry.

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[33] Berman, p. 188.

[34] Ibid., p. 188.

[35] Ibid., p. 103.

In contrast to the worst forms of internal and external tyranny that could be generated in modern states by a practice of everyone pursuing his own self-interest ("amour propre") and an ideology that encouraged it, stood Rousseau's answer. Rousseau's critical powers had allowed him to postulate a synergistic possibility--that several ingredients could be more enhanced in combination than any singly. This was the original nature of the conception projected by Rousseau's new use of the social contract.[36]

The notion of the social contract had utility in suggesting some means by which society first occurred and made social ties between members possible. This was the familiar approach for political philosophers of the time. Once Rousseau could explain human association, it was possible to distinguish between particular wills, the will of all, and the General Will. Moreover, he could particularly show the inadequacy of the social theory of classical liberalism which predicated itself on a concept of a public interest as the mere sum of the particular interests.

Essential to the hypothesis of the General Will, as the basis for a good political order, was the notion that a rational order, in contrast to the order achieved in the natural state and the disorder of chaotic claims that characterized civil society, could be achieved by replacing physical force (coercion, which was necessary to maintain the multitude of warring fantasies) with moral force. And this is what makes Rousseau's

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[36] The conditions Rousseau presumed under which the contract would take effect must be pointed out. In order to restrict the privileged and powerful minority, a proper economic and educational environment had to be established. Rousseau, while requiring a relatively equal economic structure, did not reject the private property system and, instead, called for a progressive tax policy.

consensus a "moral" one; it is a community consensus in which each person votes for a policy that he is willing to live with if everybody else will abide by it. The moral force is obtained when everyone recognizes that in giving himself up to the common good, he gives up nothing. That on this basis each obtains equality, not under domination as a subjugated being, but equality before the law that they have all participated in making and know the true reasons for obeying.

Only in the legitimate state, the state based on right, in which a policy represented the interests of everyone in common could it be said that a General Will existed. Its elements can be seen from Rousseau's own statement:

> The undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves. Why is it that the general will is always in the right, and that all continually will the happiness of each one, unless it is because there is not a man who does not think of "each" as meaning him, and consider himself in voting for all? This proves that equality of rights and the idea of justice which such equality creates originate in the preference each man gives to himself, and accordingly in the very nature of man. It proves that the general will, to be really such, must be general in its object as well as its essence; that it must both come from all and apply to all; and that it loses its natural rectitude when it is directed to some particular and determinate object, because in such a case we are judging of something foreign to us, and have no true principle of equity to guide us.[37]

This was the ethical premise at the basis of the social contract; the emphatic position of everyone to every other made possible the establishment of universally-applicable rules for governing behavior. What is required of the individual is made clear in Brian Barry's essay which

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37 Social Contract (Cole edition), Book II, chap. IV, p. 29.

develops the contrasting meanings of the public interest:

> ...Rousseau calls for the citizen's deliberations to comprise two elements: (a) The decision to forego (either as unattainable or as immoral) policies which would be in one's own personal interest alone, or in the common interest of a group smaller than the whole, and (b) the attempt to calculate which, of the various lines of policy that would affect oneself equally with all others, is best for him (and, since others are like him, for others.[38]

Attention was now drawn to the "reflexive mood," to use Mead's terms. Empathy and true communication were the keys to any success this deliberative process might enjoy. Attentiveness would have to be given to encouraging the art of dialogue, the art of conversation, and full access to pertinent information would be necessitated as well. Finally, Rousseau had a place for solitude as a necessary condition for independent reflection to occur.

Who should participate? According to the formula of the Port Huron Statement, "Everyone should participate in the decisions that affect one's life." Rousseau's view was apparently more inclusive; he would, for instance, have excluded women from an active role in the political circles or from participating in other ways in the life of the community. But this discriminatory policy is not required by his theory and hardly seems justifiable in terms of his own recognition of the nature of the General Will. For, as Barry brings out, the General Will would represent a "single policy which is equally in the interests of all members of the group," and "only where all are equally affected by the policy adopted can an equitable solution be expected."[39]

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[38] Brian Barry, "The Public Interest," in Bias of Pluralism, pp. 159-177.

[39] Ibid., pp. 169-170.

Also, the General Will cannot be expressed when all who are affected and allowed to participate do not do so. To insure equality, that is that everyone have the same chance as everyone else to determine the General Will, Rousseau adamantly required one-hundred percent participation by the citizenry.[40] And to encourage the participation of all he proposed an incentive system based on the public awarding of civic prizes and honors. This was the only opportunity for inequalities to express themselves in Rousseau's society.

There is one other important aspect of Rousseau's citizen that must be noted, for it is also a view that tends to be discounted and criticized quite frequently, especially by political scientists. That is the strong emphasis placed on the citizen to be "omnicompetent." The omnicompetent citizen was necessary to overcome particularist forces in society. The following is an excerpt from the Considerations on the Government of Poland:

> Our distinction between the legal and military castles was unknown to the ancients. Citizens were neither lawyers nor priests by profession; they performed all these functions as a matter of duty. That is the real secret of making everything proceed toward the common goal, and of preventing the spirit of faction from taking root at the expense of patriotism, so that the hydr of chicanery will not devour a nation.[41]

Rousseau saw sufficient evidence to fear several forces in society: The bureaucracy, the military, the legal profession, and the church, as well

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[40] Unanimity of vote was not required; the majority rule principle seemed to be acceptable to him; but it mattered that every vote was counted. Social Contract (Cole edition), Book II, chap. iii.

[41] Quoted by Goldschmidt, p. 133.

as economic monopolies. "His hope," according to Goldschmidt, "was that the ordinary citizen could overcome the specialization of labor to the extent that he could perform interchangeably a wide range of government functions."[42] But this is also very much a part of Rousseau's notion of a complete and self-sufficient person as well. In his sense of a good citizen, the individual could not be allowed to beg off, to claim that he is ignorant, indifferent, or unconsidered on this or that issue. It was his responsibility in order to enjoy the benefits of a well-run society, which contributed to his own well-being to participate in a meaningful and involved way, to become a deliberative human being.

The requirement of omnicompetence has been mistakenly, I believe, viewed as requiring repression of one's private life of such a drastic sort so as not to seem viable.[43] It has also been argued that there are other activities as well, besides the political, which many or most individuals like to spend their time.[44] What Rousseau was arguing was

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[42] Emphasis added. Goldschmidt, p. 133.

[43] According to Shklar, for instance, the citizen "loses himself in" or is "absorbed by" the polity in a total and complete sense: "...the individual loses his personal identity and becomes a part of a purposive social unit. Here alone the group absorbs all his resources, emotional as well as physical." Men and Citizens, p. 15. The problem of this interpretation lies in continuing to view the individual as a dependent and passive creature, which he cannot be under Rousseau's regime.

[44] According to Michael Walzer, many have found other ways to cope short of being militant activists: "They stay away not because they are beaten, afraid, uneducated, lacking confidence and skills (though these are often important reasons), but because they have made other commitments...." "A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen," Dissent, 15 (May-June 1968):246. Here Walzer hopes to argue that these nonparticipants (by choice) have rights too. In stressing their rights, he neglects their obligations. In general, the point that some limits have to be found is acceptable, but I believe it was one that Rousseau was aware of. Rousseau is unconcerned with dogmas and ideas except insofar as "they have reference to morality and to the duties which he who professes them is bound to do to others." Social Contract, Book IV, chap. viii, p. 139.

that the political life was important and necessary to the entire structuring of one's life circumstances. In Dewey's terms his concern was the nature of one's "conduct"--the underlying tendency of one's acts.[45] Once the proper direction had been set, perhaps, it would become more likely that the individual would have greater time for his personal enterprises. Rousseau was so heavy-handed in his denial of private activities, because he was most conscious and fearful of the degenerative forces that always lurked within society. If one was not constantly concerned with this aspect, then one could only blame himself for the fragmented, limited, and probably unhappy existence he would have. But even this view, as Rousseau would point out, cannot be tolerated very long for its inherent selfishness. Aside from this argument, Rousseau's Contract allowed the person the freedom to leave, a freedom not allowed by the Soviet Union's policy of restricted emigration, for instance.

In the respect that individuals obeyed the laws, they were subjects, but in the respect that they made these laws they were sovereign. Sovereignty could be said to be lodged in them. In sum, sovereignty was inalienable, indivisible, and could not be represented. This distinction made it possible, as T. H. Green has shown, to abandon the Hobbesien and Lockean arguments of obligation or resistance to the sovereign. Such notions were now fiction; one would, of course, obey oneself or what was in one's interest.

The reinterpretation of sovereignty was not unimportant in Rousseau's

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[45] John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), p. 11.

schema in another way. It is closely related to Rousseau's attitude to social institutions in general. While it seems to be in the nature of social institutions to require authority relationships that stress the obedience of one man to another, it is each man alone and not his institutions (any cabinet, committee, board or any principle of majority rule) that is held ultimately accountable for his actions. This is taken to be the meaning of the Nuremburg Trials, and painful reminders of the difficulty of learning this lesson are found in the My Lai massacre. Historical example demonstrates so well how institutions benefit by creating the belief that obligation, allegiance, is owed to them solely. In this illusion they create both heroes and victims. Rousseau was well aware of this gambit, and for this reason certain institutions, in his view, were circumspect.[46] When they destroyed social unity by setting man against man, group against group, or by fragmenting man himself, institutions were dangerous.

While his ascerbic chapter on Christianity in the Contract stands out, along with his famous phrase of "forcing man to be free" as the height of intolerance for many interpretors, the assumed paradox--of his presumably disguised totalitarianism--becomes comprehensible. Thus, when Rousseau emphasized, "All that destroys social unity is worthless, all institutions that set man in contradiction to himself are worthless," he was enjoining his reader to give concern to the problem of the social control of necessary, but, nevertheless, still sometimes possibly rabid

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[46] Established religion was perhaps his favorite target: "Christianity preaches only servitude and dependence. Its spirit is so favorable to tyranny that it always profits by such a regime. True Christians are made to be slaves, and they know it and do not much mind: This short life counts for too little in their eyes...." Social Contract, Book IV, chap. viii, pp. 137-138.

institutions, and the Catholic Church, for him, was a good example of the ill-effects of license practiced as tolerance.[47] If man was to be truly sovereign, in the sense that Rousseau intended, he surely could not let his institutions get out of control. Rousseau was not against intermediary associations per se. Indeed, he viewed some, like the political circles of Paris, as important associations for promoting meaningful conversation and a sense of mutual respect. He was hostile only to those that generated animosities within or between societies. This view was strengthened by his appreciation for decentralized and federalized arrangements.[48]

Rousseau's appreciation of citizenship rested not merely on its value as a virtue, and a lost one at that, but as a right. The goal of society was not something ulterior to the individual; it was the individual himself. Rights secured this end. Rights recognized the rights of others; all, therefore, found themselves on a footing of equality. Rights also bring with them corresponding duties, this aspect placed serious requirements on the time, energies, and capacities of each of the individuals that made up that community or society. But the exchange could be considered worthwhile. The individual was recreated anew; as a citizen, he

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47 "Wherever theological intolerance is admitted, it must inevitably have some civil effect; and as soon as it has such an effect, the Sovereign is no longer Sovereign even in the temporal sphere: Thenceforth priests are the real masters, and kings only their ministers." Social Contract (Cole edition), Book IV, chap. viii, p. 140.

48 See The Considerations on the Government of Poland, chap. V, "The Radical Defect," in Frederick Watkins' (tr. and ed.), Rousseau-Political Writings (New York: Nelson, 1953).

received a non-threatening social order, a setting in which he was needed and valued and in which he could be sure that his faculties have been encouraged to grow and blossom. The demands made upon him would be of a worthwhile rather than of a benign or impairing sort. Rousseau had gone beyond the traditional view of letting the individual alone, toward the view that the proper conditions will help to nurture the human personality. He had moved in the direction of a radical liberalism. Nevertheless, the balance point between individual and society had not come to rest. Rousseau had, however, marked some important routes for more careful charting. Under the conditions of his social contract, power struggles would be mitigated. And when, power, like wealth, is distributed so that no one has more of an advantage than anyone else, then the conditions have been established for a rational and moral society in which all individuals have the opportunity to develop their intellectual capacities and sensibilities to the fullest.

T. H. Green's Contribution to a Participatory Theory of Society

T. H. Green, an overlooked political theorist, also offers an important contribution to developing the model of a participatory society patterned after the classical Greek city-state.[49] It would be proper today to disparage the idealism that he assumes, except that if we desire a more rational basis for making social policy, we have something to learn from this maligned position, particularly as it sheds light for a philosophy of mind.

Green, much more than John Stuart Mill, recognized the dilemma of the individual versus society. The problem with Mill, Green asserted, is that he had no clear philosophy of rights.[50] This recognition set the way for Green to come down firmly on behalf of the realization of the Self as the telos of the individual, just as realization of the Common Good was the telos of the society. Ethics and politics were connected. The result was a penetrating critique of the whole empiricist tradition, a critique which has been resumed only recently in works in moral philosophy. Green's position also offers effective complimentarity to the materialist position of Marxism which must deserve serious critique in at least one aspect. That Marx misjudged the limits of action generated by one's class position bespeaks the need to focus more attention

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[49] This is an adaptation from my paper, "Thomas Hill Green: The Community of the Good as a Basis for Political Obligation." An important reference to his ideas, not noted here, is Melvin Richter. The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[50] Green criticized Mill for having "no clear philosophy of rights, through which alone the conception of liberty attains a concrete meaning; he had no clear idea of that social whole in whose realization the false antithesis of 'state' and 'individual' disappears." Ernest Barker, Political Thought in England: 1848-1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1928, 2nd ed.), p. 4.

on the cognitive processes that Green prompts.

In the problem of the self, Green recognized that new categories for explaining the special nature of mental phenomena and of their interrelation were needed.[51] Green sought to do this by showing that social relations are the product of consciousness, and consciousness was the special agency of society. In other words, the ties between man and his society were obtained through the one unique feature that distinguished man from the animal world, his power of cognition. The activity of thought is the unifying principle of consciousness. This consciousness brings with it the power to frame ideals, which Green considered to be the essence of man's nature. The self is a social self; thought and practice weave dialectically:

> The common element to both (theoretical speculation and practical willing) lies in the consciousness of a self and a world as in a sense opposed to each other, and in the conscious effort to overcome this opposition. ...One (i.e., speculation) is the effort of such consciousness to take the world into itself, the other (i.e., willing) its effort to carry itself out into the world. ...Neither action can really be exerted without calling the other into play.[52]

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51 G. H. Sabine, "The Social Origins of Absolute Idealism," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 12 (1915):172-173. Essential aspects of Green's complete philosophy include: A theology, an organic conception of society and a progressive view of history, a view of rights as derivative from society, and the notion of a non-competitive Common Good (derived largely from Rousseau's General Will) communicating itself to man by his reason and acted upon by his will. The Common Good was another of Green's rejections of Utilitarianism and its principle "the greatest good for the greatest number."

52 John R. Rodman, ed., The Political Theory of T. H. Green - Selected Writings (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), "Introduction," p. 35.

Green seems to suggest that rights only emerge around points of agreement in the social consciousness. One cannot have a right except as a member of society. Rights and obligations, as the concrete form that freedom takes in modern society, then, only arise in such conditions of consciousness. A level of societal development can, therefore, be measured by the degree to which the Common Good is rationalized. And, it follows that a person is judged in terms of the level of desires he pursues--his degree of rationality in promoting the Common Good of the society, hence his own self-realization.[53]

The function of the state makes it possible for men to realize their highest potentialities; the state is the highest realization because of its degree of comprehensiveness. (One might wonder why a conception of a "universal brotherhood" was not superior for Green. There are some suggestions that it might be, but his own time was organized according to states.) The process began at lower levels of organization, in primary and secondary groupings. It is the function of the state through legislation, the concrete embodiment of the Common Good, to set the conditions for the telos of the individual, his self-realization.[54] The law could only set the conditions as a contribution to the fulfillment of self, moral development; it could do no more than that.

The role of the citizen was not merely to obey the laws of his state, therefore: "If he is to have a higher feeling of political duty, he must

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53 Sabine, p. 174. There is some question, however, as to what extent Green's concept of self-realization had meaningful content. Dewey, for instance, sought to be less metaphysical and sought to give it a more concrete and practical content.

54 "It is the business of the state...to maintain the conditions without which a free exercise of the human faculties is impossible." Quoted by Sabine (from Green's Works, 3:374), p. 171.

take part in the work of the state." Citizenship, as the formulation of public policy, was the important sphere of rational activity, for it was the activity which discerned the Common Good as a regulative principle and made it more and more determinate. In certain situations, Green observed, the duty of citizenship might even require disobedience. The function of participation was a process of developing intelligence, refining appropriate concepts for legislating, and weeding away the anachronistic ideas. Citizenship is neither a means nor an end. As Sabine says, "Full moral participation in a social life was for Green the highest form of self-development, and to create the possibility of such participation was the end of liberal society."[55] Only through this activity could a more proximate harmony be achieved between the Ought and the Is.

On several important grounds Green shared a close and sympathetic kinship to Rousseau--in their critiques of empiricism and utilitarian ethics, in their theory of the state, and in their radical individualism. Yet, Green also offered some angles to his interpretation that go a good distance to offset some of the totalitarian aspects alleged in Rousseau. In several ways his work helps us to extend and modify the model of Rousseau:

1. Green, with more realism, was not constructing a version of a utopia but making the General Will (the Common Good) an idea applicable to a real, imperfectly realized society. He saw society as a process to be worked at. In this view he was also rejecting an appeal to the rapid, uncontrollable measures of violent means as, for instance, proposed by socialists. (Rousseau, similarly, was opposed to rapid social change,

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[55] George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965; 3rd ed.), p. 728.

but this becomes more apparent in his essay on Poland than in the Social Contract.)

2. Green makes a better case than Rousseau for participation in local settings, seeing participation at this level of governance as an important stage for the development of the personality. He argued that from this experience broader experiences could be encouraged.

3. The Common Good may gain some content in Green. Its sole goal is the fostering of all individual's self-development regardless of class. This meant for Green the justification of state interference, and he strongly advocated legislation that expanded widely the franchise and secured the conditions of equal opportunity. Essential was an educational system that destroyed privilege. He sought to promote the representation of all interests in the determination of social policy, generally. As Holloway notes, Green's recognition was that, "Deprivation was a matter of values and interests as well as jobs, wages, and housing.... The worker as much as the 'gentleman' should be able to participate in the cultural values of his society and to thereby build a better character."[56] As a reformist in theory and practice, he affirmed liberal values in ways beyond which most liberals of his day, including J. S. Mill, were willing to go. The vision Green charts in these areas would not suggest the same domain of completeness, therefore, as exercised by Rousseau's General Will. In other respects we see a stronger liberalism: Green feared the socialization of private property and sought to remedy the ills of inequalities here by expanding private

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[56] Harry Holloway, "Mill and Green on the Modern Welfare State," Western Political Quarterly, 13 (June 1960): 398.

ownership and resisting concentration. The one apparent lapse in the guarantees of liberties was occasioned by his frustrations with drunken workers, when he advocated temperance. Still, Green, perhaps, might have done more with making a case for the protection of a domain for private life.

4. Perhaps important, finally, was the spirit of hopefulness even in the face of misfortune that Green's own political involvement and his writings exhibit.

John Dewey's Contribution to a Participatory Model

Like Rousseau and Green, John Dewey linked participation in community life with the growth of the self. He did so on the basis of a revision of English Idealism, particularly as it appeared in T. H. Green. Dewey called his philosophy "instrumentalism;" it was a method by which individuals through the application of intelligence could change society. The emphasis he placed on philosophy's task to change reality grew out of his naturalist perspective, a view of life as an ever-changing organic process. Life was a process, and growth was the ultimate good and the measure of social justice.

Dewey, then, began his long philosophical and activist career by subjecting to critical examination the concept of self-realization which he accepted as an ideal but rejected in content in Green's formulation. (More importantly, he rejected the metaphysical idea of an absolute Eternal Consciousness.) A series of articles showed that the self had no meaning as a presupposed or fixed schema that was to be "filled in."[57] Instead, he proposed the notion of a working or practical self. The self was "a concrete specific activity;" self and realization are not separated but identified:

> To realize capacity does not mean, therefore, to act so as to fill up some presupposed ideal self. It means to act at the height of action, to realize its full meaning.[58]

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57 John Dewey, "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive," Philosophical Review, I (1892):593-612, and "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal," Philosophical Review, II (1893):652-664. Also, "The Philosophy of T. H. Green," Andover Review, XI (1889):337-355; "Some Current Conceptions of the Term 'Self'," Mind, XV (1890):58-74.

58 "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal," p. 659.

What Dewey was arguing for was the notion of a "working ideal" of the self as opposed to a "fixed ideal." The problem with the later conception was that it fractured the individual's consciousness in an unnatural way. Dewey suggested that Green's self had difficulty avoiding some action for selfish purposes. As Dewey pointed out, any action becomes moral only insofar as it is done for its own concrete sake. Thus, the self must be viewed as an active agent:

> It's not action for the self that is required (thus setting up a fixed self which is simply going to get something more, wealth, pleasure, morality, or whatever), but action as the self. To find the self in the highest and fullest activity possible at the time, and to perform the act in the consciousness of its complete identification with self (which means, I take it, with complete interest) is morality, and is realization.[59]

Given the opportunities, the human being is able to develop his/her personality more and more fully. That was just the problem for Dewey as he turned from philosophy to the social issues of his day: Where were the opportunities for self-realization? According to his theory of knowledge, knowledge was a social, an associational enterprise. He knew well that the high level of industrialization was foremost a product of sharing. Why did this not occur in regard to social ideas and social practice?

The Public and Its Problems suggests that a disjunction occurred in modern society between the capacities for industrial growth and in the attitudes and institutions needed to respond to it; in other words, there was a cultural lag. When Dewey searched for the "public," he discovered

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[59] Ibid., pp. 661-662.

no single body; what he found was "uncertain and obscure," "confused and eclipsed."[60] What happened was that industrial development had acted as a disintegrating force on the small community and made difficult the generation of a Great Community. Dewey viewed this core situation as at the root of democracy's problems.

Many forces worked against a reorganization of publics and the public.

1. Effective political interests (his paradigm cases are the criminal band, the rapacious corporation, and the self-seeking political machine) were able to dominate the situation. For this reason the state had to have a larger role than accorded by pluralist theory (the role of umpire).

2. Reliance on experts, the faith in technologists, Dewey viewed as a dangerous revival of the Platonic philosopher-king: "In the degree in which they become a specialized class, they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve."[61]

3. Political apathy is, under this static and unvitalized social structure, fostered. According to Dewey, "Political apathy, which is a natural product of the discrepancies between actual practices and traditional machinery, ensues from inability to identify one's self with definite issues. These are hard to find and locate in the vast complexities of current life."[62]

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[60] John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1927), chap. IV, pp. 120-121.

[61] Ibid., p. 206.

[62] Ibid., pp. 134-135.

4. In his lecture, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Dewey also made note of conscious efforts to restrict participation, pointing out as well its negative effects for the whole social body.[63]

5. The situation is further aggravated when cheap amusements shove "the political elements in the constitution of the human being, those having to do with citizenship" to one side.[64] Our existing state of social knowledge is inchoate: "Our Babel is not one of tongues but of the signs and symbols without which shared experience is possible."[65] In Liberalism and Social Action Dewey again affirms that there is not a social order that has for one of its chief purposes the establishment of conditions that will move the mass of individuals to appropriate and use what is at hand."[66]

The need was for a "radical liberalism." "If radicalism be defined," he wrote, "as perception of need for radical change, then today any liberalism which is not also radicalism is irrelevant and doomed."[67] This

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63 Dewey's passage is worth reiterating: "The very fact of exclusion from participation is a subtle form of suppression. It gives individuals no opportunity to reflect and decide upon what is good for them. Others who are supposed to be wiser and who in any case have more power decide the question for them and also decide the methods and means by which subjects may arrive at the enjoyment of what is good for them. This form of coercion and suppression is more subtle and more effective than is overt intimidation and restraint. When it is habitual and embodied in social institutions, it seems the normal and natural state of affairs. The mass usually become unaware that they have a claim to a development of their own powers. Their experience is so restricted that they are not conscious of restriction." "Democracy and Educational Administration," School and Society, 45 (April 3, 1973):458.

64 The Public...., p. 139.

65 Ibid., p. 142.

66 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963 [1935]), pp. 52-53.

67 Ibid., p. 62.

political theory will be shared by the interpretations of Peter Bachrach and Arnold Kaufman. Laissez-faire liberalism had proved its bankruptcy; adventitious elements had been imposed on early liberalism which made it unresponsive to the emerging social problems of a developing industrialized society.

Ways must be found to reestablish "community" through revitalizing the inquiry and discussion and verification process. This was first of all an intellectual problem; but it was also a practical problem. Part of the conditions necessary to this end are continuous, face-to-face communication over shared issues. Out of this interaction, shared attitudes (based on common interests, knowledge, and purposes) can be expected to grow and, thereby, change the life of the individual and the community. This is the development of a social consciousness; for Dewey this is what it meant to be "human":

> To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values. But this translation is never finished.[68]

An account of Dewey's theory of participation should note that in locating settings for shared associations--in which meanings may develop and new realities form, Dewey held no institution as inherently sacrosenct. Even in his discussions of political democracy he minimized the importance of institutional and constitutional arrangements. Dewey, for instance, reframed the definition of democracy not as an emphasis on procedure but

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[68] The Public...., p. 154.

in its classic meaning as a way of life.[69] Its forms, like universal suffrage, recurrent elections, majority rule, were merely the best means obtained so far for this end. The key was experimentation.

It is undoubtable, however, that for Dewey the public school was the most important instrument for remaking, peacefully, society. The purpose of schools was to enable the forming of future citizens so that the society they create is always an improvement on the previous generation's. To this end, Dewey saw no other way than the shifting from an authoritarian to a democratic structure: "Absence of participation tends to produce lack of interest and concern on the part of those shut out."[70] The teachers' annui would translate itself to the students. Accordingly, "...the democratic principle requires that every teacher should have some regular and organic way in which he can, directly or through representatives democratically chosen, participate in the formation of the controlling aims, methods and materials of the school of which he is a part."[71] There is research support to Dewey's theory that now makes his ideas "truly convincing."[72] Indeed, the young student can grow, move

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69 His definition: "The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together: Which is necessary from the standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as individuals." In "Democracy and Educational Administration," p. 457.

70 Ibid., p. 461.

71 Ibid., p. 460.

72 Lawrence Kohlberg, "A Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," Humanist, 32 (November-December 1972):13-16. The series of studies on which these conclusions are based is discussed in L. Kohlberg and E. Turiel, eds., Recent Research in Moral Development (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

from one stage of moral development to another, with procedures little different from those available to all teachers. Kohlberg in his experimental work with M. Blatt suggests the nature of his findings:

> The educational implications of these experiments are that the teacher must help the child to consider genuine moral conflicts, think about the reasoning he uses in solving such conflicts, see inconsistencies and inadequacies in his way of thinking, and find ways of resolving them....[73]

His conclusions are that,

> The classroom discussion approach should be part of a broader, more enduring involvement of students in the social and moral functioning of the school. Rather than attempting to inculcate a predetermined and unquestioned set of values, teachers should challenge students with the moral issues faced by the school community as problems to be solved, not merely situations in which rules are mechanically applied.[74]

That small success has been achieved in this area must be considered a matter of fact. Of course, a private educational institution has an easier time of justifying its authoritarian structure with the argument that the student is free to choose his institution. The public and state-supported institutions face the problem in another way--generally by avoiding any but the safest and most orthodox issues and tending to value-neutral skill subjects.

There were other settings, as well, where participation should occur. Dewey wrote in The Public and Its Problems: "Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community."[75] It could occur in the community, in social and business groups. What occurred in these secondary

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[73] Ibid., p. 16.

[74] Ibid., p. 16.

[75] The Public..., p. 213.

social groups was important as it had a bearing on the formation of dispositions and tastes, the attitudes, interests, purposes and desires of those engaged in carrying on the activities of the group. In the broad sense, all institutions were educational; and participation in local settings would have a broadening effect on the understanding of the larger national and international issues as well.[76]

Dewey's theory of participation for the construction of a democratic life was derived from his theory of knowledge. He had the strongest faith that no one knew better an individual's own needs and troubles than that individual himself. When that individual was given the respect he deserved, through the chances and opportunities of meeting with others like himself in the community, he and the others would enhance their reasoning and moral capacities. For this, society itself will be much the better off. Dewey was not so naive to believe that the mere coming together was a situation sufficient to prompt this growth. It required patterns of thought and practice encouraged and supported widely by all social institutions; for instance, it required the courage to reject the old and familiar for the new and untried. Like Rousseau, Dewey was equally a strong critic of established, other-worldly dogmas. He was a naturalist in the way some today would consider themselves to be ecologists. While Dewey may, I believe, have underestimated the force of dominating economic and political institutions and the depth of repressive ideologies, he surely deserves significance for the profound appreciation he had of the strengths and weaknesses of social institutions on the formation of persons' character.

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[76] Ibid., p. 217.

Conclusion

The classical vision supplies an answer to the perplexing problems of advanced industrial society, particularly to its features as a class-fractured society. Our society's peculiarly debilitating feature is that it sets no limits on any sufficiently forceful promotion, including governments. The most egregious feature of this condition is the unnecessary repression of the human, creative personality.

Rousseau's solution would reconstruct the political society on a moral basis. The key to his vision was the character of the individuals that made up the society; and, this answer distinguished Rousseau, for instance, from Marx who recommended simply a reconstruction of the economic base. A modern society could only bring about a civilized style of life when all members of the community recognized the need to sublimate one's natural or badly-cultivated impulses, needs, or wants. One became a realized "self" to the extent that one was enabled to develop these reflective and deliberative, moral capacities about the interests of the community. The most likely condition for them to blossom and flourish, it was felt by Rousseau, Green, and Dewey, was in the participating society where all would share in the deliberation and solution of issues that affected their lives.

The view of knowledge to which the moral notion of man was connected was especially developed by Dewey's pragmatic philosophy, and its chief feature was the view that there is no fixed, authoritative basis for knowledge. Knowledge and intelligence were developing processes; and fundamental was the process of inquiry that this recognition encouraged. Rejected was the spectator-view of knowledge of the empiricists, for

instance, in favor of a view of man in the world as "agent-patient." From this philosophical perspective, it necessarily follows that the pursuit of knowledge was not the task of elites but was a social and democratic task. Participation in social decisions is justified in terms of fundamental human rights and for the preferred consequences to which this practice leads.

We can see in the liberal-pluralist interpretation, reviewed next, that this essential insight--that the best civil society will be one that is formed by a moral citizenry--has been lost and needs to be regained.

CHAPTER III

THE LIBERAL-PLURALIST INTERPRETATION: THE THEORY OF ROBERT A. DAHL

Introduction

Realization of the self has not been a widely shared aspiration of social scientists or philosophers of the twentieth century. For instance, considerable attention of mainstream political science has been devoted to that anomalous abstraction after which one study was so aptly titled, the American voter. This literature of votingbehavior was in an important way the natural evolution of government wartime studies conducted by behavioral psychologists and rested on a scientistic assumption that quantification of the regularities of human behavior will lead to a body of knowledge about political life and make possible predictability and control. It ignored questions related to the quality of life.

The extensive research commitments of the past two decades are highlighted by a sequence of studies that must include: The Peoples' Choice, The Voter Decides, Voting, The American Voter, The Civic Culture, and, most recently, Political Participation in America. By 1965 a literature review was necessary to integrate the overwhelming number of periodic and full-length studies and their findings.[1]

The central point that review study made is suggestive of this group of authors' concerns: "About one-third of the American adult

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[1] Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation - How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

population can be characterized as politically apathetic or passive; in most cases, they are unaware, literally, of the political part of the world around them. Another sixty percent play largely spectator roles in the political process; they watch, they cheer, they vote, but they do not do battle."[2] The correlates of voting--psychological, sociological, and political--were examined in the light of this finding, and "political efficacy," "civic duty," and similar terms supplied political science with a new vocabulary to explain participation rates.

The attempt, however, was not to explain in causal ways the findings. Very few questions were raised about the quality of participation, the effects of participation, or the question of how participation changes over time. Finally, there was little directed attention to explaining the phenomena of non-participation.[3]

On one issue of fundamental importance to this study--the conclusions drawn from the evidence of limited participation--there was some division of opinion.

A weak wing, for instance, suggested that the low rates of participation were not of wide public concern.[4] These low rates, when contrasted

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[2] Ibid., p. 21.

[3] See Dale Rogers Marshall, "Who Participates in What? A Bibliographic Essay on Individual Participation in Urban Areas," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 4 (December 1968):201-223, who emphasizes the "reactive" and "static" character of the literature. She writes: "The literature is dominated by attempts to support or refute theories of mass society and thus it focuses on the question of whether or not there is participation." p. 215.

[4] My introductory chapter suggested the work of Heinz Eualau, among others, as illustrative of this trend. Also noteworthy is the work of Edward Banfield, Daniel P. Moynihan, Norman Wengart, and James Q. Wilson.

with the experience of some Western democratic systems, could be read as indicative of satisfaction with the political system. Examined more closely, the representatives of this wing showed a distrust of human behavior and a policy-preference that key decisions be made by professionals--by, in other words, an open and democratic elite. Milbrath represents the opinion this group advanced. For instance, in his concluding summary statement in Political Participation he suggested: "Moderate or low participation levels by the general public place a special burden or responsibility on political elites for the successful functioning of constitutional democracy."[5] The passage concludes:

> If this analysis is correct, present levels and patterns of participation in politics do not constitute a threat to democracy; they seem, in fact, to be a realistic adjustment to the nature of modern society. The political processes of that democracy may not be close to the ideal of the classical theorists, but they may well be the best possible approximation to popular control of government that can be achieved in modern, industrialized, mobile, mass society.[6]

Another stronger wing, however, developed and urged the democratic requisite of encouraging voter participation in the political process in order to extend the democratic achievements and secure the widest range of political legitimacy.[7]

The weak case is obviously disparate from the classic democratic

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[5] Milbrath, p. 153.

[6] Ibid., p. 154.

[7] Dahl will supply the paradigmatic example for this study. Also representative are Alan Altschuler's Community Control - The Black Demand for Participation in Large, American Cities (New York: Pegasus, 1970), and Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America - Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

model. But even if we examine the stronger wing of this tradition we discover that it, too, misses any close correspondence to the empirical and normative theory of such classic democrats as Rousseau, Green, and Dewey. The concept of "participation" has undergone a revision in both its criteria of application and its moral point of view, a revision coinciding with the revision of democratic theory. Robert Dahl provides a case in point.

I believe we can take the work of Dahl, spanning as it does two eras--the behavioral period and the period of the post-behavioral critics--as representative of the predominant pluralist approach and the adjustments forced upon its paradigm by critics. Dahl's work constitutes a large literature, encompases an important range of theoretical issues, and has not shirked the important task of making recommendations to associates in the profession, as well as to practitioners. In this capacity, Dahl has been the subject of appraisal as well. Dahl's work, while attempting to respond directly to certaincriticisms, fails, nonetheless, to incorporate sensitively the relevant theoretical charges into his perspective.

Several problems in Dahl's interpretation become apparent to the critic:

1. He has lost the meaning enriched participation had for the development of the personality and which the classic adherants valued.

2. He is unconcerned with and, therefore, cannot show persuasively how his model of participation will meaningfully effect the current status of social and economic problems in significant ways.

3. The more difficult problems of how to implement extensive patterns

of participation, once they are appreciated, in a highly integrated mass society is skirted altogether.

As a result, his recommendation for expanding the settings of participation is only loosely anchored.

The seriousness of the underlying theoretical weaknesses of the paradigm are magnified in the execution of the Verba and Nie study, Political Participation in America; the meaningfulness of its empirical data must be questioned and the study's social and political implications exposed.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the interpretation of the stronger wing of the behavioral scientiests, for it is here that the contrast between the Rousseauan vision and the empirical model is most significantly revealed. The limits of the behavioral conception of participation will be seen to be connected to the limits of its perspective,[8] the consensus-integration perspective that guides inquiry. Dahl will be suggested as proto-typical of the limitations of this perspective.

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8 The characterization of the "consensus" and "conflict" perspectives as competing frameworks for the study of society grows out of the work of Ralf Dahrendorf, John Horton, and Gerhard Lenski among others. The presumptions and expectations that make the "consensus" perspective distinctive are indicated in William E. Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," Polity, 6 (Fall 1973):14-16. Dahl fits the consensus perspective because, for instance, he attributes social and political stability in the United States to a widespread consensus as to the procedural norms of the society, which is sustained by multiple roles for individuals and the encouragement of social pluralism in the society.

As will be this study's general format, discussion will proceed in terms of the following considerations: First, there will be an examination of the theorist's approach; secondly, there will be a characterization of the theorist's conception of participation and his paradigmatic case and an explanatory account of the theorist's version of participation and non-participation. Finally, a critical assessment of the account will be presented against the contrast model for expanded and enriched participation which is provided by Rousseau, Green, and Dewey.

Dahl's Approach to a Politics of Advanced Industrial Society

Dahl's political science has been framed within the parameters of the behavioralist approach and, with no logical inconsistency, has been strongly committed to the recommendation of increased participation as necessary and desirable to the evolution of the democratic process in the United States and for other democratic systems as well. Perhaps, because of these chief features, it would be helpful to see Dahl's work as firmly rooted in Western liberalism, in harmony in at least some ways philosophically, for instance, with John Stuart Mill and probably not widely separated from such welfare-state practitioners as Franklin D. Roosevelt or the efforts of John F. Kennedy's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation.

This section shall set out certain features of the theoretical framework to which Dahl's account of participation is connected, and which may, finally, be seen as posing certain conceptual constraints. I shall assume that the main features of the behavioral approach are familiar, so that what I shall endeavor to do is bring into focus those features most subject to criticism. There are several important aspects to be dealt with, and we shall want to focus on the shifts that Dahl makes within these issue-areas as he responds to the theoretical pressures from, mainly, the Left. The principal issues I plan to set out include, first, the aims and methods of a "science" of politics and, then, the notion of the "democratic" polity and the role of elections for it will be considered.

Aims and methods of a "science" of politics. Dahl's earliest writings on the study of politics reflects a presumption as to the

desirability of a science of political behavior. For instance, with reference to Easton's The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science Dahl was disturbed by Easton's concern with the "metaphysical" question of "What is political science?" As a scientific question, he says, it is trivial: "...empirical theory can be produced only by constructing and testing propositions about the real world, not by defining political science."[9] He seems never to have doubted the possibility of a science of politics whose premises followed that of the universal-generalization paradigm. By the time that he wrote an article for the American Political Science Review entitled, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: An Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," and Modern Political Analysis, he was firmly committed to that position.

Its features we need only briefly recall. In the article Dahl indicated "wholehearted" agreement with the statement of the aims and methods of political science set out by David Truman in a much "neglected" essay of 1951. In his review, Dahl characterized behavioralism as a "mood" whose purpose was science: It was an orientation which aims, citing Truman, at stating all the phenomena of government in terms of the observed and observable behavior of men; it must be systematic, growing out of a precise statement of hypotheses and rigorous ordering of evidence; it must place primary emphasis upon empirical methods.[10]

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[9] Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Politics: New and Old," World Politics, 7 (April 1955):481-482.

[10] Truman's essay was entitled, "The Implications of Political Behavior Research." Dahl's article was published in American Political Science Review, 55 (December 1961):763-772. Page references here are from the reprint in Melanson, ed., Knowledge, Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1973), pp. 50-51.

Underlining Truman's words, Dahl reminded his readers: "...The ultimate goal of the student of political behavior is the development of a science of the political process."[11]

Dahl goes on to suggest that the measure of this new outlook must be its results:

> ...if all of these activities do not yield explanations of some important aspects of politics that are more thoroughly verified, less open to methodological objections, richer in implications for further explanation, and more useful for meeting the perennial problems of political life than the explanations they are intended to replace; if, in short, the results of a scientific outlook do not measure up to the standards that serious students of politics have always attempted to apply, then we may confidently expect that the attempt to build an empirical science of politics will lose all the impetus in the next generation that it gained in the last.[12]

A "tentative if deliberately incomplete assessment" indicates positive results; for instance, of the research bracketed by The Peoples' Choice and The American Voter he suggests:

> It is no exaggeration to say that in less than two decades this series of studies has significantly altered and greatly deepened our understanding of what in some ways is the most distinctive action for a citizen of democracy--deciding how to vote, or indeed whether to vote at all, in a competitive national election.[13]

Also highly regarded by his criteria are Lane's works and the work done towards understanding the psychological characteristics of homo politicus: attitudes, beliefs, predispositions, personality factors. Names cited in this literature include Lasswell, Cantril, Lane again, McCloskey, Adorno and associates, Almond, Stouffer, and Lipset.[14] In 1961 Dahl's

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[11] Idem.

[12] Ibid., p. 52.

[13] Idem.

[14] Ibid., pp. 53-54.

expectation was that the behavioral mood would disappear as an issue, "because it had succeeded." Behavioralism as a protest movement, he concluded with a few caveats that history nor speculation be spurned, was needed to bring political science into stride with the other social science disciplines.

This model of a science of politics also involves a logical positivist delineation which Dahl follows. He assumes the possibility of a clear distinction between fact and value statements and that empirical knowledge can be objectively developed.[15] While values should not bias empirical findings, the unimportance of values was not implied, nor was any form of value relativism. Dahl made the assumption that the forms of knowledge were different and that evaluations, nevertheless, are important to make. Dahl's approach brought together consistently epistemological individualism and the emotivist position in value non-cognitivism.

To achieve objectivity it is very important to be clear about one's words. While this proposition can hardly be disagreed with, the recommendation Dahl follows is problematic. His goal, shared by other behavioralists and notable for the persistence with which it is held, is to "operationalize" key concepts in the propositions one is testing. The concern to eliminate the multiple meanings of political terms is profound. In Modern Political Analysis Dahl writes, with his own standpoint objectified:

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[15] For this discussion see Dahl's Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 101-107.

> Probably most Empirical Theorists would argue that the ordinary language of politics does pose serious problems, because many political terms in ordinary usage have a multiplicity of meanings even among political scientists.[16]

In Polyarchy Dahl again presses the point:

> The problem of terminology is formidable, since it seems impossible to find terms already in use that do not carry with them a large freight of ambiguity and surplus meaning. The reader should remind himself that the terms used here are employed throughout the book, to the best of my ability, only with the meanings indicated in the preceding paragraphs.[17]

The concern is carried, for example, deeply into his treatment of democratic theory and construction of a model of democracy befitting the contemporary industrialized society. The substitute for democracy and its historically overladen meanings is "polyarchy:"

> Some readers will doubtless resist the term polyarchy as an alternative to the word democracy, but it is important to maintain the distinction between democracy as an ideal system and the institutional arrangements that have come to be regarded as a kind of imperfect approximation of an ideal, and experience shows, I believe that when the same term is used for both, needless confusion and essentially irrelevant semantic arguments get in the way of analysis.[18]

For similar reasons Dahl rejected another term of central importance to the vocabulary of contemporary political inquiry, "elite." This term has been transmitted through the vocabulary of Mosca, Pareto, and Michels down to both a conservative and a radical tradition in contemporary

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16 Modern Political Analysis, p. 105.

17 Dahl's Polyarchy - Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), Fn. 4, p. 9.

18 Idem. It ought to be pointed out that when Dahl co-authored Size and Democracy with Edward R. Tufte (California: Stanford University Press, 1973), he reverted to the more "loose" phrase of "democracy." See pp. 25-27 for the explanation.

political thought. Dahl has directly rejected the application of "elitism" as a description of his own work, and he has cited the importance--again for rational, scientific discourse--of a more neutral term, of terms "rather more descriptive and discriminating."[19] His own formulation supplies the term "leaders" and the key dichotomy in politics of industrialized society is the one between "leader and supporter."

The effort to escape the rich meanings of our ordinary language appears to be pursued to the extreme in Dahl's later works which are largely bereft of the narrative that tempered the New Haven study. From merely the point of view of literature, the contemporary empiricist style is rarefied and empty. The reader is invited to follow the meanings of concepts whose criteria are apparently closely and narrowly stipulated--and yet the terms remain vague and have little essential reference to everyday life, our shared public world. Another problem is that the language is non-dialectical. This representational view of language will be critically inspected for its implications in concluding comments.

To meet the charge that the empirical theorists "smuggle their own values into their theories," Dahl suggests that these theorists do concede support for democracy and open inquiry.[20] Since Dahl is consistently

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19 See Dahl's "Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy,'" American Political Science Review, 60 (June 1966), Fn. 7, p. 298: "I suggest that this difference in the choice of words is more than a mere taste or distaste for certain labels. It also reflects a conviction on the part of Key, Truman, myself and others that 'elitist' interpretations of American political life are inadequate both empirically and normatively."

20 Modern Political Analysis, pp. 106-107.

pledged to the advocacy and promotion of "democratic values," it will be important to see just what he means by them in the next section. The point to be made here is that the nature and function of normative theory for Dahl is essentially different and unscientific and succeeds empirical analysis. It is, from the point of view of that position interesting to note that Modern Political Analysis, while clearly staking out a place for values in political inquiry never suggests how they are to be determined or may be reasoned about. Nor is conduct of this discussion to be found anywhere else in his writings.[21] At best, his Preface to Democratic Theory promises this sort of discussion when it sets out the Madisonian and populist models as the limits of democratic possibility. But even here the position that is developed follows from a linguistic slide which amounts to "claiming facts may refute ideals."[22] Both ideal models are to be rejected and replaced by a more "realistic" model, polyarchy.[23] Dahl's confusion is representative of the behavioralists' misunderstanding

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21 This is because Dahl and others who share his perspective misconceive the nature of moral argument. They maintain that ultimately moral ideals and commitments must rest on subjective and irrational grounds and do not recognize that "good-reasons" can be given for value preferences. See discussion of Kai Nielsen, "History of Ethics," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 3:110-112.

22 This argument is suggested by Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes in "The New Democracy," in McCoy and Playford, eds., Apolitical Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967), p. 168. They suggest that "it needs to be shown exactly how and why the ideal is rendered improbable or impossible of attainment. This has nowhere been done." p. 171. See also Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 60 (June 1966:288-289, where he emphasizes the shift from the prescriptive element in classical theory to apology.

23 It should be noted that Dahl's claim to "realism" throughout his work trades on the assumption that his readers share that "reality" with him. Philosophically speaking, Dahl's community of reality" bears, however, further examination than Dahl would want to give it.

of political science's connection to political theory and political philosophy.[24] As has been persuasively argued, the logical positivists fail to appreciate the differences between mathematical and logical questions (to which they erroneously reduce social science questions) and philosophical ones.[25]

This misunderstanding is expressed in Dahl's cynical attitude to claims made on behalf of the relevance of classical ideals for conditions of advanced industrial society. For Dahl, not much worthwhile knowledge can be expected from reviewing the classical political theorists because social and historical conditions have changed. Conceptions of democracy are regarded as "nostalgic" and "utopian" and are seen as inducements to cynicism rather than as spurs to action.[26] This attitude is portrayed by Dahl as one of "realism."

The significance of Dahl's approach is that he is consigned to a narrower theory of democracy, and this view weakens the case Dahl is able to make on behalf of expanding the settings of participation and opens it to charges of being "cooptive" and even "repressive."

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[24] For a positive view of what this connection must be see Connolly, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

[25] The argument is made by John Wisdom, "A Feature of Wittgenstein's Technique," in Fann, ed., Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy (New York: Delta, 1967), pp. 353-365.

[26] For his castigation of classical theory see, for instance, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 1; After the Revolution? Authority in A Good Society (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 24, 59, 82; and Size and Democracy, p. 139.

The revision of democratic theory. Dahl's two studies, After the Revolution? and Size and Democracy, may be regarded as counter-responses to the recent efforts of pluralist critics who have endeavored to re-assert the applicability of the classical democratic vision.[27] Dahl's analysis in the first citation and his empirical model in the second should be seen as efforts to reconcile the contrasting propositions of the classical democratic theory and the facts and realities of political experience. A characterization of the Rousseauan model provides Dahl with an explicit contrast model for arguing his viewpoint.

First, let us consider the matter of how Dahl perceives the argument of classical democratic theory. A brief review of Dahl's interpretation of Rousseau's ideas, which he mainly takes from The Social Contract, will suggest that Rousseau's model of a democracy of participation is incompletely perceived and, in part, misconstrued. Dahl sketches most forthrightly the paradigm of Rousseau in the following passage and it is from this sketch that the particular accent Dahl gives to his interpretation can be discovered:

> A democratic polity must be completely autonomous, because otherwise its citizens could not be fully self-governing: Some of their decisions would be limited by the power or authority of individuals or groups outside the citizen body. A democratic polity must have so few citizens that all of them could meet frequently in the popular assembly to listen, to vote, perhaps even to speak. Smallness, it was

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[27] The relevance of the Rousseauan argument was suggested by Walker, op. cit.; Duncan and Lukes, op. cit.; Peter Bachrach in The Theory of Democratic Elitism - A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Robert J. Pranger in The Eclipse of Citizenship (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968); and see W. E. Connolly, "The Challenge to Pluralist Theory," in Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 22-24.

> thought, enhanced the opportunities for participation in and control of the government in many ways. For example, in a small polity every citizen stood a very good chance of being chosen by lot at least once in his lifetime to sit on one of the important administrative bodies. Smallness made it possible for every citizen to know every other, to estimate his qualities, to understand his problems, to develop friendly feelings toward him, to analyze and discuss with comprehension the problems facing the polity. To be sure, if a democratic polity was to be both small and completely autonomous, there was a price to be paid: The citizen body must be self-sufficient and life must be frugal. But frugality was considered a virtue in a democracy, since it helped to reduce inequalities and jealousies among citizens and to toughen them for the rigors of military life, which all must experience from time to time if autonomy was to be maintained.[28]

In this sketch the accent is on the efficaciousness of "size." The accent is not on the requirements placed on a community of individuals to act in socially responsible and principled ways, which Rousseau viewed smallness of size as supporting. It is from this perspective that Dahl misunderstands Rousseau's criticism of representative processes of democracy for not encouraging the development of these cognitive and affective capacities.[29] Indeed, Dahl makes a mockery of Rousseau. This distorted interpretation constitutes the basis for Rousseau's dismissal: "For in founding authority on personal choices Rousseau was as modern as

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[28] Size and Democracy, pp. 5-6.

[29] Dahl makes the suggestion that Rousseau did not even take his own ideas seriously: "In fact, it was the impossibility of arriving at all the conditions necessary for direct democracy, including the impossibility of keeping the people constantly assembled in order to decide public affairs, that led Rousseau to conclude that 'democracy,' in his sense, had never existed and never would." See "Further Reflections...," pp. 296-297.

yesterday's existentialism: It was only in limiting the legitimacy of authority to the city-state that he locked himself into the prison of the past."[30]

Several obvious historical developments, according to Dahl, had made the idealization of the small city-state anachronistic; mainly these were the development of the nation-state, the emergence of representative legislatures, and the philosophic and ideologic adaptations of democratic theory to this grander scale.[31] Simply, the shifts in the historical situation and in the response of the theorists was so commanding as not to require further serious consideration. From the critical perspective, however, Dahl's was a false historicism which never viewed classes and human beings and their language and symbolism as having a constitutive effect on the world.

In recognition of the more complex conditions of a mass bureaucratized and industrialized society, Dahl suggests that no one principle can be evoked to make a case for the single best structure for democracy as, it is alleged, Rousseau thought. Rousseau's concept of "general will" is effaced by Dahl's imposition of a Lockean notion of authority. The relationship individuals have towards the "general will"--one that seeks to identify it and act according to it--is transformed into an authority relationship of five types: Committee democracy, primary democracy, referendum democracy, representative democracy, and several forms of delegated authority.[32] The argument is that we need associations of

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30 After the Revolution?, p. 80.

31 Size and Democracy, p. 8.

32 See After the Revolution?, chap. 2.

different dimensions for different purposes; all necessitate organization by authority. This proposition reinvites Dahl's appeal to the metaphor of the Chinese boxes suggestive of multiple settings for varied styles of participation.[33] The problem is not that the argument for varied settings is wrong, but that it is incomplete, for Dahl fails to give recognition to the fuller insight Rousseau, Green, and Dewey had about the nature of democratic participation. Obligation, under the classical model, was obtained less by coercive authority than by a certain kind of choice; this choice necessarily involved sublimation, but it was personally not institutionally derived; it was necessarily moral choice.

The concept of self had disappeared in Dahl's democratic theory. Like many other political scientists Dahl had followed Schumpeter's critique of democratic ideology and his revision of democratic theory along non-substantive, procedural lines.[34] We need only recall Dahl's substitution for democracy in practice, polyarchy, to make this point. "Polyarchies" were defined as "systems with broad electorates, extensive opportunities to oppose the government and contest it in elections, competitive political parties, peaseful displacement of officials defeated in honestly conducted elections, and so on."[35] For Dahl, the pluralist, the keynote of democracy was the opportunities of choice that

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33 After the Revolution?, pp. 88-89; and see Dahl's "City in the Future of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 61 (1967):953-970.

34 This general argument is made, for instance, by Bachrach in Theory of Democratic Elitism, pp. 17-19.

35 After the Revolution?, p. 78; also, Preface..., p. 84; and Polyarchy, pp. 7-8.

occurred for the voter, under conditions of political equality, between competing candidates for public office and competing programs. Elections were decisive for three reasons: Because they had finality, because they vastly increased the size, number, and variety of minorities whose preference must be taken into account by leaders in making policy choices, and because elections occur within a social process, "for politicians subject to elections must operate within the limits set both by their own values, as indoctrinated members of the society, and by their expectations about what policies they can adopt and still be reelected."[36] The electoral process held the possibility of accountability and responsibility through final control, having the "last say."

In summary, two chief aspects of Rousseau's model were overlooked or too easily dismissed: (1) The moral development of the person that democracy promoted, and (2) the conditions requisite for its nurture, which smallness of community facilitated but by itself was insufficient. There were other conditions as important: Social equality, respect for persons, opportunities for solitude and reflection which would nurture dialogue. Voting in the classical scheme was more than simply a checking or vetoing-type of process. As Duncan and Lukes point out: "To the 18th and 19th century democratic theorists, voting was perhaps the citizen's most important act, in which the people as a whole were to reveal their political energy and virtue. It was to be the culmination of long, thoughtful, and fair consideration of the relevant issues."[37] The normative character of Rousseau's model, which Kant had recognized and which

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[36] Preface..., pp. 132, 125.

[37] Duncan and Lukes, p. 165.

Cassirer had endeavored to capture in his interpretation, slips out of the grasp of the positivist/consensus paradigm which forces the prescriptive theory to fit a much tighter empirical mold. In order to clean up the contentious features of appraisive concepts, the empirical theorists had to destroy the moral point of view by which "democracy," for example, obtains its valued, but controversial, meaning. Thus, for instance, Dahl is induced to protray Rousseau's Social Contract as a charming utopia which would be unacceptable to any "reasonable" or "realistic" person. This effort, however, can only be viewed as successful within the language-game of which it is a part. Another important implication is to be noticed as well. The constraints placed on the democratic model by Dahl's perspective must have theoretical implications for the concept of participation that he employs, encourages, and defends.[38]

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[38] The argument for the contextual nature of certain kinds of concepts is set out William E. Connolly, "Essentially Contested Concepts in Politics" (Paper presented at American Political Science Convention, September 4-8, 1973), pp. 1-19.

Dahl and the Pluralist Account of Participation

There are a number of questions to which a theory of participation must supply answers and according to which I will elucidate and appraise Dahl. Significantly, differing interpretations will place emphasis on these questions in differing ways, and, indeed, some questions may seem to be overemphasized. Other questions not cited may receive consideration as well. I propose this set as possessing sufficient range to apply to the interpretations under consideration in this study initially:

Who participates? Why? What are the dominant and limiting forms of the legitimized participation? What impact do these forms of participation have on the policies affecting society, for the rules of the system, for the lives of the participants? Who should participate? How? Who doesn't participate? Why? What is the impact of non-participation for public and private policies, for the rules of the game, for the non-participants when there is no meaningful role for them? What factors in the society exist to induce expanded participation? What factors prevail to discourage it? What is the net effect? That is, from the viewpoint of classical democratic theory, what is the trend with regard to the widely shared practices and attitudes towards participation in the society?[39] I shall try to show how Dahl's account supplies answers to

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[39] The Verba and Nie study suggests a more limited set of questions because of the authors' view that certain questions cannot be examined empirically. Thus, it dismisses as "endless" the debate set out by the critics, Walker and Bachrach, and bring quite sizeable research commitments to bear on the old question of rates of participation, a topic "more amenable to study." See pp. 5-6.

these matters and shall show by way of contrast that by what it neglects, discounts, or overrides with other considerations it is subject to critical measure.

The starting point of Dahl's inquiry is fixed by the perspective he brings to inquiry. By adopting the emergent political science framework of the 1950's, the consensus perspective, he has selected for himself useful phenomena for attention, and these he embraces with a particular attitude and holds in focus in specific ways.

Notably, the conduct of Dahl's empirical research (e.g., Size and Democracy) is determined by the familiar "systems" model. This model also serves the purposes of Verba and Nie's Political Participation in America. This analytic construct, the systems model, sets up a flow chart of key political relationships which are schematized as inputs, conversion procecesses, and outputs. Significantly, the model as typically diagrammed presupposes the initiating nature of the individual. And, the individual is regarded in a selective way, in his role as a voter with congealed interests.

The potential impact of the individual on public policy is treated through the aggregation process. "Voluntary" and "special interest" groups and the major political parties provide the essential intervening sets of social institutions (with political functions). They serve to coalesce individuals' interests. Parties are chief agents in modern democratic society for "institutionalizing" and resolving conflict. The relationships between these aggregating institutions as they press their claims on to the institutions of the governmental arena is defined and sustained by the "support" structures of the society. The political ethos

and the constitutional framework provide these supports, but even apathy might be considered positively in this regard.

Dahl's interpretation of the systems model would view the conversion processes of government as the decisive "arena" for controlling decisions:

> Government is crucial because its controls are relatively powerful. In a wide variety of situations, in a contest between governmental controls and other controls, the governmental controls will probably prove more decisive than competing controls.... It is reasonable to assume that in a wide variety of situations whoever controls governmental decisions will have significantly greater control over policy than individuals who do not control governmental decisions.[40]

In this arena the process of negotiating, bargaining, and compromise takes place, and this process ultimately yields official decisions and practices concerning a wide range of issues. These decisions are regarded as resultants of social vectoring--an equivalent to the "public interest" if the term is applied at all. Mainly, it is a goal-less system, or a random-goal system.[41] Stability is promoted by the smoothly functioning (predictable) process, and individuals can begin to aggregate their interests anew. The model is recognized as simplistic by its practitioners, for this is recognized as the problem of all ideal models. But its serious distorting effects on the conduct of empirical research are not recognized.

Advisedly, some of these distorting effects should be pointed out. For one thing, the systems diagram has a built in bias by regarding the individual's demands as pure inputs (based on abstractly defined needs,

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[40] Preface..., pp. 48-49.

[41] This abstract goal, set by the framers of the systems model, nonetheless conceals certain commitments, certain interests.

wants, purposes). It is to be observed that no compensation is made by also regarding the individuals as conditioned political entities, not only as purely needs-satisfying individuals. Deeper than this, then, is the abstract nature of the model--that is, the political system is not portrayed in terms of any fundamental connection to the economy and its tendencies. Finally, by avoiding the constellation of questions that arise when treating the system in terms of political economy, the problem of the commercial stimulation of pseudo-needs is neatly avoided, as is the construction of the whole system of rationality that holds the economy together as a system of practice.

In addressing the systems model we are, in fact, addressing the core metaphor of the dominant conceptual paradigm of political scientists. The core metaphor is mechanical and may be symbolized by the clock, or perhaps as well by a motor.[42] The clock exemplifies a closed, finite energy system according to which the energy input is totally accountable in the output. The clock is the symbol of Newton's mechanistic universe. It stands to be argued, however, the extent to which this core metaphor is applicable to the human world.

Immediately, we can show that this hidden metaphor invites certain presumptions. In particular, let us look at the presumption it sets for participation.

The systems model screens out the multi-faceted and interconnected

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[42] See also Thomas Landon Thorson, Biopolitics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970) who suggests the metaphor of a thermostat, p. 76.

roles of the individual and the social pressures on the individual as well. It focuses on the conventionally ascribed role of the individual; it reveals the individual in his single (abstracted) role as a chooser between two alternative leadership groups. Sinply put, it is an image of a political actor of rather reduced dimension. And the bulk of the population is viewed in this way, falling some place on a one-dimensional continuum extending from apathetic to frantic activist.[43] Most of the population are seen to fall into the broad middle voting segment. Similarly, Verba and Nie construct a range of the following sort: The inactives (22%), the voting specialists (21%), the parochial participants (40%), the communalists (20%), the campaigners (15%), and the complete activists (11%).[44] Although Verba and Nie's continuum suggests a larger number of activists, both Dahl's and their ranges are closely similar to the one proposed by Milbrath. The paradigmatic case of participation in pluralist theory is voting, according to the rational economic model. Self-interest may impel one to further participation in campaign or special activity. Dahl has closely allied himself with this position.[45] Where he has diverged in his recent years is on the policy recommendation to

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[43] After the Revolution?, p. 47.

[44] Political Participation..., pp. 118-119; Cf. Milbrath, pp. 16-22.

[45] See After the Revolution?, where his criterion of economy imposes limits on the kinds and levels of activity of a participant and Size and Democracy, pp. 44-45; see also Verba and Nie, pp. 2-3, which emphasizes "the acts that aim at influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel;" and Altschuler, p. vii, which includes "the right to be consulted at one end of the spectrum to near absolute community control of vital public functions at the other."

the question, Is the level of participation a problem? The answer to this question has worked itself out for Dahl in terms of three phases of thought.

First, during the 1950's Dahl followed the findings of the early voting studies which showed that the level of participation--voting turnout--fell far shorter than was expected by the researchers. These findings led Dahl, like Eulau, Milbrath and others, to draw the conclusion that a democratic system did not need high levels of voter participation. In his 1955 essay, "The Problem of Participation," Dahl extended the political findings to develop their implications in terms of the following hypothesis: "The proportion of individuals who will avail themselves of normal opportunities to participate in decision-making, at least in the United States, will be relatively small in all forms of social organization."[46] This suspicion led Dahl to propose several tentative conclusions at that time. For the democratic process to function properly several conditions were necessary; they were not dissimilar to Milbrath's conclusions: (1) Reliance on the competitiveness between leaders was crucial, (2) an opportunity for non-leaders to switch from one set of leaders to another was needed, (3) the classic assumptions about the need for total participation were, at the very least, to be viewed as inadequate, and (4) bargaining between other leaders inside and outside the system became important as checks. This adaptation was widely shared by political scientists, as was the conclusion: "...What we call 'democracy'--that

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[46] Robert A. Dahl, "The Problem of Participation," reprinted in Williams and Press, eds., Democracy in Urban America (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), p. 407.

is, a system of decision-making in which leaders are more or less responsive to the preferences of non-leaders--does seem to operate with a low level of citizen participation. Hence it is inaccurate to say that one of the necessary conditions for 'democracy' is extensive citizen participation. It would be more reasonable simply to insist that some minimal participation is required, even though we cannot specify with any precision what this minimum must be."[47]

A second period, inaugurated by A Preface to Democratic Theory, may be viewed as bringing into detail some of the problems out of focus in the early assessment. The Preface outlines the task for much of Dahl's later work toward developing a defensible model of the possible levels of political activity and the proper mix of political roles in the optimal system.

In this study the limits of democratic possibility are posed by the Madisonian model at one extreme and the populist-Jeffersonian model at the other. Dahl examined these models from the viewpoint of the critical-realist, asking the question, What is possible given the constraints of the real world of advanced industrial society and individuals who have many different pursuits to occupy their time? Briefly, his answer is supplied by his critique of the two models. The problem with the Madisonian model is that it fears too much majority's tyranny of the minority. For Dahl, Madison's analysis does not make good political science, though it made good ideology. It is not constitutional structure, but man's "social" nature, his willingness to form a consensus,

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[47] Ibid., p. 408.

that limits tyranny.[48] The populist model is objected to on the grounds of its singleness of purpose; the goal of political equality and popular sovereignty is not balanced against other warrantable goals. As Dahl says: "For most of us--and this may be particularly true in countries that have managed to operate democracies over long periods of time--the costs of pursuing any one or two goals at the expense of others are thought to be excessive. Most of us are marginalists."[49] Dahl's case, of course, rests on the unargued assumption of a widely held diversity of interests, all worthy of pursuit:

> Political equality and popular sovereignty are not absolute goals; we must ask ourselves how much leisure, privacy, consensus, stability, income, security, progress, status, and probably many other goals we are prepared to forego for an additional increment of political equality. It is an observable fact that almost no one regards political equality and popular sovereignty as worth an unlimited sacrifice of these other goals.[50]

Behind this critique lies the image of the citizen as "rational economic man," whose values are bourgeois.

By following the Aristotelian rule of moderation in all things, Dahl resolves the tensions between the two democratic (and axiomatic) models by proposing a compromise solution, an optimal model, which he proposes to speak of as "polyarchy." He finds, not surprisingly, that the American case fills these minimal conditions. The chief character of polyarchy, and the American case, is the extent to which the operations of such societies cannot be described in terms of contrasts between majorities and minorities:

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[48] Preface..., chap. 1, esp. pp. 30-32.

[49] Ibid., chap. 2, esp. pp. 50-51.

[50] Ibid., p. 51.

> We expect elections to reveal the "will" or the preferences of a majority on a set of issues. This is one thing elections rarely do, except in an almost trivial fashion. Despite this limitation the election process is one of two fundamental methods of social control which, operating together, make governmental leaders so responsive to non-leaders that the distinction between democracy and dictatorship still makes sense. The other method of social control is continuous political competition among individuals, parties, or both. Elections and political competition do not make for government by majorities in any very significant way, but they vastly increase the size, number and variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken into account by leaders in making policy choices. I am inclined to think that it is in this characteristic of elections - not minority rule but minorities rule - that we must look for some of the essential differences between dictatorships and democracies.[51]

Dahl is aware that the constitutional structure, for instance, has lead to the over-representation and under-representation of specific groups.[52] What I am concerned to show is the, disputable, meaning that he draws from this recognition. Dahl recognizes that not everyone has equal control. Even though it appears to be a creaking structure--for instance, in arriving at foreign policy--the system has the virtue of its vices. Dahl asserts:

> With all its defects, it does nonetheless provide a high probability that any active and legitimate group will make itself heard effectively at some stage in the process of decision. This is no mean thing in a political system.[53]

The conclusion ignores structural biases that favor the organized as against the unorganized groups in society; as well, it pretends that "being heard" is equivalent to having political impact. The task that Dahl saw, at one point briefly, as important for political science is

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[51] Ibid., pp. 131-132.

[52] Ibid., p. 145.

[53] Ibid., p. 150.

not that one addressed in the Preface's conclusion.[54] Where is his recommendation for maximizing political equality for the disenfranchised groups he identifies--Negroes, sharecroppers, migrant workers?[55] Instead, the study ends uncritically on a passifying statement of conviction.

And that conviction must be questioned. It is problematic whether the system is "decentralized" as Dahl claims or whether it should be, more correctly, viewed as a system of fractured power. Perhaps, it is a veto-system that protects some interests against other interests? There is another problem as well. Just because a majority is found not to rule, to conclude that it is a system of minorities, rather than a decisive minority, that rules is fallacious. Obviously, that was the point of the New Haven study--to confirm by the key decision method that different individuals made decisions in different issue areas. But the study's method failed to show adequately, as Bachrach and Baratz contended, the "mobilization of bias" in the community. These matters are significant themes in the interpretations of all the critics to follow in this study.

The third phase marks a more decisive departure for Dahl in terms of his recommendations for participation; yet, his mode of analysis is scarcely altered. Central to our attention is After the Revolution? Authority in A Good Society, which apparently is conceived as a liberal-pluralist answer to the disturbances of the 1960's and the New Left

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[54] See Preface..., p. 83, where Dahl states: "For what we desperately want to know (if we are concerned with political equality) is what we may do to maximize it in some actual situation, given existing conditions." If I read Dahl correctly, what he does is say this is a problem and then discovers that extension of the franchise has been an evolutionary (apparently "natural") process so that no particular attention is required. Even the 1970's studies are not concerned with extending participation to the lower classes.

critiques of that period.[56] The New Left is not taken seriously as offering any theoretically coherent analysis or any specially developed, systematic and constructive program. This is a typical Dahl-ian bias, which suggests he is either truly unaware of the literature or simply does not want to be aware of it.[57]

After the Revolution?, along with Polyarchy and Size and Democracy, proposes for consideration ways to extend participation--that is, to identify settings in which participation could be encouraged. The metaphor of the Chinese boxes is reappropriated to suggest the need to find units which would encompass the principle of affected interests and at the same time not be too small so that rule becomes inconsequential. It is now recognized that polyarchy has a fatal flaw: The remoteness of the government from the citizen. Dahl invites us to consider four recommendations for democratizing polyarchy:

1. He proposes that we consider the corporation as the unit most satisfying the problem of size and affected interests, and he recommends "self-management" as an appropriate participatory solution. Alternatives

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55 Ibid., p. 117; see Table 3.

56 After the Revolution? is best regarded as a polemic. Its style is assertive; its reasoning is not tight; and the title itself is inapplicable to the contents as well as presumptuous. The criteria offered for authority to become legitimate--that decisions correspond to personal choice, are informed by special competence, and economize on the citizen's time, attention and energy--are a priori. See p. 8 and chap. 1. The social injustices of our time - racism, poverty, militarism - are dismissed with the most simplistic ad hoc explanation--the American people are to blame.

57 This naivete is expressed, for instance, in his discussion of the private corporation: "Yet Americans have all but abandoned any serious challenge to the appropriation of public authority by private rulers that is the essence of the giant firm." Ibid., p. 115. He continues: "Why are Americans half colorblind when they look at economic enterprise? An important reason is that our history has left us without a socialist tradition." Ibid., p. 119.

of "interest-group" management and "bureaucratic socialism" are rejected.[58] The self-management model of industrial democracy that Dahl makes reference to is the Yugoslavian one, which occurs within a setting of economic and governmental controls. For the first time, Dahl challenges the private property ethic.[59] The limitation Dahl senses with regard to this proposal is that the workers probably will not want to spend the time or hold the responsibility that this practice requires. (He does not see that this is a cultivated attitude, not a necessary one.) Dahl suggests that the impetus for participation in the corporation would likely come from the white-collar employees, technicians, and executives themselves. (But he does not suggest that there may be resistances from the major ownership of the corporation.) Dahl would recommend expansion of industrial democracy to the political parties, trade unions, and universities as well.

2. Dahl also proposes considering restoring the ancient device of lot-selection as a method for choosing advisory councils to every elected official of the giant polyarchy--mayors of large cities, state governors, members of the U. S. Senate and House, and even the President.[60]

3. Of more limited practicality would be participation in neighborhood corporations, he says; reference is to the model characterized by Milton Kotler in Neighborhood Government. Participation should be

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58 Ibid., pp. 130-140.

59 After the Revolution?, pp. 121-129, after a non-socialist model of "industrial democracy."

60 Ibid., pp. 149-153.

encouraged here, but Dahl suggests the reservation that its limited scope of decision-making would make it less attractive.[61]

4. The optimal unit for participation, according to Dahl will be the middle-sized city, which ranges from 50,000 to several hundred thousand in population. Dahl comments: "Within this range the decisions (or non-decisions) of the city government cut pretty deeply into the lives of the inhabitants, and they could cut deeper still.[62]

Dahl's recent writing on the subject of participation reflects an attempt to construct a more responsive point of view within his basic conceptual framework. Dahl begins to see the opening up of varied settings for participation (loosely conceived) as both a continued extension of the democratic process and appropriate to sustaining a pluralist social process in face of the growth of large governmental and corporate units. But Dahl does not go much beyond asking his readers to consider his recommendations.

Dahl, for instance, would appear close to the participatory model in terms of his advocacy of expanded settings for participation. But his account remains deficient in the extent to which he fails to take note of the particular requirements Rousseau, Green, and Dewey place on the individual, the realizing self. He has not noticed the extent to which social and political arrangements must be consciously regulated on behalf of a teleological principle, the community, and that this will require the limiting of certain individual behavior and institutional practices. Because he does not recognize the specific moral feature of the Rousseauan

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[61] Ibid., pp. 159-160. (I would disagree with his assessment here.)

[62] Ibid., pp. 160-165.

vision, Dahl's interpretation is vulnerable to the charge of being "cooptive," a charge made by both the constitutional republicans and radical-liberals, and the charge of being "repressive," Marcuse's claim.

This inadequacy in Dahl's account may be attributed to some interrelated theoretical problems which are not re-assessed in the latest phase of Dahl's writing. They are, first, the problems associated with the rational economic model of the voter and, secondly, the analytic problems associated with liberal-pluralist explanations of non-participation.

Why participate (vote)? The answer to this question is viewed as a matter of rational choice, a decision left up to the individual. The principle motivation, according to this ethic, is the degree to which one's self-interest is maximized. For as Dahl reflects: "I cannot satisfactorily gain my own ends unless I allow others an opportunity to pursue their ends on an equal basis."[63] For Dahl, political equality means "the personal choices of others have equal dignity with my own."[64] The problem with this conception, for a Rousseauan, develops when the individuals do not mutually share the same interest, of determining and acting within the common good. And that is not what the rational economic model requires, whatever else its conception of self-interest may be. Note, for example, the six conditions that would make one more likely to value and, therefore, choose to participate:

1. The more you enjoy taking part...
2. The more important to you the matters the association is concerned with...

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63 After the Revolution?, p. 12.

64 Ibid., p. 26.

3. The greater the differences in the alternatives at stake in the decisions of the association...

4. The more likely it is that by participating you will change the outcome in the direction of your choice...

5. The more likely it is that the outcome will turn out badly if you do not participate...

6. The more competent you are with respect to the subject at hand.[65]

If the value of participation is derived from the meaning it has for the maximization of an individual's goals, then, conversely, when none of these advantages accrue to individuals, it is "rational" for them not to participate. Dahl, thus, accepts as rational the non-participation of the working class and even draws the conclusion that its members could only with difficulty be induced to participate, given the opportunity:

> ...affluent American workers, like affluent workers in many advanced countries and the middle class everywhere, tend to be consumption-oriented, acquisitive, privatistic, and family-centered. This orientation has little place for a passionate aspiration toward effective citizenship in the enterprise (or perhaps even in the state!)[66]

The cultural and structurally-related aspects of a consumptive living style is unrecognized. Substantive rationality is not Dahl's concern, for this would require attention to the quality of human life. Participation is an instrumental activity; it has extrinsic value for an individual (notably, for individuals of a certain class), not intrinsic worth.[67]

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65 Ibid., pp. 46-47. This model is more completely articulated in Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); in the work of W. H. Riker; in Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier Macmillan, 1970); and in William C. Mitchell, Why Vote? (Chicago: Markham, 1971).

66 Ibid., p. 135.

67 After the Revolution?, p. 100. See also Verba and Nie where this

There are several difficulties with this conception of the way the voter should go about considerations involved in voting.

First, by structuring the choice open to the average individual in terms of preferences to be maximized, Dahl begs the question of whether the alternatives are real ones. In other words, it veils the class interests at play in society. The bias in the way issues are framed, the way the agenda is set, makes it irrational for members outside the consensus (usually, members of the lower class, minorities, women) to participate. But Dahl cannot see that, say, for blacks, in a largely black ward of Baltimore to go out and elect a white businessman for city council usually makes little sense. Moreover, "having the last say" is neither significant nor, indeed, real since elections do not act like vetoes. In a winner-take-all, two-party system, in a contest between two crooks, the electorate must expect one of them to be victor.

The notion of rationality as an accountant's balance sheet with debits and credits columns is a most primitive way of determining broad choices for public policy, anyway. Are all problems reducible to a profit-loss statement? Thus, should determination of a school bond proposal hinge on whether I have a child who can make use of the new school? What opportunity does Dahl's theory allow for other considerations

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is explicit, p. 5, and inter alia. Also, they state more clearly than perhaps Dahl does, their commitments on how the participant arrives at choices. Rejecting the classic view, they assert: "A more modern view is that participation can lead to better public policy even if citizens bring their own narrow and selfish interests into politics. Through such "selfish" participation, the government is informed of these interests and pressured to respond. In this way it produces public goods more closely attuned to citizen needs than it would if there were no participation." p. 11. The authors note Lowi's critique of this version of interest-group liberalism but refrain from dealing with it.

in the determination of issues--such other considerations as biological and environmental ones, social ones, ethical ones, aesthetic ones? And if these other considerations are not given favor, does the model too not encourage segmental and short-run determinations over comprehensive and long-term ones? Dahl's criteria, it appears to me, are non-existent.

Finally, there is the problem facing the individual of coordinating his or her conduct in everyday life so that some consistency is obtained. The paradigm of voting according to the rational economic model, however, does not endeavor to embrace the several roles an individual holds in a coordinated way, nor does it indicate ways to bring about a mental resolve when matters are in contention. The individual may sense the discordancy of the role as producer and the role as consumer and the role as voter, nonetheless. Is this discordancy best resolved by non-voting? Do not the consequences of one's activity, aside from voting, also have implications of a political sort? Does not one's role, say, as producer have profound political implications that ought to be integrated as well? I am suggesting there are areas of activity in individuals' lives that Dahl's paradigm of participation does not make coherent.

Dahl's treatment, it seems to me, obscures the interests that are in contest in the American polity, and it obscures the way interests are formed and how they come to prevail or even dominate, and it obscures the fact that an individual can be a reflection and embodiment of these contradictions. This can be attributed to the failure to acknowledge human "agency." To make the point I shall quote from a passage suggestive of a growing insight among some analytic philosophers and held, as well, by Dewey: "No matter how difficult it may be to specify criteria for what

is to count as agency, and granted that there are many difficult borderline cases--where it is unclear whether X did something or something happened to X--the concept of agency is basic to what sort of creature man is."[68]

The way the class interests for framing choices is concealed by Dahl's analysis is disclosed in his explanation of non-participation. This is explained as non-class related.

According to Dahl, the restraints on participation are mainly legalistic and relatively easily alterable economic ones. The main causes are identifiable and capable of being mitigated, Dahl claims:

> Many of these, and certainly the most unjust ones--registration and voting laws and practices that make participation unnecessarily difficult; discriminatory laws and practices; severe lack of education; inadequate organization and mobilization; apathy produced by poverty or a group history of subjection and defeat--can be eliminated or at the very least greatly reduced. Greater equality in political resources...would reduce gross differences in opportunities for participating in decisions.[69]

Where economic constraints intervene, they are not seen as especially significant in the way social scientists who follow the "power elite" formulation view them. The reason is Dahl's presumption that there is an overriding tendency in advanced industrial societies to soften the tendencies for cumulative advantage. Dahl does not need to refer to the evidence on the distribution of inequalities as he argues in the following way:

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[68] Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action - Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 269.

[69] After the Revolution?, pp. 142-143.

> To be sure, advantages and handicaps tend to be cumulative in all societies. However, in advanced industrial or post-industrial societies, particularly if they are governed by polyarchies, this general tendency is somewhat softened by another. Extreme deprivation is attentuated by government policies and rising incomes, while the inequalities that remain tend to become somewhat less cumulative and more dispersed. By dispersed I mean that persons who are poorer in some resources such as wealth and status often (not always) have access to others such as the ballot, their sheer numbers, their solidarity, their special knowledge, and even some amount of collective economic weight to throw around.[70] (Emphasis added.)

The reasoning is a familiar one.[71] The argument, typically, is addressed to the Marxist critique of political economy. Particularly, it belongs to a set of arguments that attacks Marx's account of the development of social classes in modern capitalist societies.[72] If we follow Bottomore's analysis, however, it becomes evident that "the changes which have taken place are still open to various interpretations."[73] For, the evidence is by no means conclusive, and some aspects of the working class have been hardly studied at all (e.g., the extent to which manual workers have acquired a new outlook and new standards of behavior which resemble those of the middle class).[74]

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70 Ibid., p. 109, and see entire passage.

71 This is the usual argument of businessmen, for instance, who want to make a persuasive case for closer connections between government and business. Dahl expresses the association more directly in his essay, "Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science," in Dahl, Haire, and Lazarsfeld, eds., Social Science Research on Business: Product and Potential (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 1-44.

72 See T. B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society (New York: Vintage, 1966), pp. 22-30.

73 Ibid., p. 30.

74 Ibid., p. 31.

My interpretation would suggest that the sanguine terms of Dahl's analysis are inappropriate. Dahl's account, first, rejects the notion of a politically-significant, biased pattern--one that has design to it--in the distribution of burdens and benefits. Secondly, he rejects out of hand the view that there is a consensus formulated in terms of the dominant class interests. He says, in sum, that there is "no a priori reason for supposing that the rich will display more unity than the poor; and even if they do, it does not follow that the combined resources of the well-off strata will inevitably exceed the combined resources of the badly-off strata."[75] The importance of this point is that these processes affect opportunities for linguistic and cognitive development. The greatest obstacle to democratization and reducing inequalities is not the bugbear of the New Left, an elite of wealthy men, but, he asserts, "for the want of a more appropriate term, the American people."[76] He goes on to repeat himself: "...Americans are curiously tolerant of the inequalities in opportunities, freedom, and influence that inherited wealth create."[77] In the face of all the disturbances of the 1960's, Dahl resorts to a most elastic category for his explanation.

Dahl maintains that political equality will reduce the economic inequalities in American society, and he points to the historical trend toward the expansion of the franchise as an example of this possibility. Dahl does not notice how a position of power is more likely to accrue to itself further advantages so as to protect its position, so as to prevent

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75 *After the Revolution?*, p. 114.

76 Ibid., p. 110.

77 Ibid., p. 113.

the expansion of political equality in a meaningful sense. Some of the advantages that accrue to the dominant class are suggested by Domhoff and include those of political recruitment; political resources (as for instance, incumbancy allows); elaborate channels of intra-class and power elite communications; personal participation in historic issue decisions; and frequency and ease of access to decision centers.[78] The opportunities available to the dominant class by virtue of its position of wealth, education and technical resources for developing and elaborating its own ideology, and control of information, are also ample. As Rousseau, however, framed the matter, the relationship between economic equality and political equality was fundamental.

In addition, class structuring and the forces that perpetuate it are basic factors for disadvantaging some individuals more than others. Thus, to treat the disadvantaged as advantaged in terms of more numbers, capable of some force when aggregated, does no credit to the complex nature of the problem--as the history of mass and other social movements, rightist or leftists, attest. The interacting factors that make the social world quite a different reality than that of a mechanism is just what the systems model is incapable of suggesting. In a mechanical system the energy is clearly definable and accountable by the inputs. In social processes, however, the energy level is not definable in this same way and cannot be limited to the visible and measurable factors; the less-easily quantified forces of belief systems must be considered as well.

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[78] From G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles - The Governing Class in America (New York: Vintage, 1970), p. 105.

Yet, Dahl's account has no place for this examination. Dahl is uncritical of the rules and practices of the consensus, or of the very nature of that consensus, in the United States. Indeed, he depicts American politics as ideology-free and, therefore, static. Dahl simply does not treat the human being as having unique capacities capable of development and as, simultaneously a member of a class or group pressured to conform according to the class's or group's needs and goals. It is this nature of social existence that requires critical examination in terms of the extent to which it contributes to and frustrates human development. Class differences arise from differing relations to the social structure and language capacity (in other words, level of conceptual development) may appropriately be hypothesized as a root structuring factor in advanced industrial society. This consideration merits at least some cursory attention and not disdain.

The reapportionment formula of "one man, one vote" as the expression of political equality can be viewed as illusory unless the disadvantaging factors--economic and linguistic limitations--are attended to for bringing individuals to something like the same starting line. As Bayard Rustin recognized by the mid-1960's, the civil rights movement could not merely be a voting rights movement if it was going to be successful; it had to become a human rights movement as well.

In summary, the analysis has endeavored to show that the concept of participation which Dahl proposes falls short of the classical version. It also falls short in terms of being a scientific approach. In proposing a form of argument and then arguing in favor of (justifying) its propositions, the attitude is that of a promoter. A scientific attitude would involve a listing of the limits of possibility, with consequences and derivatives.

The argument on which the case for Dahl's narrowed conception of participation rests misses the normative aspects of the concept, set out in the first chapter, of Rousseau, Green, and Dewey. This leads to a false emphasis on the importance of size of community and setting and a misplaced rejection of Rousseau. Dahl, proceeds, nevertheless, to make a case for expanding participation, at least in terms of its number of settings. The argument is that the sense of legitimate authority in polyarchy can be further secured in this way. But if the causes of non-participation are not correctly identified, even that sense of legitimacy may not necessarily develop.

Dahl asserts that this is a non-Rousseauan model which he proposes, which it is for the wrong reasons. As my first chapter suggested, Rousseau, Green, and Dewey afford a cogent argument for the multiple settings for participation, governmental as well as non-governmental. Rousseau in his practical writings makes clear his relevance to the small setting; Dewey develops the case more strongly. Other studies have similarly made this claim that Rousseau is applicable to a case for participation in the small setting.[79] The chief contribution of Rousseau, then, was not any focus on the necessity of a small all-embracing polity but the ethical character of citizenship.

"Participation" was a moral notion. It implied that an individual would have adopted a moral point of view by which to act as a (privileged) member of a group, community, nation. In other words, one's actions developed out of a process of identifying the "general will" or "common

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[79] For example, see Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

good." Of necessity, the varied roles of the individual had "political" implications, and it made little sense to treat them segmentally, analytically, after the fashion of the rational economic model. The weakness of Dahl's case is that it is unassimilated to a theory of human development; the effects of participation are to get people what they want, what they have already been encouraged to want, not to promote a growth in the distinctively "human" capacities which develop when individuals are encouraged to act for social reasons, principled reasons.

A Critical Assessment

In important ways the perspective a student of politics brings to inquiry sets the problems for examination, the relationships explored, and, finally, limits possible recommendations offered as guides to action. If a "science" is at all possible in political and social inquiry, it has surely not been realized to the present by the political behavioralist paradigm, for so much that is a feature of politics is left out by it.

A theorist's perspective is, therefore, an appropriate subject to address. On the surface, the behavioralists, Dahl among them, seem to have fashioned a system of thought so protected that the challenges to it seem, on purely logical grounds, to be virtually impenetrable. The basic character of this paradigm remains significantly untouched by the serious criticisms raised in the literature in the past decade. While there are gestures toward counter-argument, Dahl's most recent three studies hardly signify a real comprehension of the philosophic and linguistic issues. Or, for another matter, the work scarcely reveals a sensitivity to the stakes that these philosophic issues, at the political level, imply. For, to assert a certain picture of reality plays some part in also constituting it.[80] The details of Dahl's interpretation, not unlike other interpretations, truly frames a language-game in the Wittgensteinian sense.

My claim is not that Dahl's, or the behavioralists', interpretation does not succeed in some matters. Under limited conditions it succeeds all too well. For instance, quantitative political science is all too

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[80] "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," op. cit., pp. 12-14, 26-31.

successful in the way it has been able to support a technology-industry of electioneering, its claim to impartiality not withstanding. For, predictability and control is possible under limited conditions of time and space. It is at the level of social and political theory that the paradigm fails and fails abysmally.

Well-developed arguments have been presented elsewhere and, for my purposes in this study, it is not necessary to become detailed about them.[81] A few general points should suffice by way of offering objections to the behavioral model. Many others, in more detail, will follow in the chapters to come. I want to offer some comments first on style and then on the problem of the systems model; and, finally, I want to comment on the ideological aspects of Dahl's interpretation.

First, Dahl's style is assertive rather than discursive or persuasive; it is not freely hypothetical. This means that one criterion of adequacy of his theory must be the completeness of cases that can be explained by it. Unfortunately, from my point of view, there are many issues that cannot be rigorously dealt with by the theory so that the style itself becomes illicit. One can note how Dahl establishes himself as an authority in controlling the meanings of words--a process which, anthropologically, is social. Many of Dahl's terms are drawn at a high

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81 For the case against abstracted empiricism see C. Wright Mills, Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), chap. 3; also Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudo-Politics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," American Political Science Review, 59 (March 1965):39-51; and for a lengthy critical essay of Dahl's approach see Peter Euben, "Political Science and Political Silence," in Green and Levinson, eds., Power and Community - Dissenting Essays in Political Science (New York: Vintage, 1969), pp. 3-58.

level of generality. Note that making "choices" (the electorate's prerogative) and making "decisions" (the elected officials' prerogative) is not quite the same occupation; Dahl's language would not have us recognize the significant political differences. This level of generality also leads to equivocation. To illustrate, let me quote Dahl: "By drawing on the resources they do have, the less advantageous can often (not always) acquire leverage and bargaining power."[82] Also, the vocabulary is so neutralized by attempts to "operationalize" that language's connections to human problems have been stripped away. The result is an esoteric language system, not unlike some forms of sociological explanation which Ralf Dahrendorf likened to utopias.[83]

The sciences and the social sciences at their limits seem to need to work with metaphor. I have tried to show what the core metaphor of Dahl's analysis has been. But metaphors are also circumspect, and, finally, they tend to call for replacement. As I. A. Richards has observed: "What we have to do is to watch metaphors at work tricking us and our fellows into supposing matters to be alternatively much simpler and much more complex than they are." In the case of the behavioralist its core metaphor, expressed by the systems model as a self-regulating mechanism, is brought into considerable doubt by the paradigm shift that has occurred in the natural sciences of the twentieth century. Perhaps this can be captured representationally in the Heisenberg Principle of

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[82] After the Revolution?, p. 109.

[83] Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia - Toward A Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," in his Essays in the Theory of Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 107-128.

Uncertainty, which suggests that the object of research is not any more nature as such but nature as exposed to human questioning. Research focuses on the network of relations between man and nature. The question presenting itself is whether empiricist epistemology and its mechanistic model of reality is applicable to the natural and human world, when a chief feature of the contemporary outlook seems to be the assuredness of the inconclusiveness of sense experience as opposed to earlier confidence in its conclusiveness. The philosophic task as Wittgenstein had come to see it was one of human self-understanding, and the task was linguistic.[84]

But the practitioners of the systems model have no doubts that they can conduct their research and develop their considerations "scientifically," outside and apart from the study of man. They are able to assert the claim with some amount of persuasiveness because the case they make (e.g., Verba and Nie) proceeds by the development of small issues. Participation In America amounts to being a case of very skillfully developed detail. This style in art is, not without reason, called "trompe l'oeil."

Important specific and distributive features are omitted by the systems model. An observation of Toulmin helps to suggest the source of the inadequacy of the systemic metaphor. Toulmin writes:

> For human affairs--notoriously, in Descartes own view--lack precisely the kind of tight and self-correcting, or "systemic," organization typical of physiological systems in organisms. The "organization" of entire societies is

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84 This is the interpretation of Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin in Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), chap. 7.

> something less than organic; the behavioral "codes" of human groups are only very partially codifiable; the so-called "social System" is a good deal less than systemic. (And Toulmin adds in a note: "After years of loose talk about "ecosystems," many leading ecologists are now shying away from the term, for similar reasons. The phenomenon so referred to [food-chains, etc.] also lack the stable, self-restoring character of physiological systems: i.e., are not fully "systemic." If only they were!)[85]

The chief feature of the human species, consciousness and susceptibility to symbolism, means society must be viewed as an open-energy process, and this will have historical specificity. The chief feature of the systemic view, of the positivist philosophy of science, is its closedness. Piaget brings this out clearly:

> Positivism is chiefly a philosophy of science which forbids science to cross certain barriers and which, consequently, prejudges the future. In anathemas and prophecies (all subsequently denied in the course of history) from Auguste Comte to the "propositions without significance" of the neo-positivism characteristic of the Vienna Circle, positivism is presented chiefly as a closed doctrine.[86]

Indeed, it may well be that the systems model, as a theoretical framework for generating hypotheses, excludes more than it encompasses.

As unsystematic normative discourse, the analysis of Dahl can be seen to reflect some unexamined commitments. Specifically, the case for expanding the arenas of participation, without attention to developing competences and conduct, continues and reinforces the social trend away from individual autonomy, self-respect, and social responsibility--against, in other words, the humanization of civilization and in the

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[85] Stephen Toulmin, "A Biology of Russian Dolls," New York Review of Books, (July 18, 1974), pp. 30-32.

[86] Jean Piaget, Psychology and Epistemology - Toward A Theory of Knowledge (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 93.

direction of the further technicalization of it. That, I believe, is the certain implication when individuals are encouraged to act on the utilitarian grounds Dahl encourages, given the present culture. Furthermore, Dahl himself exhibits little awareness of the frustrated efforts of some groups to gain the franchise and meaningful participatory power; in this his own work does not seem to show "respect for persons." But, still further, he also fails to be concerned about, objectively, these persons' need to develop their capacities in matters that, at a minimum, directly affect their lives.

By now it should be sufficiently clear that his analysis does not consider the bias of the ground rules and the bias of the political culture in the United States. As a consequence, he serves to reinforce the American myth that voting is a meaningful right and duty for the middle class, when the conditions are such that voting becomes a highly questionable activity for a wide segment of the population. For those of whom this myth remains inoperative, the political process continues to remain illegitimate, and it may be infelicitous to characterize them as "uninterested."

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICAN INTERPRETATION: THE THEORIES OF GRANT McCONNELL AND THEODORE J. LOWI

Introduction

Both participation in the classical sense and participation in the constricted pluralist sense seriously misrepresent the aims and processes of the constitutional republic. This is the claim of an interpretation that constructs a critique of the dominant explanatory theory of the political processes in contemporary American society. It is a critique that traces its roots to the theory of factions of Madison, the fears of majority tyranny of DeTocqueville, and the idea of the rule of law of F. A. Hayek. The common bond of this perspective is the idealization of an extreme individualism. In this chapter I shall endeavor to show how this perspective leads to an account of participation that, on the one hand, correctly perceived the condition under which participation can become cooptive, but that, on the other hand, in assimilating a generally low estimate of human potentiality, dismisses the individual and social advantage obtained through expanded opportunities for participation.

Grant McConnell and Theodore J. Lowi are familiar enough in the political science literature, they have explicitly addressed themselves to developing a theoretical perspective, and taken together they nicely supplement one another--historically and in the cases they survey--to warrant their selection as contemporary exponents of the constitutional republican interpretation.[1] Both McConnell's Private Government and

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[1] One political theorist writing from another perspective considers Lowi's work, for instance, "to be one of the very few expressions today

American Democracy and Lowi's The End of Liberalism, which are the main studies I shall draw upon, are framed in terms of a first part which critically analyzes the limits of liberalism and a later part that illustrates these limits in the formulation and implementation of selected public policies. McConnell's attention, for instance, is directed to the illustration of the problems of the delegation of power at the state level; the indistinct roles of private and public agencies involved in the determination of land and water policy; and in the, particularly administrative, problems of functional autonomy of business and labor.[2] Lowi traces the determination of policy in foreign issues; in the cities--the problems which are interconnected of political jurisdiction, housing, schools, race; and in "old" and "new" welfare.[3]

The task ahead necessitates, first, a sketch of the critique McConnell and Lowi provide of the liberal-pluralist system as it has evolved. It is a critique that rests on some incompletely detailed discrepancies--discrepancies such as exist between liberal rhetoric and practice and between such practice and the ideal of the rule of law. Following this sketch, it will be possible to suggest how and why participation is identified, from the point of view of the constitutional

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of a major intellectual tradition whose insight and failures both can contribute to an adequate theory and strategy of change." See David Kettler, "Beyond Republicanism: The Socialist Critique of Political Idealism," in Surkin and Wolfe, eds., An End to Political Science-The Caucus Papers (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 48.

2 Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Vintage, 1966).

3 Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism - Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

republican, as a hortatory word in the liberal lexicon. Our appraisal of this formulation will be guided by these questions: How are McConnell and Lowi correct in their interpretation in suggesting the distorted nature of much of contemporary participation? And, why, in terms of their strategy for realizing a set of wider, public interests, are they mistaken that participation cannot be a valued goal in an advanced industrial society that aspires to be democratic?

The Theory of Interest Group Liberalism

The contemporary liberal's model of power portrays a system of relatively harmonious social equilibrium maintained by the integrating process of the voluntary association and by the process of negotiation, compromise, and bargaining that occurs in the political arena between economic, social, and political groups. The function of the state is the mediation of the conflicting sets of claims that emerge before its agencies. Out of this process policy reflective of the general interest is expected to issue. And, the individual, as J. S. Mill would say, is left a realm of freedom of action so long as it does not harm others.

Social problems of a wide variety--the racial disturbances of the 1960's, as well as other issues of equity, the difficulties of obtaining regulatory policy in areas such as pollution that would serve the widest public interest, increasingly technocratic institutions of learning just suggest a few of them--give rise to McConnell's and Lowi's suspicions that the proper function of the state has not been realized. Properly, they suggested, against the liberal's "public philosophy," there was a crisis of legitimacy, a crisis of public authority.

"Interest-group liberalism" is the liberals post-1937 ideology for accounting to the public the actions of government. As Lowi formulates it:

> It may be called liberalism because it expects to use government in a positive and expansive role, it is motivated by the highest sentiments, and it possesses strong faith that what is good for government is good for the society. It is "interest-group liberalism" because it sees as both necessary and good that the policy agenda and the public interest be defined in terms of the organized interests in society.[4]

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[4] Ibid, p. 71.

The main consequence of the historical developments that crystallized in the New Deal was the delegation of power, the exercise of governmental power by what might otherwise be considered private groups, and, concomittantly, government's incapacity to achieve justice.[5] This delegation of power takes many forms--for instance, increased Congressional reliance on administrative departments' discretion, the increasing use of the executive agreement and executive order, and in the regulatory commissions, where there was little other directive than the admonition to follow the "public interest," McConnell suggests, the commissioners were "forced into a search for accommodation, and accommodation shifted imperceptivly into corruption."[6]

McConnell and Lowi are clearly stressing the shifting of the general rule-making function out of the hands of duly elected and appointed bodies into private and quasi-private associations in the society. So, while they are rejecting the characterization of the group process as described and appreciated by the pluralists, they also do not embrace the portrayal provided in the "power elite" model of C. Wright Mills, for instance,

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[5] McConnell's normative concept is "the public interest;" Lowi's is "justice." In The End of Liberalism Lowi has a passage that suggests the nature of the ideal they hope to approach: "Considerations of the justice in or achieved by an action cannot be made unless a deliberate and conscious attempt was made by the actor to derive his action from a general rule or moral principle governing such a class of acts. One can speak personally of good rules and bad rules, but a homily or a sentiment, like liberal legislation, is not a rule at all. The best rule is one which is relevant to the decision or action in question and is general in the sense that those involved with it have no direct control over its operation. A general rule is, hence, a priori." p. 290.

[6] Private Power and American Democracy, p. 50.

either. For, that model is stressing the combination of interests that occurs between top economic and top political decision-makers, a combination which constitutes a class consciousness.[7] For McConnell and Lowi the accent is placed on the diffusion of power that has occurred in the political process. The function of government has come to be the provision of system maintenance for the organized groups in society rather than for the society at large.[8]

How, according to this interpretation, did the distinction between the public and the private spheres of authority become blurred? The answer may be suggested in the following brief sketch.

By the end of the nineteenth century the historical forces of industrialization and urbanization had bureaucratized and rationalized most types of organizations, the state being only one among many of them; and neither was it, given the realities of capitalism and the laissez-faire

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7 While the power elite model is considered more correct than the pluralist version in that it recognizes not all coalitions are equivalent, Lowi finds the power elite model unacceptable because it "wrongly assumes a simple relation between status and power." According to Lowi, both the social stratification school and the power elite school "mistake the resources of power for power itself, and escape the analytic and empirical problems by the route of definition." See "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," World Politics, 16 (July 1964):679. And, see McConnell's Private Power and American Democracy, chap. 10, esp. pp. 337-338. Lowi, and McConnell, prefer the model of power characterized in the work of E. E. Schattschneider, which was erroneously received as a pluralist account. "His political arena was decentralized and multi-centered, but relationships among participants were based upon 'mutual non-interference' among uncommon interests. The 'power structure' was stabilized toward the 'command posts'..., not because the officials were above pressure groups, but because the pattern of access led to supportive relations between pressure groups and officials." p. 680.

8 Lowi uses this formulation to characterize the main theme of his study, The Politics of Disorder (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

ethos, the most advanced in that direction.[9] The process, in Lowi's account, did not follow the Marxist theory of a revolutionary stratification along class lines but rather evolved in the direction "where the addition and multiplication of classes tendsto wipe out the very notion of class stratification."[10] This is McConnell's point as well. Lowi makes two observations: (1) That in the modern pluralist systems, modern developments have brought about a discontinuity between that which is socioeconomic and that which is political, and (2) that in a pluralist society there is always a discontinuity between politics and government.[11] It might be helpful for the purposes of future argument to see that this interpretation has placed emphasis on the multiplicity and diversity of interests developing in human society. It is a conception of interests which has connections to the existing modes of production and consumption and, yet, is also tied to claims for universal values--liberty, justice, morality.[12]

McConnell's account is useful in providing a history of some of the

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9 End of Liberalism, pp. 33-41.

10 Ibid., p. 42.

11 Ibid., pp. 45, 48.

12 I draw this conclusion from McConnell's own characterization: "Another difficulty derives from the fact that no individual has a single interest, opinion, or characteristic. He may have a very clear and dominant interest as a producer, but he will inevitably also be a consumer. He may also be a Catholic, a fisherman, and a stamp collector. Inescapably, people differ in many ways and there are many dimensions of social difference." Private Power and American Democracy, p. 101. See also Kettler's comparison of Lowi to Hegel on this point, "Beyond Republicanism," pp. 49-50.

ideas instrumental in defending the evolving group process. McConnell, for one, attributed significant responsibility to the Progressive movement's response. One of the ironies of American politics, for him, was that the most viable political movement to attack the corruptions of private power turned out to be a "justification and acceptance of the ends it set out to destroy."[13] The Progressives took the power out of politics (in their non-partisan reforms, for instance), and they unwittingly failed to question the power of private groups and the use of power in the decentralized political locale. Furthermore, they lent an assist to the creation of administering agencies which were unguided by any clear standards of the public interest.

The accretion of public power by the private sphere was supported and defended in many ways. Business's main doctrine against the concentration of governmental power banked on the model of cooperation between government and corporation worked out during the war and under the theory of administrative decentralization of Herbert Hoover; it took the forms of voluntary cooperation, voluntary self-regulation, and the idea of the trusteeship.[14] Agriculture found rationalizations for the decentralized structure that evolved out of the farm bureau movement by appealing to the long-standing, and rhapsodized Jeffersonian tradition that identified the small, local political unit with democracy.[15] Labor, anti-statist and seeking its own economic autonomy, appealed to the slogan, coined by Gompers, of "voluntarism."[16] A shared attitude to government was common

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13 Private Power and American Democracy, p. 32.

14 Ibid., pp. 50-70.

15 Ibid., pp. 70-79.

16 Ibid., pp. 79-88.

to all these groups. It composed three doctrines. First, was "a very loud and persistent appeal for liberty" (which was a view of liberty represented as the absence of compulsion, mainly, by the state); secondly, "a belief in small units of association as the essence of democracy," and thirdly, "a dislike of law and formal authority."[17]

The historical perspective on the relationship between government and private groups is brought up to date in Lowi's The End of Liberalism. The New Deal fixed the old conservative-liberal dialogue about positive government by establishing the mechanism of politics by administration in 1937. Rule of law gave way to rule by administration; legislation of integrity, such as the Social Security Act of 1935, gave way to public policy by non-law, such as the Economic Opportunities Act of 1964. Issues of morality such as civil rights gave way to problems of equity and the legislation of payoffs. Formalism and impersonality, seeming to imply compulsion and inflexibility to the "faint-hearted" liberal, gave way to discretionary and arbitrary practices. The characteristic feature was the avoidance of standards; the public interest, lacking precise and absolute criteria, became little more than a cliche, and found easy ratification by a political science profession made up of group theorists for whom value-free science might even require the denial of a public interest.

The new public philosophy, "interest-group liberalism," was bought at a price. While it made the state an acceptable source of power and justified positive government for the twentieth century, and while it also helped to disprove the Marxian notion of solidarity of classes and class dominated government, its costs ran high:

> But the zeal of pluralism for the group and its belief in a natural harmony of group competition tended to break down the very ethic of government by reducing the essential conception of government to nothing more

than another set of mere interest groups.[18]

More than this group-view of the state was wrong about the pluralist interpretation, however. McConnell and Lowi take issue on two points of the characterization. First, their examination of the internal dynamics of groups suggests that the small group was far from the essence of democracy that was claimed for it. And secondly, they argued, in following Schattschneider's analysis of the "scope of conflict," that the group process is biased in favor of some groups and against others.[19]

The common feature of the private association and the small unit of government was its oligarchic character. Several points can make this evident. For one thing, the case is not entirely clear that all individuals are entirely free to join and leave an association as they will. But even if they were, McConnell's case suggests, the internal structure is not likely to be such that it imposes no limits on the freedom of the individual. Membership usually involves an homogeneity of interest and belief. The internal systems of governance are not regulated by democratic principles or by a bill of individual rights, and, not only are the private associations capable of imposing a wide range of sanctions, they are even able to "call down the action of public authority over which they have established a strong degree of influence." The pressure for conformity reigns in the small group. Furthermore, the values that the private association supports publicly are not always those associated

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[18] The End of Liberalism, p. 48.

[19] The following account draws mainly on McConnell's discussion in "The Public Values of the Private Association," in Pennock and Chapman, eds., Voluntary Associations: Nomos XI (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), pp. 147-160. See also Private Power and American Democracy, chap. 5, and Lowi's Politics of Disorder, chap. 3.

with liberty and are more likely opposed to it; they tend to be the values of order and stability. Too frequently their only goal is the achievement and protection of privilege.

In inter-group arrangements, some groups are favored by access to particular resources or relationships. Others, completely unorganized, stand in a noncompetitive position, and it is euphemistic to speak of them as "potential interest groups." For instance, farm migrant workers, Negroes, and the urban poor are not included in the celebrated pluralist system. With each group geared for achieving its own particular partial interests, group interaction tends to the realization of narrow-range economic interests rather than the values which are preeminently public. Thus, in the fragmented political system of virtually autonomous small groups the values of clean water and air, the conservation of areas of scenic beauty, and competent public education are unlikely to be emphasized. The group process, in the end, trades the values of stability and order for limitations on liberty, equality, and numerous other public values.

McConnell's charge is then that "organization of political life by small constituencies tends to enforce conformity, to discriminate in favor of elites, and to eliminate public values from effective political consideration."[20] The republican interpretation, therefore, maintains that how the nation is organized is exceedingly important. The size of the constituency matters:

> Quite different results may be obtained with the same distribution of interests depending on whether the context they are placed in is centralized or decentralized.[21]

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[20] Private Power and American Democracy, p. 6.

[21] Ibid., pp. 91-92.

If the causes of faction cannot be removed, one must address the effect of faction. Madison's solution of centralizing power in a national constituency would provide the basis for an answer. It was "very simply, large political units."[22] Diversity of interests in the large constituency is what makes possible the achievement of the wider, more diffuse and abstract public values.[23]

The argument rests on its peculiar conception of "interests," which assumes that any aggregate of individuals will seek to achieve, in the most economical way, its self-interest. The argument is developed in Mancur Olsen's The Logic of Collective Action and assumes a mathematical model. There is a sense in which a functional interest in a small and familiar setting is able to secure any and all of the social and political forces necessary for its own dominance. As the conditions are altered by the increase in numbers of competing interests--the shift from a condition of homogeneity to heterogeneity of interests, the tendency (which might be represented as a "law of interests") is for the more general, abstract, and diffuse interests to prevail.[24] The argument rests on a view, unsupported by the evidence of the American political process, that the

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[22] Madison's is regarded by McConnell as "the most illuminating treatment of the problem we have." Ibid., p. 103. An excellent logical and theoretical critique of the Madisonian model is provided by George D. Beam, Usual Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), chap. 4.

[23] Private Power and American Democracy, pp. 104-107.

[24] The principle is axiomatic for McConnell and Lowi. In responding to Dahl's argument against Madison on this point, McConnell argues that Dahl "passes over the great differences among the values served by majorities drawn from constituencies of different sizes." Private Power and American Democracy, Note 18, p. 397. He concedes, however, that there may be no way to demonstrate the claim that large constituencies will lead to "better" majorities--at least, for determined skeptics.

decisions reached in the large unit can escape the forces that act on the small ones, that "size" is the crucial variable. The conception of interests that ties McConnell and Lowi to the large constituency finds, then, at best, only superficial correspondence with Rousseau's notion of the General Will as I have characterized its conditions and features. For, what is important to Rousseau is the effort to form good moral character by all directly sharing in the processes of deliberation; for McConnell and Lowi how character is to be nurtured is beside the point.

Tracing out the logic of their position, McConnell and Lowi (and Schattschneider) recommend in their political strategy attention to the expansion of the political arena and to the distinct separation of the public order from the private. The specific objective is to encourage the important rule-making authority to be centralized in the largest political unit--namely the national level of government. Especially important would be the reassertion of the powers of Congress, albeit its "localist" aspect, and the proper functions of the President. At the time of his writing, McConnell seemed to advocate this strengthening of the President as a valid and useful trend: "The constituency of this majestic office is all the people. The prestige of its occupant is so great that when his power is husbanded and skillfully used he can make innovations of policy in the interest of those who are outside the pluralist scheme of rule."[25] With the escalation of the Vietnam War a few years later Lowi expressed some reservations. Also, the work of the Supreme Court, as best exemplified in the 1935 Schechter rule that

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[25] Private Power and American Democracy, p. 351. And see his The Modern Presidency (New York: St. Martin's Press, 196).

abrogated Executive powers in regulation, is regarded as fulfilling the requirement of the rule of law. McConnell would have us believe that its constituency is the whole nation.[26] Return to the original constitutional principles may necessitate a strengthening of the unplanned for party system, as the process by which to determine the legitimate regime. The state governments are viewed as important loci of governmental powers in some particular, functional areas. But, as the federal arrangements of the U. S. Constitution provide, there is and should be no rule-making authority for local units of government, cities, or towns.[27]

Lowi's phrase "juridical democracy" is only another way of speaking for the same shared political objectives. His paradigm of "juridical democracy" would call for the implementation of the following proposals: (1) The restoration of the rule of law, which would regard statutory law as the essence of government; (2) the establishment of rule of law by administrative formality; (3) the development of a truly independent and integrated administrative class, a Senior Civil Service; (4) the restoration of regional (state) government; (5) the replacement of subsidy-type policies with "genuine" fiscal policies; and (6) to insure an organic constitution, adoption of a tenure of statutes act.[28] Implementation of juridical democracy must rest on the persuasiveness of the republicans' appeal to "fit" men and women to seek public office and the exhortation to Congressmen and women and other public officials to following a priori rules.

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[26] Ibid., p. 352.

[27] Ibid., chap. 6, and End of Liberalism, p. 282.

[28] End of Liberalism, pp. 297-310.

The Constitutional Republican Account of Participation

The constitutional republicans' dismissal of the small unit as a setting for citizen participation is involved with their projection of public virtue onto the large constituency. The dismissal of the small unit upon which this projection rests, cannot be viewed, however, as logically and theoretically required. I shall try to show the particular formulation of the problem of decentralization and what participation comes to mean for the interpretation of McConnell and Lowi in order to suggest some of the difficulties with it.

Both McConnell's and Lowi's attention is focused on the meaning, for the legitimacy of public policy, of the devolution of public power: (1) To the local political unit and its subunits, (2) to the quasi-public units such as the regulatory agencies, and (2) to the private association such as the trade association and the trade union which are characterized by their intimate connections to public officials and agencies. Their focus, then, is on the structure and ideology of "decentralization;" it is not specifically or directly a theory of citizen participation. Indeed, following the defeat of the 1972 Democratic Presidential candidate, Lowi argues the case for "abstentionism."

To the constitutional republicans the urge to decentralize can be discovered in divergent sources. One of the main forces, however, has been the historical yet mythical association between the small agrarian unit and democracy. There is "a conception of the small geographic community as the repository of social virtue."[29] For McConnell, but Lowi

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[29] Private Power and American Democracy, p. 93.

can be seen to share the view as well, the connection is more an idealized one than a closely examined consideration:

> The view of the small community as the natural home of freedom has been much more a direct perception than a general theory. If the community is autonomous, it is free; self-government itself is freedom--this has been the equation seen by small communities and new nations for most of history and asserted today as vigorously as ever (and almost invariably without elaboration), as though a self-evident truth.[30]

The claims made on behalf of increased participation in various local settings, governmental or non-governmental, are from McConnell's and Lowi's standpoint, to be viewed as ideological or misconceived or both. Their targets are not, unfortunately, very clearly identified; but they do single out the positions of the liberal-pluralists, the New Left, and the Guild Socialists. Perceiving these models as more approximate to attitudes than well-reasoned theoretical conceptions, both McConnell and Lowi fail to treat seriously some of the more important claims made for participation by them. This failure, for instance, leads them to liken indiscriminately the Rousseauist claim to citizen participation with other sorts of claims for decentralization. All of the following are equated: Pluralism, countervailing power, creative federalism, partnership, maximum feasible participation, grassroots democracy, participatory democracy.[31] They are all equated, because they are all regarded as slogans. For the real meaning of participation is taken to be "politics behind closed doors," "politics in smoke-filled rooms." Those would be

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[30] Ibid., pp. 72, 94.

[31] End of Liberalism, pp. 85, 95, 293; Private Power and American Democracy, p. 122.

the paradigmatic cases of participation for McConnell and Lowi.

We can see from the foregoing that this interpretation seeks to circumscribe the role for participation in various localized settings in a democratic society: In local government, in the neighborhood, in the town meeting, in trade associations, in the union, at the workplace. The republican interpretation rests on discrediting local participation by claiming to demonstrate the political effects of decentralization: That some elements of the public get "shut out."[32] For, the goal is to shove the whole process of the formulation, discussion, and deliberation of policy affecting the public to the one overriding constituency--the national government. What role is left for the citizen is more constrained then that espoused by the pluralist or that recommended by the radical-liberal. The role of the citizen would seem to be that of becoming involved in the party nominating and election processes which have as their function the establishment of a legitimate regime--for the state or for the nation. The limits of citizen involvement in the McConnell-Lowi scheme, however, I cannot find anywhere suggested. It would seem, probably, to be quite limited to the determination of representatives if the programmatic function of the party is as circumscribed as it appears to be for Lowi.[33] This view may have changed in recent years.

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[32] End of Liberalism, pp. 86-87.

[33] From my reading of the following article I do not gather that Lowi looks too favorably upon the programmatic-responsible party model of many European systems and seems to find acceptable the contemporary American party pattern. He concludes his essay: "The United States possesses as many of the conditions of instability or of mobilization as France and Germany do, but with the major difference that our irresponsible parties have managed to keep legitimacy and policy separated. This is a peculiar but important type of differentiation. Given the contemporary world tendency for legitimacy to become intertwined with policies and for constitutions to fall over issues, it is remarkable that American parties manage to maintain this particular kind

Lowi seems to read the defeat of the 1972 Democratic Presidential candidate as confirmation of the impossibility of citizen politics; what began as an issue-campaign ended by merely seeking, under the guile of the pollsters, conquest. Lowi's conclusion was that the militant commitment to conventional politics proved as useless as earlier forms of protest against the establishment. Perhaps, he recommends, the only untried route is "abstentionism" or actual participation by refusing, on publicly expressed principle, to participate.[34] Abstentionism would withhold from the politicians much needed public consent.

A brief review of several selected cases may show in closer detail the structure of participation that McConnell and Lowi perceive occurring in the decentralized setting. The four I have selected seem to indicate that McConnell and Lowi have addressed themselves to a wide range of situations for which participation has been sought and given shape but not the widest possible range.

1. Participation in the Urban Setting: One of the most important concerns to students of public policy must be the complex pathology of America's metropolitan areas and the seeming inability of government--national, state or local--to deal with it in any satisfactory degree. No Presidential explanation has grappled with the most crucial fact of the problem--that in reacting to the urban area's problems government

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of differentiation at all. The salient fact is that they do. "Party, Policy, and Constitution in America," in Chambers and Burnham, eds., The American Party Systems - Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford, 1967), p. 276.

[34] Theodore J. Lowi, "A 'Critical' Election Misfires," Nation, December 18, 1972.

undertook to find solutions by political subdivision. From the 1930's onward most metropolitan areas were parceled so that the true socio-economic entity of New York or Chicago, which the older method of annexation allowed, is not even sustained as a legal fiction. To the point, Lowi notes Robert Wood's study of New York's 1,400 governments. "Fear found a means, through government," according to Lowi, "to divide the individible unit into an incapacitated marketplace of publics. There are now many publics, but there is no polity."[35] The stratification of society was legally sanctioned by establishing the independent constituencies of various socio-economic groups. The political expediency of subdivision, for festering social conflicts could be more easily avoided and suppressed in this way, made possible and achieved all too frequently abandonment of the city's gravest human problems, while its physical structure was used by day but not maintained except in the barest ways. The mayor, not even empowered to control his own tax base and budget, under the interest-group process was caught up in the process of bargaining which was unguided by any principle or standard. The mayor's political base was so carved up in terms of bureaucratic fiefdoms that Lowi suggests they are best characterized as "islands of functional power," sanctioned and sustained by federal law and practice. The arrangement, obviously, negates any possibility of coordinated and comprehensive, long-term programming that would adequately address the city's needs. Lowi and McConnell are so opposed to the results of these enclaves of localized powers that they would abrogate citizenship at the local level altogether (i.e., the election of local public officials).

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[35] End of Liberalism, p. 197.

2. Maximum Feasible Participation: The War on Poverty program was an expression of interest-group liberalism par excellence. Delegation of power was the order of the day in this statute. To the extent the statute is end-oriented, its directives are better viewed as sentiments than specific standards. It was process-oriented non-law. Several problems are identified from the formulation of this program: (1) A system of justice, under which poverty appears randomly but apparently not, less frequently cannot be achieved by programs that merely indemnify the poor. For, the cause of poverty is not poverty but the injustices caused by racism. (2) The dominant interests continue their dominance. In New York City where politics was originally fragmented, the participation-clause furthered the structure of fragmentation; in Chicago, where power was already controlled by a machine, it was further consolidated. (3) The programs were paternalistic. (4) This was a paternalism, furthermore, that demoralized, because it deprived "the disappointed something to shoot against," it "took the heat off" the real moral issues. (5) Official recognition of some groups and representatives tended to mitigate the emergence of others. (6) The program in its totality of ineffectualness encouraged a cynicism toward public objects.[36]

3. Community Control of the Schools: For Lowi as for many others, public education is probably the most crucial opportunity by which the structure of racism can be destroyed. Yet, the public school has succumbed to interest-group liberalism as well. By the manner in which

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[36] Ibid., pp. 233-249.

they are districted and controlled, in flagrant disregard for any publicly meaningful scheme, schools have become the proprietary rights of various contending groups--parents, PTA's, the unions, professional educators, and so forth, until finally the black separatists too sought to establish their claims. For Lowi, the separatists have no more superior claim, because of their suffering, to establishing a private system of education than the other groups that press weak and illegal reasons to fight off integration through busing experiments. Not community control of public school education but "public" control is what is needed; schools are not the proper domain of cities.[37]

4. Participation in Trade Associations: One of the well-touted claims of interest-group liberals, according to Lowi, is their contention that the trade association be treated as a form of interest group, that it could be regarded as "merely a means of efficient representation of certain economic interests."[38] This view could not be further from the truth in the republican analysis; as suggested above, both McConnell and Lowi are skeptical of the presumption for democratic procedures internally and their service to democratic values in general. And not only trade associations but a multitude of others should be regarded in the same way. Many of these, for instance, the government has established itself or become dependent upon for information, regulation, and administrative services. Lowi suggests that this relationship leads to the favoring of some groups over others: "Decentralization through delegation of power

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[37] Ibid., pp. 275-281.

[38] Politics of Disorder, chap. 3, p. 69.

to lower levels almost always results in unequal access and group domination of the public situation.... Formal recognition of groups and their representatives for purposes of such participatory democracy converts each group so honored into an official component of government. Such recognition converts what is already an oligarchic situation into an involuntary situation."[39] Lowi is lead to the conclusion that the situation is little different between a Chicago gang called the Blackstone Rangers which forces teenagers to become members and the community organizer who will say, "Join our organization or you will have very little say in community policy-making."

The central criticism of the McConnell-Lowi interpretation is the inability of decentralization, in the forms that they review, to achieve "justice," but the concept of distributive justice they recommend is not very clear. The four illustrations are tied together by a demonstration of participation as a group process which gives more weight to some than others in the formation of policy decisions and which does not encompass all the persons affected by the decisions. And, this is an important and compelling complaint. In all cases participation has become an incantation, a halo word, a hortatory word; the slogan is substituted for programs firmly defined by legal and moral criteria and vigorously executed by authorized use of power. The shared point in these illustrations is that when public authority is widely and irregularly dispersed, two purposes are in evidence: The first, the hope to avoid the problems of law and, secondly, the effort merely to ameliorate conditions, not rout them out.

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[39] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

McConnell and Lowi, therefore, are undoubtedly correct, at least in terms of their cases, as identifying some forms of participation as cooptive. Neither the radical-liberal, Bachrach, nor a radical like Tom Hayden or Herbert Marcuse, would disagree. Hayden's article, "Welfare Liberalism and Social Change," for instance, may more dramatically and closely portray the situation from the point of view of the poor, but the indictment remains the same: The poverty program seeks to be a substitute parent more than a meal ticket, an agency of socialization more than of welfare; the definition of objectives is middle class; control is by elites; the Southern black movement is more liberating with real legal targets to fight than the liberal Negro machine of the North.[40]

But Hayden is also aware of some other features that the constitutional republican interpretation fails to take into account. The point about "cooptive" participation is that certain features are present that may lend the appearance of participation but others, which would give it a reality fitting the classical model, are not. The key feature is the pattern of authority relations between the participants; in the cooptive situation it is a vertical one; the classic model suggests only under conditions of mutual respect and autonomy, which requires not only political equality but social equality as well, can the individual be expected to act morally. Thus, "citizen participation" as a bureaucratic ideology is intended to increase the acceptability of the agency's action to the influenced public. As Krause shows with two examples, participation

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[40] Tom Hayden, "Welfare Liberalism and Social Change," in Gettleman and Mermelstein, eds., The Great Society Reader (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 476-501.

is directed at target groups. When the proponent is the local urban renewal agency, the primary clientele group is the middle and upper class and the primary target of the ideology is the poor neighborhood and its residents. In the community action program, the clientele and the target group are the same. Where cooperation is obtained, or in the case of the urban renewal agency, the benefits more frequently accrued to the clientele group than the poor. When the situation was conflict-ridden, as in the case of the CAP agency, federal offices put pressure on the agency to "cool it," using the leverage from appropriations.[41]

McConnell and Lowi fail to suggest any distinction between such features, while the radical case must, for those other features may be theoretically, if not politically, possible. The radical-liberal and the radical want to make them politically achievable. McConnell's and Lowi's interpretation is helpful in showing the conditions of a cooptive or manipulative participation, but they overgeneralize from their cases to suggest that participation in any local setting is not conducive to the public interest and social justice.

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[41] Elliott A. Krause, "Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology: 'Citizen Participation,'" Social Problems, 16 (1968):136-141. Krause's conclusion is: "Thus the citizen participation ideology, from the point of view of the target group, is an irrelevant or empty phraseology. From the functional point of view, it appears in most cases to be either detrimental to or ineffective for the target group, if they accept it or act on it, in the present social context." p. 141.

A Critical Assessment

The critique of the McConnell-Lowi interpretation and their account of participation would be facilitated if some of the key features of their model of politics, in which their concept of participation may be seen to be embedded, is summarized. The following points, I hope, will be found suggestive:

1. The lack of participation (as, for instance, measured even minimally by voting turnout, roll-off, and drop-off) is not considered a problem for the McConnell-Lowi interpretation. They do not ask, What will encourage more people to engage intelligently in the electoral processes? Or even, Who participates? Who does not participate? Why? For them, it is the call to participation, even when it would encourage excluded groups to translate troubles into public issues, that is questioned and challenged.

2. Their political model appears to accept public apathy and other anomic features of a mass, technocratic society. The concept of man that McConnell and Lowi adopt is the least explicitly reasoned aspect of their perspective. If, as seems the case, they have assimilated the view of man shared by Madison, Schumpeter, and Lippman, theirs is a conception of "abstract individualism." Lukes offers a helpful characterization of this view:

> According to this conception, individuals are pictured abstractly as given, with given interests, wants, purposes, needs, etc.; while society and the state are pictured as sets of actual or possible social arrangements which respond more or less adequately to those individuals' requirements. Social and political rules and institutions are, on this view, regarded collectively as an artifice, a modifiable instrument, a means of fulfilling independently

> given individual objectives; the means and the end are distinct. The crucial point about this conception is that the relevant features of individuals determining the ends which social arrangements are held (actually or ideally) to fulfill, whether these features are called instincts, faculties, needs, desires, rights, etc., are assumed as given, independently of a social context. This givenness of fixed and invariant human psychological features leads to an abstract conception of the individual who is seen as merely the bearer of those features, which determine his behaviour, and specify his interests, needs and rights.[42]

This view of man, and the epistemology to which it is connected, should be regarded as a perspectival choice which precludes examining the possibility of participation in local settings, when reformed, for achieving the values they seek.

3. "Politics" is defined narrowly as an activity engaged in by officially elected representatives. There is a sense in which the constitutional republican analysis, I feel, envisions that society's corporate associations can be "cleansed" of their "political" influence.

4. McConnell and Lowi share with Hayek the view that the State and the people are separate and distinct entities. This is a view that stands in opposition to the theory of sovereignty of Rousseau, which rejects the unnatural bifurcation of an individual into two beings, a man and a citizen.

5. The State must stand somewhere above any of the corporate associations in the society and regulate the terms in which those associations operate.

6. The State can reasonably be expected to assume a moral intent when it acts.

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[42] Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973), p. 73.

7. There is a role for the citizen. Civic duty involves the necessary involvement in the party processes to nominate and select worthy representatives in the federal system. This version of citizenship would seem to emphasize the side of obligation to obey the civic order, to fulfill such civic roles of sacrifice as are demanded, for instance, in time of war.

8. Political education is the work of a central authority, the State, and not of diverse social groups that are narrowly directed by their self-interests. Lowi's image is not of "mass education" but of a national educational system as the only possible system that could achieve the universal values of justice that he is committed to; he expresses it as "the gigantic task of reeducation toward the universalization of the values concerning the human relations of Americans."[43]

Can we accept the explanatory theory of McConnel and Lowi? Contemporary republicanism begins by attacking the rationale by which the pluralist ideologists claim the political process follows and which McConnell and Lowi also take to be the reality of that process. While McConnell and Lowi are somewhat equivocal on this point, it would seem to be pertinent to suggest that they reject a Marxist definition of "ideology," as a justification for a practice which may in some important ways distort the reality of the process. Lowi sees interest-group liberalism more as faulty rationalization than as a smokescreen behind which economic and political interests can collaborate.

I think it is important to pose the question, however, the extent to which the ideology of the group process adequately represents the

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[43] Kettler's essay "Beyond Republicanism" has been very helpful to me in drafting this summary. The quote is from Lowi's End of Liberalism, p. 269.

use of power in the American system. Are McConnell and Lowi correct that political and legitimate power is diffuse--in other words, that C. Wright Mills is fundamentally wrong and not merely in error in minor ways? I want to argue the position that McConnell and Lowi are only half correct in their view of the distribution of power. The lines of conflict may not be drawn around two integrated and opposing classes, but it is not very correct to say that the lines around which interests are formed are not coordinated at all. If this is the case, it does not make too much sense to draw the centralization-decentralization dichotomy.

One way to suggest the nature of this argument is by reexamining their selection of case studies. To what extent do their cases mirror the important cases of power? Their examples are national farm, labor and business policy; the problems of state and local government; welfare policy; and to a lesser extent the conduct of foreign policy. They fail to examine two policy areas in which the central government, and mainly the President, has increasingly expanded the use of its authority. In economic matters, the President has exercised executive powers to effect the economy in crucial ways, which often puts the U. S. Government in a favored position; these have been powers used to go off the gold standard; to do deficit-spending; to control, through the Council of Economic Advisors and Treasury Department, monetary flow; to compete with private banks; and with the assistance of Congress to fail to develop a satisfactory and equitable progressive tax structure. And in the other area, the filling of elite positions, the game of musical chairs between top decision-makers of the Pentagon and the defense industry, as well as the military's commanding share of the national budget, and its role in

in propaganda, seem to me compelling reasons to suggest that centralized tendencies, in which political and economic interests converge, not decentralizing tendencies, give the determinate character to the American political scene.[44]

Within this framework, why cannot an insufficient, decentralized welfare program be seen as the minimal cost necessary to buy off dissent in order to continue the general scheme of things? To this extent, McConnell and Lowi may be correct. What is suggested by their cases is that groups with particularist claims can be deferred to when their claims do not conflict with the broad governing principle, the established and secured consensus. Such groups can even be useful in reproducing it. McConnell and Lowi may even be correct that some economic associations exert more political influence than the national government itself; such seems to be the development of the multi-national corporation in the past twenty years. Finally, McConnell and Lowi may be correct that participation in the local setting will never, as a structure of power, break the lock-hold these associations have.

But, there are also other forces of centralization in society to which McConnell and Lowi never attribute significance. These are the forces involved in the creation and reproduction of power relations in society. The only target is the "small group," of which no analytic distinctions are made. In sum, Lowi may have swallowed too much of the liberal ideology in failing to characterize for himself the consequences--for the life of the individual, for the shape of the internal and external

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[44] Here I am drawing on the work, generally, of John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).

relations of groups; for the chance of a principles legal system--of these system-wide forces for conformity, of these other "socializing forces." In the same way, they neglect the political parties as a factor in the integration into a narrow political consensus.

Is there evidence to confute the generalization McConnell and Lowi make that all groups, as a matter of sociological tendency, lead to unjust, and, therefore, illegitimate political effects? Again, their cases do not examine those where the merits of participation are upheld. They select the weakest cases, overlooking the developed cases for neighborhood control, community control, workers' councils, as well as other similar experiments.[45] They suggest some of the groups (e.g., League of Women Voters) are public-interest oriented, but these get lost in the shuffle (both in reality and in their theory). McConnell and Lowi conflate the "synthetic" group of industrial sociology with the town meeting and the Quaker meeting, not realizing that the conditions and the results may be quite different.[46] There is no attention to the effect participation in small settings may have for the development of the human personality.

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[45] Such proposals are worked out, for instance, in the writings of Milton Kotler, Marilyn Gittell, and Andre Gorz among many others. Lowi's heedless attitude is reflected, for instance, in this statement which fails to credit the New Left, a cicumlocution which avoids identifying anyone, with any coherent theoretical statements: "The renewed and intensified cries for decentralization in the past decade--this time by the sentimental left rather than the right--provides further testimony to growing distrust of duly constituted authorities. But they provide no constructive direction for new uses of authority or new structures of authority." End of Liberalism, p. 268. We might also note, incidentally, Lowi's conflation of the right and left has parallels in Hayeks' conflation of fascism and socialism. F. A. Hayek, Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 113 and inter alia.

[46] See Private Power and American Democracy, pp. 95-96.

The social organizations of a society, however, are not abstract creations but mediating institutions between the society and the individual, and this fact is not taken into account in the analysis. In this, they are cultural formations, and as such they are transmutable.[47] McConnell and Lowi uncautiously and unnecessarily dismiss all participation in local settings. As Peter Bachrach contends: "There is no denying the force of McConnell's thesis that small units conducive to popular participation are also vulnerable to elite manipulation and domination. However, this danger can be avoided, at least to a considerable degree, if the membership of the small unit is not also homogeneous and congenial to elite control."[48]

In rushing (with Madison, who Beam argues had good reason to be more concerned with political expediency than logical and conceptual issues) to the judgment that only an indirect, representative process will serve the interests of individual rights and liberties, McConnell and Lowi hasten to sanctify the loss of the one element the opponents of the Constitution were so fearful, and justifiably, of losing.[49] This was a

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47 Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), chap. IV, "The Group." This point of view proposed that, "If one really wants to do justice to the mediative character of the social formation which is contained in the term group, then one cannot proceed from a concept of group which is unequivocally fixed for all time." p. 65. And, "The relation of the individual to society itself underlies these social dynamics." p. 66. They term many of the newly differentiated groups as "synthetic" when "they are themselves planned from above, as cushions between the anonymous collectives and the individual. Such types as company or factory associations belong to this type...." p. 68.

48 Peter Bachrach, "Corporate Authority and Democratic Theory," in David Spitz, ed., Political Theory and Social Change (New York: Atherton, 1967), p. 269.

49 Bean, pp. 66-70. This theory is argued in Jackson Turner Main, The Anti-Federalists - Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961).

loss which they sought to prevent through struggle and, finally achieved only as a partial concession in the Bill of Rights. The claims for more popular and local government failed, but they wanted the right of self-determination in matters that directly affected their lives (most certainly, in economic matters) in the face of the growth of a propertied, elite class with aristocratic pretensions.

To what extent is the contemporary republican interpretation anymore concerned with the securing of individual liberty for all than was the original doctrine? The grounds on which the argument rests is not very compelling. As Lukes suggests for Hayek, there is a basis for suspicion: "The prescription of economic individualism, while appealing to the values of equality and liberty, in fact amounts to their denial."[50] If the pluralists were providing rationales for an indirect democratic process in advanced industrial society, the contemporary constitutional republicans took the next step, a regressive one, to seal its fate.

The role left for the individual in the constitutional republican order where public and private realms were separate and distinct was clearly minimal. McConnell's and Lowi's writings are poverty-stricken as sociology. The theory remains formidably silent on the activities of the individual and his relationship to the society at large. It lacks

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[50] Lukes, p. 154. To this point, Hayek's claim on behalf of the Rule If Law is revealing: "It cannot be denied that the Rule of Law produces economic inequality--all that can be claimed for it is that this inequality is not designed to affect particular people in a particular way." Road to Serfdom, p. 79.

the "sociological apperception," which "reveals society as irreducibly constitutive of or built into the individual in crucial and profound ways."[51] The role viz-a-viz the state is essentially passive, resting as it does on a theory of law which relegates claims on behalf of human needs, purposes, and aspirations to the dumpheep of ideas in favor of an a priori construct. (But that the notion of an a priori is closer to dated, religious preconceptions would seem apparent to me.) Thus, in the case studies we find it is not desirable to have blacks, poor, workers communicate their needs and grievances to others within society's established institutional arrangements. The paradox of the theory is that it is acceptable for these claims to be asserted in social movements.[52]

The difficulties of the interpretation on these points is traceable to the republicans' abstract conception of the individual, a conception which I regard as generally inappropriate and unfruitful for a contemporary democratic theory.[53] The notion of the dignity of man and the ideal autonomy are missing from their account, for instance, Lowi, in persisting to equate (erroneously) participatory democracy or community control with interest-group liberalism fails to perceive the very important grievances, the conditions of non-freedom, the powerlessness of sectors

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[51] Lukes, pp. 150-151.

[52] See, Politics of Disorder, shap. 2.

[53] Lukes provides two arguments for this conception's inadequacy: "First, because it in fact forms the basis for a particular ideological view of a certain sort of society and its social relations, and second, because it represents a primitive and a- or pre-sociological view of the nature of the individual." p. 152.

of the population. As Dewey tried to put it in everyday language, only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches.

Decentralization has several arguments to its advantage: (1) It can allow the expression of suppressed needs, wants, and aspirations; (2) it can afford opportunities to develop a capacity for defining these personal troubles and translating them into public issues; (3) it can develop the human capacities and the self-respect that only comes when an individual acts as an agent in breaking out of his or her own alienating condition. This capacity, this sense of autonomy, cannot be derived when others claim to take on the task, especially when they may continue to be part of the problem in other serious ways. As Philip Green suggests, the answer to conflicts in decentralized units, such as were exhibited in the New York School Strike of 1968, may be more decentralization, not less.[54] The presumption of this view is that there are some merits to encouraging social and cultural diversity in face of arguments for majoritarianism of a large constituency or against the centralization recommended by some collectivist-socialist interpretations. Dewey again is to the point: The problem of democracy is more democracy.

The critique of groups proposed by the republican interpretation of McConnell and Lowi, then is only partially appropriate; it dramatizes one feature correctly, the conformist nature of many group arrangements.

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[54] Philip Green, "Decentralization, Community Control, and Revolution: Reflection on Ocean Hill-Brownsville," in Green and Levinson, eds., Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science (New York: Vintage, 1970), p. 270. He writes: "If initial efforts at decentralization fail to eliminate all the problems of majority tyranny, then surely we desire not less decentralization, but more."

But, it is insensitive to another possible feature, the values it has for promoting the development of the human personality and the positive effects this may have on the society.

Once we realize this problem in the republican interpretation--a problem which is ultimately characterized as its lack of responsiveness to human needs, wants, and aspirations, we are in a better position to appraise its strategy for change. Agreeing that standards of justice, principles governance, is an ideal to which a theory and practice of politics should aspire, will the contemporary constitutional republican version approach it any better than the older one did? There are several reasons to suggest the ideal they aspire to cannot (and should not) be achieved by the strategy they suggest.

Constitutional republicanism rests on a coercive principle, which McConnell and Lowi admit to holding. All governance may require coercion, but a political theory that does not examine it requires a great amount of faith on the part of its adherents. This is just the price Lowi would exact from us. The scope and extent of coercion and whether the price is too high is not questioned in this interpretation; yet, it is an important one, if some of the coercion (for some segments of the society at any rate) is unnecessary, as Marcuse's conception of "surplus repression" hypothesizes. That argument goes further than any other to suggest that not only are groups conformist but the whole society is repressive in ways that raise the issue of whether any social force can be formed sufficient to countermand the existing structures of repression. If any are, it will have to be directed at the very levels of human consciousness; that is what any schema of social change must require.

To yield to coercion at the apex of power but not at its lower levels raises the prospect of some form of elite. Lowi concedes as much, but the elite has to be more virtuous than the common lot. The appeal runs on the judgments that another sort of democrat, a Rousseauan, for instance, would not want to chance--the problems of responsiveness to the public. What will induce elected officials, under all the pressures of the present electoral process, to act more like statesmen than the cunning politicians they seem to be? What power will the citizenry have over their leaders? The important point is that there is no energy-principle to give the constitution new life (even if we concede that the two hundred year old document and its separation of powers, checks and balance principle is still viable, that the basis of representation secured by the party system is fair, and that a tenure of statutes act makes sense, which I am reluctant to do).

And there are many social forces working against its instauration, suggesting the theory as a strategy of change will never succeed in practice. Kettler shows the persuasive argument Marx lodged against Hegel's model of the state, important features of which the republican theory of state and law share. The nub of Marx's criticism rested on the insight of an irresolvable contradiction in the constitutional republican theory. According to Kettler, Marx argued

> that the constitutional state portrayed by Hegel recognizes genuine republican principles only when it is at war or in crisis, and that the operating principles of that order under normal conditions are the destructive principles of greed and lust for power.[55]

Central to understanding this criticism is the fallacious assumption that

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[55] "Beyond Republicanism," p. 60.

the political state is and can be kept separate from the economic domain, and this is an anachronistic principle that Lowi is as faithful to as Hegel seemed to be. Lowi writes, for instance: "The juridical principle can convert a consumer economy into a just society without altering in any way the virtue of consumption or the freedom to consume."[56] Two arguments must be asserted against this sort of statement, which, depending on one's viewpoint, could be seen as naive or as manipulative. First, from the ecologists', it is evident that resources are not unlimited nor is the earth's tolerance for wastes; while the society of the nineteenth century might have been able to afford a wanton attitude towards its resources, the present scale of populations and consumption of energy may not find nature so obliging. A regulative principle here would be something that the Lowi notion of "juridical democracy" does not seem to entail. Secondly, the radical argument is that the capitalist and welfare-state solutions badly distribute resources and wealth. Confronting social inequalities, both material and linguistic (derived from class position), and the productive structures to which they are tied, that create class divisiveness is essential and ancillary to the just and free society. Men and women are social beings; they are historically constituted. And, old or new constitutional republican theory does not resolve the problems of alienation arising in a commercial society, just as its contemporary variant nowhere takes into account the massive pressures to conform according to one's class and status position in the consumer society. Kettler sets out the overriding contradiction Marx perceived:

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[56] End of Liberalism, p. 312.

> In the classical language so important to Marx and to the republican tradition out of which he sprang, it may be said that he came to deny the possibility of a political sphere removed from and superceding the economic relations--those of the household between master and slave, and those generated by that all-pervasive economic preoccupation which Aristotle himself had called chrematistik and considered antithetical to the formation of a genuine polis. Marx's constant reference to slavery should not be seen as hyperbole: it expresses his conviction that the normal operation of economic life has everywhere required that some men at least meet the conditions which define a slave for Aristotle: they are by their nature (i.e., their social destiny, for Marx) not their own man, but another's; although men, they are articles of property, which means that they are instruments intended for the purpose of action. They do not project; they do not shape their lives; they are resources in the plans of others. If the realm characterized by these relationships dominates the formally political realm, then the promises and strategies of the republican constitutional tradition must be adjudged irrelevant, on the authority of its founder, Aristotle.[57]

Against McConnell and Lowi--yet appreciating their importance for drawing out some of the hypocrisy of induced or synthetic participation, I believe it can be concluded that their strategy by no means promises the sought for social change.

The contemporary variant updates the classical constitutional republican interpretation in interesting ways, but it fails short of being a root explanation of the crisis of authority in the American system, because it is a narrowly political and legalistic approach to problems which may be deeper and sociological. Both fail to appreciate the important connection between social equality and political equality, and this is where they misconstrue the grounds of the radical case the most. Those whose effort it is to promote participation in its classic sense are not seeking to encourage mere political activism but to develop

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[57] "Beyond Republicanism," p. 66.

a style of moral action, a formation of a moral consensus that can only develop among equals. Participation in the formation of this law will make it less alien and more likely to be respected when it conflicts directly with one's personal interests. The view is expressed by R. P. Wolfe in his critique of J. S. Mill's utilitarian view of liberty:

> Insofar as our enterprises are inherently social, the public-private, interference-noninterference model of human relations breaks down. The central problem ceases to be the regulation of each person's infringement on the sphere of other person's actions, and becomes instead the coordination of the several actions and the choice of collective goals.[58]

But this is not totalitarianism, should such a change be advanced.

The dilemmas of the republican interpretation are a matter of the internal ordering of the perspective. The focus on the rule of law, whether expressed as the "public interest" or "juridical democracy" and which was patterned after the model of Madison, DeTocqueville, and Hayek, mitigated against any recognition of the distributive principle at work in society and its effect of the quality of human life and, thereby, on law. This set in motion an interpretation that, given its premises is logical, but if we call them into doubt, find the account of participation is weakened at several points, as is its strategy for social change.

In advanced industrial society the individual is not an abstraction apart from the social fabric, but a particular, historically specific human being. Particularly, the individual is a member of many different forms of human association. The moral character that is formed in this process of interaction between social arrangements and personality is

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[58] Robert Paul Wolfe, Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 50.

what must be called into view and critically examined and, if necessary, prescriptions made towards a reestablishment of human relations along other lines. Denying the human being's most basic social patterning to talk, work, and live together--its political meaning would hardly seem the way to begin this instauration. It would hardly seem desirable to deny the rich mediating functions that language, would seem to hold out, and yet that is just what McConnell and Lowi must do by limiting the settings and features of democratic participation. Without attention to the supporting conditions for the cognitive and affective and moral growth of all members of society, only a few may enjoy those broader opportunities that a democracy can more abundantly afford.

Conclusion

The constitutional republicans in their interpretation of the American political and social system offer a critical step forward towards the explication of a theory of participation. They have shown us a facet in contemporary society to which the liberal-pluralists appear to be insensitive: The set of conditions under which participation among political unequals is not and cannot be realized. By drawing the contrasts between the promises of participation, the realities under the present organization of wealth, power, and prestige, and the shabby results for the public interest, McConnell and Lowi suggest that participation and decentralization to which it has been linked are hortatory words in the lexicon of the liberal ideology. Our thesis has been that the constitutional republican interpretation is, therefore, useful in showing the distortions that may accrue to any important t erm in the vocabulary of democracy.

But just because the conditions to which a meaningful participation is connected have not been widely satisfied, this is not a sufficient reason to suggest, as McConnell and Lowi do, that the possibility for meaningful participation, and participation that will have a positive effect for the realization of universal values, is invalidated or is unwarranted. That the liberal-pluralist practice and ideology have seemed to weaken the meaning and practice of participation in the fuller classical sense does not necessitate it being done in altogether. As Arnold Kaufman in his case for participation in various settings has suggested: "...the effort to achieve a possible good (sometimes) depends on our belief in the possibility of that achievement--the very

nerve of our effort to achieve a good may be cut by premature admission of its impossibility."[59]

Our next set of critics of the pluralist ideology, the radical-liberals, attempt to examine this side of the question more closely. The following questions will help to guide our inquiry: Can a case be made for participation in local settings as having positive consequences for the rule of law and principles governance? Can a case be made that participation is instrumental to freedom? The radical-liberals offer a positive response.

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[59] "Human Nature and Participatory Democracy," in Bias of Pluralism, p. 195.

CHAPTER V

THE RADICAL-LIBERAL INTERPRETATION: THE THEORIES OF PETER BACHRACH AND ARNOLD S. KAUFMAN

Introduction

Contemporary political theorizing has been largely bereft of humanistic influences. But such concerns of Rousseau and Dewey, for instance, were not entirely effaced and in the 1960's the classical vision of man had a renaissance. Efforts to revitalize the American political process--through the civil rights, disarmament, and anti-war movements and the 1968 Presidential campaign--required an enriched theory and strategies for change. The emergent perspective was identified by C. Wright Mills and characterized as the "New Left." Perhaps, most symbolically, it was represented by the 1962 "Port Huron Statement" and its conception of human beings, human relationships and social systems: "The goal of man and society should be human independence: A concern not with image of popularity but with finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic; a quality of mind not compulsively driven by a sense of powerlessness, nor one which unthinkingly adopts status values, nor one which represses all threats to its habits, but one which has full, spontaneous access to present and past experiences, one which easily unites the fragmented parts of personal history, one which openly faces problems which are troubling and unresolved; one with an intuitive awareness of possibilities, an active sense of curiosity, an ability and willingness to learn."[1] Subsequent papers by such individuals as

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[1] My source here is Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, The New Radicals - A Report with Documents (New York: Vintage, 1966) and Christopher Lasch,

Tom Hayden, Richard Flacks, and Staughton Lynd and many others began to work out the analyses that would guide action. Much of the impetus for this recrudescence came from the humanistic traditions of Rousseau and Marx and the American pragmatism of Dewey and others.

By the end of the 1960's, the lines for distinguishing theoretical orientations among the new humanist critics of pluralist ideology had more clearly formed around certain issues. Most crucial was the issue of whether social change was possible by working within the established political structure. Events of 1968 seemed to provide sufficient reason for the formation of judgments on the matter. While I have no desire to reduce to a few categories the many well-articulated and distinguishable arguments on the issue, I do want to demarcate the position of one of the more moderating, non-socialist and non-militant perspectives to emerge on this crucial issue of social and political change.

That is the perspective of the radical-liberal. Dewey's phrase, "radical-liberal," had been reinvoked, chiefly by Arnold Kaufman in his book by that title, to suggest that the liberal or good society is "one in which each person possesses the resources of materials, mind, and spirit, as well as the opportunities to carve out a career in conformity to that person's own nature and reasoned choice."[2] To be a radical-liberal meant to hold a deep-rooted commitment to the values of a liberal society.

The Agony of the American Left (New York: Vintage, 1969), chap. 5 and Postscript. For another point of view, there is William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart - An Informal History of America in the 1960's (New York: Quadrangle, 1971). The quote is from "The Port Huron Statement" excerpted in Jacobs and Landau, pp. 154-155.

[2] Arnold S. Kaufman, The Radical Liberal - The New Politics: Theory and Practice (New York: Clarion, 1970, 1968), p 6.

Radical-liberals began with a critique of the American pluralist interpretation, emphasizing its failure to hold true to classical liberal-democratic theory in practice. It had jettisoned its faith and support for the person, for self-development, when it needed it most. Radical-liberals thus shared the common purpose of bringing alive participation, to foster enlightened participation in a broad-ranging set of social, political, and economic institutions. This account differed from Dahl's, for instance, in that the concern was not with getting people what they have already been encouraged to want but in trying to find ways of creating conditions such that individuals would be able to act reasonably and with some sense of autonomy. It was essentially, however, a reformist-liberal position. Its expressive forms included the Presidential campaign strategies and political platforms of Eugene McCarthy in 1968 and of George McGovern in 1972. The basic economic structure that undergirded class relations was not conspicuously threatened.

I have selected for my consideration here two exponents of radical-liberal thought who might be regarded as complementary, Peter Bachrach and Arnold Kaufman. They are not widely familiar outside the political science profession and perhaps not too widely known within it, but I feel that they are the best representatives of this Dewey-ian position presently available. The meaningfulness of this interpretation derives not from the fact of popularity or familiarity then, but from the fact that it offers a warranted alternative to pressures for a narrowing conception of participation and avoids some of the more drastic requirements of some Marxist interpretations.

The work of Peter Bachrach is useful and suggestive for its inception of a rather original critique of American plural-elite theory. The questions Bachrach posed, with Baratz, and the argument they made in two critical essays on decision-making have become central to the debate in the methodology of community power and pose a significant challenge directly to the assumptions Dahl, for instance, makes.[3] In The Theory of Democratic Elitism - A Critique Bachrach cogently points out the miscasting of democratic theory from Schumpter to Dahl in its derivation from early elite theory.[4] Unfortunately, the perspective Bachrach is attemption to construct has not been held consistently, and in his study of power in Baltimore (co-authored with Baratz), Power and Poverty, he incompletely and unsuccessfully makes the case for increased citizen participation.[5] Bachrach's work is, then, not without some theoretical problems, and the crucial one is its failure to hold consistently to the original conception of participation. It is hoped that by examining Bachrach's account it can be shown where the case for expanded and enriched participation requires further attention and elaboration.

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3 See, for instance, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, 56 (December 1962):947-952; and "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytic Framework," American Political Science Review, 57 (June 1963):641-651.

4 Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism - A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

5 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

Kaufman's writing represents a mindful orientation toward integrating problems of philosophy, theory, and practice. I believe this work offers a more closely argued case for participation in terms of a self-development model than Bachrach's and is, as well, a judiciously considered assessment of the prospects for participation. Given his goal, The Radical Liberal and essays in Dissent are determined efforts at working out a feasible strategy for change within the constraints of the American party system and its structure of power.[6] Generally, Kaufman proposes a realignment of the party system through a national coalition-building program; the Democratic Party would provide the political base. His case is such that a coalition, representative of groups from moderate to left, could be united around a synthesis of individual goals and collective need, and this would radically transform social arrangements and political priorities. Such a transformation would be directed toward establishing the life conditions necessary for the dignity of all.

Together, Bachrach and Kaufman offer a provocative and fairly-well delineated model of power and possibility in the United States. It is one which asserts the positive goal of participation, not simply because participation may offer clearly better decisions. It may not even do that. It is offered because a democracy of participation is that practice that most realizes the dignity and capacities of all individuals in society. Therefore, the conditions by which this practice can be best furthered out to be promoted actively.

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[6] Kaufman published diversely; I will make reference to these mainly: "A Call to Radicalism: Where Shall Liberals Go?", Dissent, 13 (September-October 1966):555-624; "Opposition Politics Is More Important," Dissent, 15 (January-February 1968):21-25; "Strategies for a New Politics: New Party or New Democratic Coalition," Dissent, 16 (January-February 1969): 13-18; and "A Political Strategy for Radical Liberals," Dissent, 18 (July-August 1971):382-393.

The radical-liberal's interpretation is most forcefully challenged from the left. What about the evidence that social forces are so strong that they conspire against the possibility of some class of individuals participating meaningfully in the present state of affairs? The radical-liberals do, perhaps, realert us to the original meaning of participation in classical democratic theory. But to what extent do they adequately explore the distinction between the conditions necessary for the encouragement of participation as self-development and those which now prevail and which are largely coercive? Do they misjudge the possibilities? Are the radical-liberals prepared to meet the more radical challenge, in short, which suggests that the structural and cognitive restraints to meaningful participation run deeper than any of the pluralist critics suggest?

The argument is a formidable challenge to the case for expanded participation. The constitutional republicans and the radical-liberals make clear objections to the pluralist case, so that we are now aware of the need to strengthen the individual's autonomy and dignity against multifarous social pressures. What grounds can we suggest that the Bachrach-Kaufman case makes such a model of citizen participation realizable? I want to suggest that the confrontation of the radical-liberal and radical perspectives will point us in the direction for working out a balanced and steadied conception of an enriched participation for an advanced industrial society such as our own.

So, I will turn now to examine the account of participation for the radical-liberals. I will first give some attention to the roots of their perspective and then set out their respective accounts of participation.

Finally, I will take up some objections and seek to offer an assessment of this account. My final concluding chapter will try to develop those considerations necessary for bringing the radical-liberal and radical cases into balance.

The Radical-Liberal Perspective

Central to the inadequacy of the approach liberal-pluralists like Dahl took to the analysis of the American political process, I suggested in an earlier chapter, was the presumption of a widely-shared consensus as to the political norms and practices in the society. This presumption has the serious problem of directing attention away from the sources and pressures that cause personal discontent, and such discontent is viewed more likely as pathological than indicative of failures in the social structure.

Central to the radical-liberal perspective is the presumption that at the root of politics is conflict.[7] The conflict perspective of the radical-liberal is American generically and not essentially Marxist. The drafting of this model in a classic form may be attributed to E. E. Schattaschneider. The concept of a "mobilization of bias," Schattschneider's term, is fundamental to Bachrach's developing interpretation and can also be seen to lie behind the considerations of Kaufman, so that I want to begin by sketching Schattschneider's conflict model of the American polity briefly.

Schattschneider's study, The Semi-Sovereign People, was, as he says, an attempt to work out a theory about the relation between organization and conflict, the relation between political organization and democracy, and the organizational alternatives open to the American people.[8] Basic

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[7] For characteristic presumptions of the conflict perspective see William E. Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," Polity, 6 (Fall 1973):16-17.

[8] E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People - A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); and also Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942).

to our understanding of politics is the contagiousness of conflict. Since a conflict always consists of two parties--the individuals who are actively engaged in a dispute and the audience that is attracted to the scene, central to the determination of the outcome is the scope of its contagion. Strategy becomes important to the outcome, and the role of the bystanders is the strategic target. The basic struggle revealed by the political literature is "between the conflicting tendencies toward the privatization and socialization of conflict."[9]

Examination of the political pressure system and the party system in the United States reveals that the scope of conflict has been fairly-well set since the realignment of 1932 and that these systems both operate with a class bias. Schattschneider's examination of the pressure system requires a distinction between "public" interests and "special" interests, a distinction interest-group theorists fail to make. It is a distinction that the constitutional republicans made and which radical-liberals must make, as I shall try to show later. Organized groups by definition have a mobilization of bias--that is, the interests it favors--and as a result, it is possible to consider it as also possessing scope. That scope in American politics is small. Schattschneider has often been quoted on the point he makes: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upperclass accent. Probably about ninety per-cent of the people cannot get into the pressure system."[10]

The scope has been limited in the party system, as well. Generally, one-third of the electorate do not participate in national elections and

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[9] Semi-Sovereign People, p. 7 and chap. 1.

[10] Ibid., p. 35.

even fewer participate in state elections; still fewer on the average in local ones. The reason, for Schattschneider's explanation, was not so much acceptance of the system as recognition that the lower class was excluded from the process: "Nonvoting is related to the contradiction, imbedded in the political system, between (1) the movement to universalize suffrage and (2) the attempt to make the vote neamingless."[11] He continued: "It has been assumed that only legal barriers inhibited the disenfranchised. We know better now. The exclusion of people by extra-legal processes, by social processes, by the way the political system is organized and structure may be far more effective than the law."[12]

All divisions in the community are maintained at a cost: "The existence of a large body of dissociated people is part of the price we pay for the dominance of the cleavage between government and business. This cleavage had tended to freeze the stakes of politics at a point that has never involved the whole community."[13] The costs were the inability for some to have their needs and wants translated into public policy; the cost was, ultimately, one of constitutional legitimacy.

The study of politics, according to Schattschneider, then ought to be the study of the structures which go toward sustaining the existing bias and scope of conflict. Organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out. And, "Anyone who finds out how to involve the forty million in American politics will run the country for a generation."[14]

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[11] Ibid., p. 103.

[12] Ibid., p. 111.

[13] Ibid., pp. 109-110.

[14] Ibid., p. 103.

The work of Schattschneider does not take us very far towards an enriched concept of participation. Schattschneider himself views representation as a basic version of participation. In his definition of democracy he maintains a conception very close to Schumpeter's; it is "a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process."[15] The problem of Dahl's concept is thus manifest here, too--i.e., Schattschneider is not concerned with the effects of participation. His weakness is that he limits participation to demands, what people already want, and remains unconcerned with development of the fullest capacities of the human being. Significantly, then, his theory is unassimilated to a theory of human development. And that was the task that Bachrach seemed to set out to do, but it was better fulfilled, as we shall see, in the work of Kaufman.

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[15] Ibid., p. 15.

Bachrach's Account of Participation

Bachrach took up the task outlined by Schattschneider, to give attention to the mobilization of bias in the political system; he began with a critical examination of the underlying assumptions and methodology of the community power analyses. The formulation was expressed as both a critique of the "power elite" approach (e.g., Hunder's) and of the pluralists (e.g., Dahl's and Polsby's). In "The Two Faces of Power" Bachrach and Baratz argued that the pluralist objections to the elitist argument were "effectively exposed."[16] Mainly, they rejected any notion of an "ordered system of power." Against the other side, they maintained that the pluralist confinement to only "safe" and always "important" or "key" issues in the study of who has power meant the researchers overlooked "the chance that some person or association could limit decision-making to relatively non-controversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power conflicts."[17] Study of decision-making calls first for the study of the organization of bias, for study of not only the visible but the invisible face of power. Only after that is done can the analysis of participation in decision-making in concrete issues begin.

Objection to this presumably "subjective" domain for political inquiry was anticipated, and so a paper developing the innovative concept of

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16 From "Two Faces of Power" reprinted in Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 52-53.

17 Ibid., p. 55.

nondecision-making proposed in the first article followed. "Nondecision-making" was the method used to sustain the mobilization of bias. It was "a set of predominant values, beliefs, and constitutional procedures ("rules of the game") that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others."[18] This is their definition as developed later in Power and Poverty:

> A nondecision...is a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker. To be more nearly explicit, nondecision-making is a means by which demands forchange in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process.[19]

Examples of nondecision-making are provided in the case of Senator Joseph McCarthy and his supporters, when in the early 1950's their exploitation of anti-communist sentiments effectively blocked access to the decision-making arena demands for social reform, and in the case of Baltimore when the value of equal opportunity for blacks had been used in a way to isolate advocates of Black Power.[20] Other cases are offered in Power and Poverty as well, but these are suggestive.

"Nondecision-making" was a provocative and controversial concept for most political scientists.[21] Mainly the difficulty of operationalizing

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18 Power and Poverty, p. 43.

19 Ibid., p. 44.

20 "Communications," American Political Science Review, 62 (December 1968):1268-1269. See John H. Schaar's essay, "Equality of Opportunity, and Beyond" for an excellent examination of the conservative implications of the "equal opportunity" slogan. In Pennock and Chapman, eds., Equality: Nomos IX (New York: Atherton, 1967), pp. 228-249.

21 It was criticized by Richard Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power," American Political Science Review, 62 (June 1968):451-

it for empirical research provided the chief objection. The concept has, however, been applied in at least one study.[22]

Perhaps nondecision-making (and non-issues) is more appropriately viewed not as an empirical concept but as a heuristic one, one which enables us to focus on structures of forces not readily observed. For instance, nondecision-making (in the form, "not to decide is to decide") suggests that nonparticipation cannot be explained completely at any rate by apathy or by satisfaction with the ongoing system. The concept, I suggest, was unexplicitly an Hagelian or dialectical concept and ought to be regarded in this light. Thus, nondecision-making only has meaning against an ideal which a decision does not obtain, against some criteria by which a practice may be compared. The ideal is only implicit in Bachrach's theory and, therefore, the concept remains ambiguous. Implicit in his concept, nevertheless, is a standard or ideal. An essential part of its meaning is the status of the distribution of benefits (and burdens) to different persons and groups in a political system or subsystem.[23] This was the intuition of Schattschneider as well. Toward the conclusion of Semi-Sovereign People Schattschneider very sketchily demarcated an

460; and an exchange of views is to be found in the same Review, 62 (December 1968):1268-1269. An expanded argument is developed in the same Review, 65 (December 1971), between Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," pp. 1063-1080, and Frederick W. Frey, "Comment: On Issues and Non-Issues in the Study of Power," pp. 1081-1101; Wolfinger offers a rejoinder, pp. 1102-1104.

22 Matthew A. Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution - A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).

23 See, for instance, Power and Poverty, p. 106, where the distributive principle is apparent. Some conception of equality, such as Schaar, op. cit., suggests might more adequately provide the normative principle.

alternative to the utilitarian ethics that undergirded pluralist politics. Very suggestively, he had hinted that possible a "wholly new calculus" should be considered for the conduct of public policy in the new international world.[24] Unfortunately, Bachrach did not draw on this insight to develop his approach in a more explicit way. Bachrach and Baratz subsequently tried to argue that the focus for study of nondecision-making should be on "latent and covert grievances of differential groups in the community." which weakened the criteria, and contended that problems of false consciousness were problems for the philosopher. This was, as Balbus points out, probably an unnecessary concession for their interpretation.[25]

The detectable shift from the model of Schattschneider to the radical-liberal perspective and emphasis on development of the personality is observable in Bachrach's The Theory of Democratic Elitism - A Critique. Mainly, in Semi-Sovereign People the attention is on organizational structure, for explaining the bias of the pressure group and party processes. Bachrach's analysis here begins to subject to critical examination the ideological revision of classical elite theorists by the

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[24] Semi-Sovereign People, p. 111. Schattschneider suggested the need to shift from a politics of distribution (the who gets what, when, and how of politics) to the politics of apportionment of burdens. He wrote, "Today our view of politics is greatly modified by the fact that the United States is involved in a titanic struggle for survival. Burdens that were inconceivable a few years ago seem to have become a permanent part of the public function. The primacy of foreign policy calls for a new kind of politics involving a wholly new calculus. The government now needs above everything else the steady support of the public, and the support cannot be had without a new scale of public involvement in public life." p. 112.

[25] See Power and Poverty, p. 49; and Isaac D. Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis," Politics and Society, 1 (February 1971):151-177.

contemporary democratic theorists. Bachrach shows the separation of liberalism and democracy and reveals the transformation that took place in democratic thinking since Schumpeter's attempt, in 1942, to minimize the role of the common man in the political process. The impetus for theorists to limit confidence in the ordinary man and woman, according to Bachrach, is associated with the rise of the totalitarian movements, fascism and communism, and later with the rise of McCarthyism in the United States. This assumption seemed to be easily buttressed by public opinion research (e.g., Stouffer's and Lipset's), which indicated the mass' lack of knowledge of democratic values. It is Bachrach's intention to reject this tendency to put the guardianship of democracy in the hands of elites and to emasculate the person as contrary to the classical vision of the purposes of democracy.

I have summarized below the main lines of argument Bachrach builds to defeat the elitist theory. He has directed his attention to some of the chief points the democratic elitists use to construct their positive case for a narrowed conception of democracy and participation. Bachrach's response will be indicated.

1. A chief line of argument, as we saw in the discussion of Dahl, was the effort to transform democracy from a substantive meaning to a procedural meaning. This argument had its principal source in Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Bachrach is here concerned to argue, and I believe correctly, that the fundamental disadvantage of this approach is that it gives the political theorist no basis for judging whether the system is becoming more democratic or more elitist in nature.[26]

2. Another facet of the democratic elite argument, especially as

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[26] Theory of Democratic Elitism, pp. 21-25.

reflected in the work of Bernard Berelson and his colleagues, has been the concern to discover how social stability can be secured rather than studying what happens to various individuals under the system. Thus, political passivity of the great majority of the people is not regarded as an element of democratic malfunctioning, but on the contrary, as a necessary condition for allowing the creative functioning of the elite. What is wrong with this is that it assumes the body politic is an end in itself.[27]

3. Related to view (2.), Bachrach suggests, is the implicit notion that an apparently thriving democratic system is bound to provide a wide degree of freedom to all its citizens. Just because a system supplies stability, it is mistaken to imply that it also adequately provides for the growth and well-being of individuals. (I think this becomes clearer as an argument when Bachrach discusses manipulation; Bachrach's argument allows, but does not say, that elite consensus can, in Kaufman's phrasing, "winnow and shape" demands.)[28]

4. Other democratic elite theorists, Plamenatz among them, assume the pressure system offers opportunities for countervailing power to a wide range of groups in the society. As we have already seen, Schattschneider's analysis, which Bachrach calls upon here, refutes this assumption easily and persuasively.[29]

5. Kornhauser, along with other social pluralists, holds a faith in the automatic control of social voluntary associations for separating

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27 Ibid., pp. 32-35.

28 Ibid., pp. 34-35.

29 Ibid., pp. 35-39.

mass and elites. Bachrach suggests this faith is insufficient, partly because it does not explain how masses can be made to join more organizations without being mobilized behind charismatic-type leaders.[30]

6. The necessity and feasibility of reaching a "consensus of elites" on fundamental procedures is the chief concern of Truman, Berle, and Mills, Bachrach says. And, he suggests that the requirements may be considerably greater than Truman, for instance, anticipates. But mainly, Bachrach's point is to raise the question, What will keep the self-conscious elites within constitutional bounds? None of the elite theorists provide a convincing answer to the skeptic.[31]

7. Finally, Bachrach draws, importantly, attention to the concept of "politics" that the democratic elitists work with. It is a concept that is unwisely, for the interests of political science, limited to governmental structures. "Politics" must be broadly defined to recognize the impact that agencies other than governmental ones have for the allocation of values. There seems to be sufficient warrant, for instance, to suggest heads of corporations are political elites; the only chief distinction is their lack of accountability. Bachrach suggests that Dahl's definition recognizes the public impact of corporations but that his political analysis fails to give practical effect to the point, and this affects his analysis for participation.[32]

The democratic revisionists also lodged a negative argument against an ideal of democracy. We can recall Dahl's dismissal of ideals as breeding cynicism and his call to "realism." Bachrach's contention was

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30 Ibid., pp. 42-46.

31 Ibid., pp. 50-62.

32 Ibid., pp. 85-91.

that the essence of classical theory was its ideal, the chief function of democracy being what it did to promote self-development. Bachrach was clearly not entrapped by the mystique of logical positivism and contended that ideals operated as "a valuable guide and spur to a more human society."

The problem then is this: What participation can be expected and fostered, practically, under the conditions of advanced industrial society? This is Bachrach's consideration, and it sounds pretty much like Dahl's, excepting Bachrach's expressed concern that participation allow self-development. Like Dahl, Bachrach felt classical theory fell short, in underscoring the importance of widespread participation in political decision-making, by offering no realistic guidelines as to how its prescription is to be filled in large urban societies.[33] Also, Bachrach will take into account the apparent necessity for some decisions to be made by technical and professional officials at the central level

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[33] Ibid., p. 99. It is relevant to note here the large qualification Bachrach builds into his case when he fairly conclusively agrees with the democratic elite theorists argument: "The main thrust of the elitist argument is incontestable. However, although participation in key political decisions on the national level must remain extremely limited, is there any sound reason, within the context of democratic theory, why participation in political decisions by the constituencies of "private" bureaucratic institutions of power could not be widely extended on those issues which primarily affect their lives within these institutions?" p. 95. Dewey's argument was that participation locally would enable the individual to see broader issues more intelligently, in more coherent ways by the experience of participation, and, therefore, it could reasonably be expected that voting decisions on wider issues would be more considered and judicious. Bachrach is not responsive to the force of this argument.

of government. Bachrach's solution to his problem of participation is the encouragement of varied forms of participation in the local setting:

> The crucial issue of democracy is not the composition of the elite.... Instead the issue is whether democracy can diffuse power sufficiently throughout society to inculcate among people of all walks of life a justifiable feeling that they have the power to participate in decisions which affect themselves and the common life of the community, especially the immediate community in which they work and spend most of their waking hours and energy. Of course, "key governmental decisions" must be made by a few, but this is no reason why we should settle for a criterion for democracy which provides no guidelines to combat a rapid concentration of power outside this narrow sphere of decision-making.[34]

The chief features of Bachrach's case for participation can be suggested as follows:

1. His theory of a democracy of participation embodies a concept of "interest-in-the-process"--that is, it entails, a self-development concept. Bachrach is concerned with the effects of participation for individuals. That it is valued and works, he points out, is the evidence of psychology. His references are to the works of Kurt Lewin, Eric Fromm, and A. H. Maslow among others.[35] He contends that it was this feature that was central to the idea of democracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as it was maintained as the buttress to the corruptibility of political, economic, and social institutions.

2. It embodies a concept of "interest-in-end-results." Bachrach's claim here is that the society which is participatory will more likely be the stabilized society by strengthening the mental capacities of all individuals and, therefore, have a positive effect in shaping conduct.[36]

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[34] Ibid., p. 92.

[35] Ibid., pp. 98-99.

[36] Ibid., pp. 95, 106.

This, to me, is a strong argument that is overlooked by the democratic elite theorists.

3. It is a "decentralized" notion of participation--that is, it recommends expanding participation to subsystems in the society. Where it once occurrec in places like the New England town meeting, participation would now develop in places like the corporation, the factory, the office, the enterprise, the trade union, the church, the school, and so forth--places close to the everyday life of the majority of individuals.[37] On this point, Dahl in After the Revolution? has shifted to a position of some agreement with Bachrach. (In aside, it should be pointed out that Bachrach does not suggest what sort of relationship would prevail between centralized corporations and centralized government, and this is a domain of inquiry that an adequate social theory cannot ignore.)

4. Participation will involve people in "those issues which primarily affect their lives."[38] In making it possible for people to become involved in issues that they can relate to, the indifference of the lower class that Dahl's theory concedes to can be overcome. Bachrach expresses his thoughts in this passage:

> For many individuals political issues and elections appear either trivial or remote and beyond the reach of their influence. Of a different magnitude are issues which directly affect them in their place of work, issues which are comparatively trivial, yet are overlaid with tensions and emotions that often infuriate and try men's souls. It is here--despite the legitimizing effects of bureaucratic forms--that the ugliness of man's domination of man is fully revealed, and it is here, consequently, that democracy must become established and put to use. I am not suggesting that the average worker, for example, if given the opportunity to share in the making of factory decisions, would be magically transformed, in the fashion

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37 Ibid., p. 96.

38 Ibid., p. 95.

> of Rousseau's common man, from an unimaginative, parochial, selfish human being to a broadminded, intelligent, public-spirited citizen. I am saying that political education is most effective on a level which challenges the individual to engage cooperatively in the solution of concrete problems affecting himself and his immediate community.[39] (Emphasis added.)

This is a particularly characteristic argument of the radical-liberal perspective.

5. Bachrach does not explore the problems that would arise in reorganizing the internal structure of the workplace, for instance, or, more broadly, the political problems that would arise from a public policy proposal for this objective. Bachrach suffices with reference to the British experiences in nationalizing industry and believes they indicate the possibility of such reorganization.[40]

6. Bachrach, further, recognizes "that participation will not necessarily in all cases lead to salutary results."[41] He has most clearly in mind the possibility of instances of manipulation and pressures toward conformity, instances that would subvert the meaningfulness of the participatory form. This possibility does not undermine the value of participation but does call for, he contends, careful consideration and empirical research on two questions: (1) Under what concrete conditions will man's capacities be developed and under what conditions will development be frustrated? (2) How will democratic theory provide the developmental conditions?[42]

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[39] Ibid., p. 103.

[40] Ibid., p. 96.

[41] Ibid., p. 101, the note.

[42] Ibid., p. 101. Tentatively, he suggests "that beneficial results from participation can best be assured if two conditions are present: (1) That the participants are roughly equal in the power they are capable of exerting in the decision-making process, (b) that diverse interests

One argument, I believe, Bachrach misses is the feature of decentralized participation which Dewey compellingly argued and which I have previously noted. That is, that in participating in areas close to one's life experience a transfer effect can be expected in terms of one's ability to see wider problems in more ordered, comprehensive, and complex ways. Central to Rousseau's, Green's, and Dewey's concept of self is the notion of interests that the participating individual develops--that the person more reflectively deliberates about his own interests in terms of the interests of the whole society.

Power and Poverty retreated from the concept of developmental participation set out in The Theory of Democratic Elitism. An essay in 1971, however, "Interest, Participation and Democratic Theory," suggested a reconsideration of the conception that emerged in Power and Poverty and some of his reservations about it.[43] I shall try to suggest the forms of participation that Power and Poverty defined, point out particularly the problem of cooptive participation that the authors took note of, and then indicate his subsequent revisions expressed in the 1971 paper.

Power and Poverty is a case study of participation in Baltimore, Maryland, for the years 1965 to 1968, particularly as it formed under the impact of the federal War on Poverty program. Part I of the study derives a model for political analysis from the concept of nondecision-making. This model assumes dichotomous groupings in a community:

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are represented within the participating group. These are probably insufficient, however.

[43] Peter Bachrach, "Interest, Participation and Democratic Theory," prepared for delivery to American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, December 1971, New York City.

(1) Persons and groups committed to existing values and (2) persons and groups seeking a reallocation of values. Both groups are assumed to have variable sources of power to draw upon; these were classified as: (1) Resources (status, assets, members, organization, ideology, interest), (2) priority (time preference, costs), (3) strategy (decisions and non-decisions), (4) interaction (alliance, cooperation, conflict). Part II reviewed the status of blacks in Baltimore to 1965 and, then, evaluated the political changes in their status as a result of events and organizational efforts (by governmental agencies and by moderating and militant black leaders, and by the poor black population at large. Some conclusions should be indicated briefly; first, importance was given to the role of federal programs and funding for bringing blacks into sharing in policy-making; the "mobilization of bias" was shifted out of nondecision-making arenas into the open decision-making arenas; and an important part of the program was the "doctrine of legitimacy" that the "maximum feasible participation" clause provided the poor. Problems, nevertheless, remained in Baltimore, and were expressed in the forms of racism, internal divisions among blacks, and cutbacks in federal programming with the beginning of the Nixon Administration.[44]

The interesting aspect of the study for our purposes is the forms of participation that that work identifies. The authors suggest at least three typical meanings for citizen participation, according to conventional federal legislative and administrative usage: (1) Grass roots democracy, (2) collaboration (the implication here is that the poor take an active part in decisions about the types and characteristics of the

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[44] Power and Poverty, pp. 100-102.

services made), and (3) involvement in the delivery of services for the poor.[45] The authors of the background paper that provide this definition suggest that how widely the concept should be construed "will hinge upon the goals that citizen participation is intended to achieve."[46] Participation becomes, according to this account, a form of political action. Its function is to reallocate values, and it is distinguished by being action of ordinary individuals, not of officials or elites. Its scope would be more than merely a few citizens employed in delivery of services or sitting as representatives on a policy-making board. It might also include voting, petitioning for a redress of grievances, demonstrating, and participation in the formulation and implementation of policies within political groups and organizations.[47]

The term "participation" has in the paradigm cases suggested here lost its self-developmental criteria and becomes so loose that practically any form of political behavior can be entailed by it. The explanation, I believe, must be seen as part of the lack of clarity in the basic decision-making/nondecision-making model Bachrach and Baratz employ. In viewing political action in terms of its position for "allocating values," the central problem of "interests" is lost and with it the notion that an individual participates not around demands, as presupposed wants or preferences, but becomes more reflective about them. Bachrach is following Dahl here, for participation in this model pertains to involvement on behalf of the existing structure of interests.

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[45] See Appendix E, by Peter Bachrach, Morton S. Baratz, and Margaret Levi, "The Political Significance of Citizen Participation," Power and Poverty, pp. 201-202.

[46] Ibid., p. 204.

[47] Ibid., pp. 203-204.

An examination of the concept of "interests" will help to make the point. Balbus in his article "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis" shows the ambiguity that results because Bachrach and Baratz fail to consider "interests" as having an "objective" (or socially-constituted) aspect as well as a "subjective" aspect. Balbus points out that the Bachrach-Baratz model is immanently Marxist in that it "assumes for heuristic purposes that society may be defined in terms of a domination-subjection relationship and that this domination-subjection relationship is the motor of change."[48] But Balbus goes on to show that even though the Marxist-type concept of "interests" is imbedded in the model, it is only suggested "briefly" and "perhaps without fully realizing it."[49] He suggests that the criterion for class membership (i.e., those seeking "reallocation of values" and "those committed to existing values") is far too vague to provide the basis for a satisfactory class analysis. The compelling argument is that any adequate social theory must recognize both sorts of "interests," subjective and objective. Balbus, drawing on Flathman's The Public Interest, provides the following explanation:

> ...although everyone agrees that subjective interests will in part determine a man's behavior, and that a focus on subjective interests is therefore essential for behavioral political theory, a sole focus on subjective interests ignores the social fact which our ordinary language recognizes that "it is precisely the presence of 'objective interests' which prompts the emergence of subjective awareness, i.e., than an individual's subjective interests

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[48] Balbus, op. cit., p. 174.

[49] Ibid., pp. 174-175.

> are not merely given, or randomly generated, but rather are systematically determined by the way in which his life-chances are objectively affected by objective conditions. To rely solely on subjective interest is to ignore the prior and decisive problem of the "conversion" of objective interests to subjective interests, i.e., the development of consciousness, a phenomenon which any adequate political theory cannot ignore.[50]

As Professor Connolly presents the case: "Any view which anchors interest exclusively in felt behavioral tendencies runs the risk of celebrating uncritically those inclinations cultivated by dominant socialization processes while deflecting conceptual attention from possible gratifying modes of existence bypassed by those same processes."[51] It is to neglect the chance of discovering unarticulated but simmering "troubles" beneath the surface of public policy discussion, and it is, as Kaufman and Marcuse suggests, therefore, necessary to identify processes which "winnow and shape" wants.

In "Interest, Participation, and Democratic Theory" Bachrach acknowledges the benefit of this critique and suggests a revised conception of participation. The emphasis is on that aspect of participation that offers "an essential means for the individual to discover his wants through the interviewing discovery of himself as a social human being."[52] He defines democratic participation as "the process in which persons formulate, discuss, and decide public issues that are important to them and directly affect their lives. It is a process that is more or less continuous, conducted on a face to face basis in which participants have roughly an

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[50] Ibid., p. 153.

[51] William E. Connolly, "On Interests In Politics," Politics and Society, Summer 1972, p. 471.

[52] "Interests...," op. cit., pp. 2-3.

equal say in all stages, from formulation of issues to the determination of policies."[53] But he reiterates his earlier belief that there is no escaping the fact that democratic participation can only function on a wide scale within a majoritarian representative framework. He now regards as nonexamples of participation: Demonstrations, sit-ins, confrontations, pressure group bargaining, voting, speechmaking, campaigning, and such similar activities, for none of these allow the opportunity for the individuals to engage in the decision-making processes on a regular and face-to-face basis.

Before concluding this section, I want to note Bachrach's attention to the perverted form of participation that McConnell and Lowi so clearly identified: Cooptive participation. Bachrach defined participation as "cooptive" in nature when the activities of non-elites in decision-making and policy-implementation are channeled toward the preconceived goals of higher authorities."[54] In the case of the community action programs and the effort to alleviate poverty and expand political roles in Baltimore, cooptation was recognized as a major tactic of the established groups. Kaufman sketches an analysis of the structure of cooptive participation, and so I will consider it more critically at a later point.

The major difficulty for Bachrach in developing his approach to the study of participation and nonparticipation in the community, I suggest, is that it is limited to the attention of structural or organizational tactics and material rewards and benefits. It fails to draw upon the significant argument of the Critique which emphasized the importance of

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53 Ibid., p. 3.

54 Power and Poverty, pp. 206-207.

what happened to the mental capacities of the individuals for the functioning of a democracy, and this requires attention to the formation of a sense of "interests" by the participant that recognizes and reconciles both the social "good" and individual need. As Balbus suggests, the concept of nondecision-making must be expanded to include processes by which wants are structurally determined or else Bachrach and Baratz have taken us no further than the pluralists.

In Bachrach's account of participation, as it appears in the nondecision-making approach to the analysis of power, the concept is too enlarged. Its paradigm cases are unlimited, encompassing it would appear, most forms of political action for change. The argument for an enriched conception of participation as it is set out in Power and Poverty, misfires because of conceptual difficulties in Bachrach's theoretical framework. My main emphasis has been to suggest the problems with the concept of "interest." The inadequate treatment of nondecision-making is in large measure a function of the inadequate treatment of "interest" which underlies it, for interest there means individual preferences, random and unstructured. The emphasis on the subjective aspect of interests and not also its objective aspect will necessarily have the effect of coopting efforts at political change in the direction of established procedures, rules, norms, and practices, and, if these undermine the development of all individuals' capacities for growth, then a participation of self-development is not generally realizable. I believe the inadequacy here must be attributed to problems of epistemology, the attempt to satisfy empirical criteria of the liberal-pluralist perspective while at the same time also staking out a place for normative standards. One aim can not be reconciled, in the way Bachrach sought to do it, with the other.

There is, we discover, a need to treat "objective" interests and how they are shaped, because this is what will distinguish a developmental form of participation from all other non-developmental forms. The liberal-pluralists (e.g., Dahl, Verba and Nie, Wolfinger, and Merelman) fail to recognize the role of ideology in shaping the nature of participation. This feature Schattschneider's model could not bring out, and Bachrach was unsuccessful in making it coherent in his own connections between nondecision-making and self-development. Arnold Kaufman, by making use of Marcuse's approach, makes explicit the force of processes for "winnowing and shaping" peoples' wants in contemporary industrial society so that certain justifiable claims are never even thought of as matters for public policy discussion.

Kaufman's Account of Participation

Characteristic of the radical-liberal approach is its effort to bring into balance significant insights of both liberalism and socialism. An important part of Kaufman's attention, philosophically, has been to make points of convergence between J. S. Mill and Marx, Madison and Rousseau, apparent and to resolve some outstanding conflicts. Kaufman's interpretation proves to be a defense for a particular version of liberal democracy that is rooted in a theory of fundamental human rights and which is tied to a theory of political obligation not very dissimilar to T. H. Green's.

The point raised in the discussion of Bachrach's interpretation was the importance, to an adequate theory of participation, of the concept of "interests." Mainly noticed was Bachrach's failure to incorporate a concept of "objective" interests into his framework in an explicit way with the result that the socialization processes could not be critically examined for the way they shaped individual preferences in any policy deliberation. I suggested that Kaufman's work provides a more successful consideration of this problem, and he does so with a theory of fundamental human rights from which his justification of a participatory democracy is derived. So, I would like to begin by sketching the main lines of this argument and then note his rebuttals to objections to participation on grounds of human nature. Finally, I will outline the general features of his account of participation and indicate the special presumptions he holds with regard to the participatory style for advanced industrial society.

Kaufman's approach is the method of contrast and comparison--of seeing how far liberalism might be pressed to meet the standards of social justice

that both liberalism, in certain of its exponents, and Marxism enjoin. He shared important elements of the pragmatic perspective of Mead, James, and Dewey. These would include: A confidance in the essential intelligence of the human being, an emphasis on the social character of the individual, the assumption of the need to make theory context-relevant, the objective of seeking guides to conduct, the significance of experience (will and effort) for putting these guides into practice and for testing them, and a belief in the self-critical community of inquirers.[55] An important feature of the pragmatic perspective, as Bernstein has drawn it in his study Praxis and Action, is its rejection of dogmatism and truth systems, that no position or point of view has an exclusive hold on the truth, for the view of inquiry is as a self-corrective process rather than of knowledge having a basic fixed foundation.[56] Kaufman's case for an expanded and enriched conception of participation seems to be closely associated with this conviction.

Kaufman was strongly critical of many contemporary forms of liberalism in order to make clear what a morally adequate version of liberalism must be. He thus found it helpful to follow the lines of arguments of liberalism's best critics. In his essay "Democracy and the Paradox of Want-Satisfaction" he began by considering some typical leftist criticisms of liberalism's practices in the United States and Britain. These include

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55 Some of Kaufman's assumptions are set forth in his early article on "The Nature and Function of Political Theory," Journal of Philosophy, 51 (January 1954):5-22, and are also briefly discussed in Richard Rodewald and Richard Wasserstrom's article, "The Political Philosophy of Arnold S. Kaufman," in "Arnold Kaufman Memorial Issue," Social Theory and Practice, 2 (Spring 1972).

56 Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action - Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), chap. III.

the contentions that democracy in advanced industrial societies "far from promoting liberty and justice for all, absolutely impedes the struggle for social justice."[57] This criticism can be identified, for example, with Herbert Marcuse. The complaint, reformulated, provides a paradox: "...democracy satisfied human wants both too little and too much." Kaufman's claim is that the criticisms joined in this paradox are "compatible and valid." How is this so?

A society--indeed, a democratic society--has many devices whereby it can give specific character to peoples' objective interests. The analysis is carried out in terms of concepts of wants, needs, and rights. Society has two angles of approach to obtain its given character. It works at the level of awareness of needs and at the level of will.

"Tokenism," for instance, is the structure which presupposes awareness of the justice of unmet political demands.[58] Payoffs, just sufficient to insure stability, are arranged through the use of power. It is made feasible for one side, by fears of the loss of an already meager command of economic resources, the sense of defenselessness, and the legitimizing consequences of the democratic process itself.[59] Kaufman's claim is that tokenism is an essential and not an adventitious vice of the political system.

Democracy also undermines the will to struggle for justice through the process of "cooptation."[60] Cooptation, as a process by which one

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[57] Arnold S. Kaufman, "Democracy and the Paradox of Want-Satisfaction," Personalist, 52 (Spring 1971):186-215.

[58] "Democracy...," pp. 188-200.

[59] Ibid., pp. 188-192.

[60] Ibid., pp. 200-205.

person is induced through benefits to identify with the values and programs of another, is the method that relies on draining off the energies that would otherwise flow from a more developed self-concept. Kaufman sketches a common pattern of cooptation under which a very poor person joins with others to secure what he, along with others, regard as their right. In view of the monumental effort of the struggle these gains become a source of symbolic satisfaction to this person; the elation of others with less personal investment perhaps fades. Kaufman suggests that the chief feature here is that the individual is not broken, but adjusted. Psychic dissonance is resolved by deep internal psychological mechanisms: "As he slips deeper into the role of political realist, he becomes increasingly sensitive to the charge that by advocating full satisfaction of the right to a decent wage he is being irrational, ungrateful, an extremist. Dissonance is resolved when all semblence of sommitment to high ideals disappears."[61] The individual's wants have been changed in a direction away from justice.

Democracy sustains the paradox of want-satisfaction also by the way it enables the comfortable social conscience to form, and this is the critical argument. Kaufman's thought is that: "...the political process, through the very efficiency by which it satisfies some demands, may help shape and curtail peoples' wants so that many other just demands are never made."[62] He contends, briefly, that needs that seek satisfaction have "corresponding wants." But the society also foists wants of its

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[61] "Democracy...," p. 203. Important to the functioning of this process, Kaufman suggests, are two patterns of argument--the half-skew, which unfairly devotes equal attention to the wrongs of those on both sides of an issue, and the full-skew which carries the tendency one step further and criticizes only the adversary. p. 204.

[62] Ibid., p. 205.

own upon individuals, and these are what Marcuse, whom Kaufman is here following, has identified as "false" needs. Satisfaction of these diverts attention away from the formation of real needs and corresponding wants. Thus, "...peoples' want patterns are shaped and winnowed in ways that make them conform to the functional prerequisites of the existing social structure."[63] Policy preferences fall in the permissible range without most people ever being aware of it. The paradigm of the person is under these conditions, that of the "slave" or "happy pig."

Kaufman suggests that if the social structure is just, the consensus reached is "to that extent morally sound.""But the fact that the social outcome has been achieved," he writes, "without much awareness of deliberation--without fuller play of human intelligence--makes the process to that extent defective."[64] But the process must be characterized as "morally pernicious" to the extent that the social structure is hierarchical: "Whether intentionally or, much more likely, self-deceptively, the processes by which patterns of wants are shaped and winnowed not only serve important interests of upper-groups, but to a significant extent destroy the prospects for a good life for almost all people in the society."[65] The significant point is that this repressive process supplants one set of human needs with another diversionary set of wants, and needs so fundamental in requiring satisfaction that they are also appropriately identified as "rights" get lost in the picture. Kaufman identifies, then, on behalf of a strengthened version of liberalism, some of the distorting processes that give shape to "objective" interests that permeate a specific society.

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63 "Democracy...," p. 206.

64 Ibid., p. 207.

65 Idem.

Kaufman's concern in rendering accounts of these three processes is to show the lossage of ideals democracy was supposed to serve and which were fundamental to democratic practice. There is neither a will nor an obligation on behalf of claims of social justice; social justice is more likely threatened not by any acts against it but by acts of omission. To the extent that these fundamental ideals are not acted upon, policy-preferences lose their justification. For, at their basis is the requirement that policy-preferences arise in a free marketplace of ideas and that they arise among members who generally have sound moral views. This was an essential feature of Mill's theory.

This argument, critical of the processes that shape wants and will in contemporary democracies, belongs to a theory of human rights which Kaufman develops in his essays, "Wants, Needs and Liberalism," and "A Sketch of a Liberal Theory of Fundamental Human Rights."[66] In the first essay he sets out a case for a theory of human rights which draws upon a convergence in Mill and Marx. To summarize: Mill was implicitly committed, by Kaufman's interpretation of On Liberty, to a theory of human needs; Mill's was a theory of human rights grounded in a conception of vital interests. Marx was implicitly committed to a theory of human rights as well, despite his dislike for moral terminology. That is, for instance, the only way his formulation "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" might be understood--in terms of some normative concept of social justice. The interpretation sketched emphasizes the point that Mill is closer to Marx than Bentham in his theory of needs; for later

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66 Arnold S. Kaufman, "Wants, Needs and Liberalism," Inquiry, 14 (1971):191-212; and "A Sketch of a Liberal Theory of Fundamental Human Rights," Monist, 52 (October 1968):595-615.

liberalism no longer sanctioned just any wants but became more reflective and considered about them. Mill's notion of autonomy or individuality involved also the consideration that autonomy was so basic to interests in living the good life that it was not enough for this right to be guaranteed; individuals from earliest childhood should be trained to want these rights.

What remained in conflict between Mill and Marx was their views of the role of reason for bringing about the just society. While Mill saw reason as having a vital function at every stage in the development of a person's distinctively human powers, he lacked the understanding of the institutional causes of those social evils which he so keenly identified. Marx, on the other hand, had a fine comprehension of the enormous extent to which social, and especially, industrial institutions shape and limit individuals' prospects for the good life. But he seemed to suppose that class awareness was all that was sufficient to enable a person to become as unalienated as social development permitted. This is what Kaufman identified elsewhere as the Principle of the Sufficiency of Unalienated Labor; he interpreted Marx to be saying that the requisite forms of political control would emerge naturally once the problem of alienation of labor had been solved.[67] The problem of Marx's analysis was that it lead to a faith in the healing power of a revolutionary consciousness. Kaufman views this as "a source of much current political self-indulgence, as well as of other forms of political unreason."[68] He concludes that the line of argument Marcuse takes in the concept of "autonomy" presciently

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67 Arnold S. Kaufman, "On Alienation," Inquiry, 8 (1965):144-148.

68 "Wants...," p. 202.

reconciles the two issues Mill and Marx pose. Kaufman's argument here is sketchy at best, for he does not attempt to explore Marcuse's analysis even in broad terms. He simply indicates that Marcuse represents a "broad and pervasive tendency among more thoughtful contemporary Marxists," which include Markovic, Stonjanovic, and Kolakowski among others. What is implied is that an autonomous person will best be able to conduct his life as a moral agent--that is, to be self-reflective about his action in relation to others and his community.

There was an important objection to the idea of autonomy that Marcuse proposed, for certain Marxist's claimed that it moved away from the communal existence is one of the great issues of our time. His surmise was that "only autonomous individuals are creatively competent to resolve these tensions in ways that promote a morally sensible fit between communal and individualistic ideals."[69] This seemed to be Rousseau's expectation and aspiration as well.

His "Sketch of A Liberal Theory of Fundamental Human Rights" provides the justification for participation as a right derived from the presumptive right of "respect for persons." Its ulterior purpose was to promote a "conception of human rights that requires more strenuous political involvement than most (individuals) are presently prepared even to contemplate."[70] It was not enough to be merely a "privately virtuous" person. The point is that a liberal theory of rights implies obligation, and Kaufman was concerned that people "see what they are obliged to do." The object of his concern was especially the affluent middle class, for,

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[69] "Wants..., pp. 203-204.

[70] "A Sketch...," p. 596.

as distinct from a personal morality, political morality is "...typically relevant to more remote and impersonal consequences of our actions--to obligations towards those who, though usually out of sight, should not be out of mind."[71]

The matter comes down to the problem of how to develop autonomous persons in a society that has institutionalized practices running at cross-purposes. Marx's explanation in terms of the Principle of the Sufficiency of Unalienated Labor is doubted in favor of a more multi-faceted strategy. As I interpret him, Kaufman's reasoning is that the development of one's deliberative powers is not only or mainly linked to conditions of work. (But he is also rejecting the militant implications, as well as faith in working-class consciousness.) Kaufman's argument for encouraging a deliberative participation in many settings seems to rest on a recognition of the individuals' general practice of relating to many other aspects of life, aside from work. (Noticeably, Kaufman is also rejecting the recommendation of Marcuse of "The Great Refusal," which he describes as curiously irrational and absurd.)

We can gain a direct view of Kaufman's account in his 1960 essay, "Human Nature and Participatory Democracy," and his overview written ten years later.[72] At the outset, major lines of the elite argument are disputed. These are arguments that augment Bachrach's nicely because of their selected focus on views of human nature and will be noted briefly:

1. Lippman, for instance, is representative of those who argue

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[71] Ibid., p. 603.

[72] Published together in Bias of Pluralism, pp. 178-212.

that while human weaknesses are statistically inevitable, any particular person's weaknesses are largely remedial. The major institutional device he recommends for reforming the social ills that he diagnoses is that of transforming educational practices. Kaufman claims that this is a typical liberal resort which imposes an intolerable expectation on the schools in view of the fact that they are inextricably connected to the social ills they are supposed to remedy. It remains an insufficient solution.[73]

2. The psychological argument, and to which the religious one (e.g., Niebuhr's) is connected, presupposes that human beings cannot be trusted. Kaufman suggests that the empirical literature is not unified on this claim, and that Freud himself was tentative on the matter. While there are divergent interpretations of Freud's claims--say, between Klein and Fromm--the theories have substantially the same implications: "These implications, while they support the case for a form of democratic organization which protects and stabilizes, in no way rule out the case for a democracy of participation, though they surely weaken some of the power for good which some may be inclined to attribute to it."[74]

3. Then there are arguments that human beings are constitutionally lacking in intelligence. Kaufman supplies five arguments; suffice it to say, he is contending that the intelligence quotient implies little about political responsibility and virtue. Nor is such a claim alert to the relationship between environment and intelligence and that, indeed, participation may be an "important if not indispensable" condition for individuals to develop fully their capacities.[75]

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[73] "Human Nature...," pp. 179-180.

[74] Ibid., pp. 180-185, for quote, pp. 183-184.

[75] Ibid., pp. 185-186.

4. Finally, the most extreme view would be that human beings are essentially irrational; Schumpeter, who many important analyses follow, is indicative. Schumpeter's case, it is contended, fails to draw the important distinction between the varied functions of democratic forms--what can be done to individuals as well as what can be done for them. He fails to recognize the full significance of his own admission, that "only when men acquire direct responsibility for a certain range of decisions that social imagination breaks through its parochial barriers and envisions larger possibilities."[76]

Drawing upon those essays and on some of his other writings, I want to suggest now the characteristic features of Kaufman's case for a participatory democracy.

1. He has suggested as a starting point for empirical work a definition of participation as embracing "actual preliminary deliberation (conversations, debate, discussion) and that in the final decision each participant has a roughly equal formal say."[77]

2. His theory involves bringing into balance a politics of countervailing power (the Madisonian system) and a politics of participation (the Rousseauan model).[78] Democracy's forms have several functions, and in this view Kaufman's radical-liberal approach represents a modification of a straight Rousseauan theory of participatory democracy.

3. Participation should be encouraged in settings which directly affect one's life, for this is what will allow as he expresses it, "the social imagination to break through." It is not enough, as

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[76] Ibid., pp. 186-190, for quote, p. 189.

[77] Ibid., p. 192.

[78] Radical Liberal, pp. 60-67.

Schumpeter supposed for participation, that a person's sphere of activity be confined to the home. Possible settings would include the workplace. But more significant and strongly stressed is a fuller style of electoral participation that would include the development of a "new politics" through coalition-building around issues.[79] Also important was participation in community associations and local political movements.[80] As well, Kaufman expressed concern for political education and the importance of keeping the universities free.[81]

4. The principle of participation may have to be modified for any of a number of reasons. So Kaufman is not recommending unqualified participation. He is, for instance, willing to subscribe to a "decentralized" view of participation, with Bachrach, but not without some additional qualifications. For instance, it is possible that a decentralized participation can become tyrannical, as McConnell and Lowi emphasized. He suggested that the principle of participation may have to be modified for any number of the following reasons: The dangers of municipal tyranny, the effort to make expanded participation more defensible, and the existence of unequally distributed wealth and revenues.[82]

5. He maintained that the participatory society would allow both the superior and the subordinate to benefit, and hoped that this would provide one of the arguments for opening up administrative practices. He was not convinced that this was a likely prospect however.[83]

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79 Ibid., chap. 5.

80 Ibid., chap. 6.

81 Ibid., chap. 7.

82 "...Ten Years Later," p. 206.

83 "On Alienation," pp. 153-154.

6. The participatory society does not require a life of frantic activism, such as Dahl tried to suggest of the radical case. It does imply a life brought into a balance shaped by particular social circumstances.[84] For the comfortable liberal it implied further reflection and commitment to action. A "politics of radical pressure" was required to overcome a habit of role-playing and adoption of the official point of view.

7. From preceding discussion of his theory of fundamental human rights, it should become clear that Kaufman has also contributed an additional element to the contemporary case and which was central to the classical meaning. Participation now becomes "informed action." That is one of its requirements. People should be enabled to see that the reason they participate is to achieve and protect conditions of autonomy and relations of "respect for persons." Only in this way might considerations of policy and selections of delegates emerge as freely and unstructured as necessary constraints allowed.

8. A "Paradox of Participation" must be allowed. The notion reflects on the problems of political activism in the 1960's. He phrased it in this way: "Participation must begin by being unsuccessful if it is to fulfill its principal functions. For, by hypothesis, participation is typically an essential condition of making men competent and responsible. But individuals who are incompetent and irresponsible will not make good decisions. They will be neither effective nor wise. Therefore, before participatory decisions can become sound, they will be unsound--necessarily."[85]

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[84] "A Sketch...," pp. 603-604.

[85] "Human Nature...," p. 206.

This is a more cautious, pragmatic consideration that avoids defeatist views, and it takes into account what radical theories of participation failed to acknowledge - that even within participating arrangements there is a place for leadership and representation.[86]

9. Lastly, Kaufman advocates the application of the practical maxim of William James to guide conduct. The maxim holds, Kaufman suggests, "making the effort to achieve a possible good depends on our belief in the possibility of that achievement." For, he contends, "the very nerve of our effort to achieve a good may be cut by premature admission of its impossibility."[87] The maxim thus makes possible a politics of persistent moral effort, a politics which Kaufman terms "radical pressure."

The radical liberal perspective, which is grounded in a commitment to authentic human ideals, has enabled Kaufman to suggest an enriched conception of participation appropriate to the conditions of advanced industrial society. It is true some accommodations have been made in this conception that are not found perhaps in the theory of Rousseau. Kaufman has brought together and framed a synthesis of the Rousseauan model of a participatory society with the requisites of a representative political process for a large and highly populated country, the Madisonian model. But the concern is not chiefly for the most effective, or most economical, or most efficient decision process as it is with Dahl and other liberal-pluralists. Kaufman's case rests on the assessment of the value of development of the self, autonomy, against the case for denying it, and he conclusively argues in favor of the value of self-development in the long run.

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86 "Human Nature...," pp. 206-211.

87 "Human Nature...," p. 194.

Conclusion

A summary and assessment to this point is in order.

The examination of the ideas of Bachrach and Kaufman, who frame the radical liberal perspective, has provided the contemporary justification for an enriched concept of participation in advanced industrial society. The emphasis has returned once again to the recognition of the classical democratic value of self-development, the person is now seen as possessing cognitive and affective capacities for moral conduct. The conditions requisite for promoting this development then come into focus. And also brought into focus are the social forces, and particularly the forces acting on human consciousness, limiting this development. Kaufman significantly relies on Marcuse's argument to make this point. But is not clear that Kaufman has entirely escaped the problem which was identified in my discussion of Bachrach's interpretation--that is, the problem of how objective interests are formed. One important criticism of Kaufman's interpretation has been that he has not fully escaped the problem of the way needs (want-satisfactions) are defined by dominant social interests; he does not work completely with a self-realization model of the individual.[88]

Perhaps this, if it is a limitation, can be overcome, if we note Kaufman's relationship to the analysis of Marcuse. It is interesting that he turns to Marcuse's account and emphasis on the "winnowing and shaping" processes of society, but he also rejects as inadequate and unserious Marcuse's strategy for change, the notion of the Great Refusal, and views any moral theory of the individual as lacking. It is clear that Kaufman finds unsatisfactory the more militant recommendations for change. This

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[88] Paul Diesing and Paul Piccone, "Kaufman on Alienation," Inquiry, 10:208-210.

is the substance of the criticism of Christopher Lasch, for instance.[89] He responds to the revolutionary view of some Marxists as simply "self-indulgent." In terms of the Marcusean argument that reform from within becomes "cooptive," Kaufman and Bachrach both respond that a structure of "cooptation" still allows the subordinate individual or group leverage. Particularly, the situation of frustration may provoke deeper analysis and a more adequate understanding of the social forces affecting certain groups. Cooptation may lead to cynicism, but it may also have some positive consequences for increasing self-awareness. Aside from this point, Kaufman believes that any advance that can be achieved in social welfare warrants the risk, even of cooptation.[90]

One other interpretation, finally, needs to be addressed before the fuller case for an expanded participation in advanced industrial society can be set out. The next chapter will be an examination of the philosophy of Marcuse and will begin to construct a theory of repressive participation as a contrast model to the dominant concept of participation. The focus on Marcuse's theory of repressive society will allow us the possibility of identifying a key factor for structuring advanced industrial society--language development.

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89 Christopher Lasch, The Agony of the American Left, pp. 190-194.

90 Radical Liberal, p. 387.

C H A P T E R V I

THE RADICAL INTERPRETATION: HERBERT MARCUSE'S THEORY OF REPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION

Introduction

Of the political and social theorists under consideration in this study, the one with the most radical analysis and the most revolutionary implications is that of Herbert Marcuse. Unlike the previously reviewed theorists Marcuse's writings constitute a highly developed and complex philosophic corpus. His work spans, formidably, now a period of forty years. This corpus contains more fully developed and proficient analysis than many of Marcuse's critics seem to be aware of or are willing to make the effort to understand. Some of his most frequently cited pieces (e.g., Essay on Human Liberation) are the least well articulated at the Philosophic level and, therefore, do not give us a strong point of reference. Thus, to fail to examine his longer works and some earlier essays in Negations misses the importance, I believe, of Marcuse's contribution to an insightful and productive, albeit provocative, interpretation of contemporary social and political life.

Chief influences on Marcuse's work are Hegel, Marx, and Freud. In many ways his writings are an apparent synthesis of major elements in each of these thinkers' work juxtaposed to social realities as he observed them, a selective synthesis. For his analysis of the structure of dominant interests in the United States, Marcuse is indebted to C. Wright Mills and he acknowledges the contribution to a lesser extent of Vance Packard and Fred Cook. Also influential in other ways are several German

writers who are generally unfamiliar to students in the United States. Particularly important are the views on language taken by Kark Kraus and the theory of institutions of Arnold Gehlen. The work of Kraus, who figures in Wittgenstein's Vienna, and George Orwell on distorted language is of major influence on the direction of analysis in One Dimensional Man.[1]

Given this melange of influences on Marcuse, it is mistaken to read Marcuse as a Marxist in any purist sense. Surely, he does not offer a political philosophy according to the conventional treatment of problems of state, authority, and legality and the appropriateness of particular forms. Yet, he is not the darling of strict Marxists either. The chief feature of his work is its claimed "critical" character, a critical examination of social forms as they are interrelated in advanced industrial society. His interpretation lies with the early Marx, which has exponents in a growing number of interpretors of that period (e.g., Meszaros, Ollman, Petrovik).

In the "critical model" many see limitations for constructing and making credible in a non-utopian sense a new social arrangement. Perhaps it is so that the structure of society Marcuse envisions is not specified as some particular form of socialism; yet, he does offer what he sees as suitable guidelines or criteria. He indicates tools for analysis and criteria for deciding courses of action.[2]

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[1] If one reflects on the fatalism common to these important influences, including Freud, it is not surprising to find the extent to which Marcuse's own negativist position is a reflection of that. Undergirding each of these theorists is a frustration with the failure of events to turn out as they hoped, the sense of human powerlessness against the larger inhuman forces. This is a position that is, however, usefully ameliorated and transcended by the radical-liberals who bring the cautious optimism of William James' "will to believe" to the existential experience.

[2] This is achieved in "the power of negation" (as the negation of negation) and in the positive principles of nature and aesthetics.

The particular significance of Marcuse's work, I believe, can be best indicated through a distinction between the focus of Marx and the focus of Marcuse whereas Marx raised to historical cognizance the relationship between material forces (specifically, the capitalist mode of production) and the quality of existence (alienation), Marcuse draws to our attention a connection between the form of existence and how we comprehend it mentally and instinctually and what this means for praxis, putting thought into action. This is the question of the character and function of philosophy, science, culture, and ideology--the symbolic forces for the integration of society and the essential components of a technological society. Marcuse reveals these not as mere superstructure according to (some) Marxist interpretation or as apologists would have us believe as neutral forces, but in their forms under capitalist structure, more coercive and repressive than necessary, taking over more subtle forms. Philosophy, science, culture, and ideology form a problem, the problem of "technological rationality," of immense importance if change toward a more humane and rational society is to be considered possible at all. That future society depends on the capacity of critique, joined at a very instinctual level (critique revealing false needs, thus, making possible the reconstruction of the individual in terms of real needs), to overcome overwhelming resistance by the dominanting force of "technological rationality."

"Critical theory" has the purpose of making manifest this important connection between human existence and the forms by which it is

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Kai Nielsen, for instance, is satisfied that Marcuse offers criteria on which to base moral action in his essay "On the Choice Between Reform and Revolution," pp. 17-51, esp. pp. 48-49, in Held, Nielsen, and Parsons, eds., Philosophy and Political Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

comprehended and acted upon. In this understanding, the sophistical question of whether Marcuse is a pre- or post-Marxist is laid to rest.[3] Marcuse's review of German idealism's treatment of the problem of the dialectic of the universal and the particular in Counterrevolution and Revolt makes this clear:

> But it is only the Marxian conception which, while preserving the critical, transcendent element of idealism, uncovers the material, historical ground for the reconciliation of human freedom and natural necessity; subjective and objective freedom. This union presupposes liberation; the revolutionary praxis which is to abolish the institutions of capitalism and to replace them by socialist institutions and relationships.

Marcuse, distinguishing his own position, continues:

> But in the transition, the emancipation of the senses must accompany the emancipation of consciousness, thus involving the totality of human existence. The individuals themselves must change in their very instincts and sensibilities if they are to build, in association, a qualitatively different society.[4]

My effort in the following pages is simply one of trying to present the work of Marcuse in a comprehensive (even if reductivist) form according to his declared and apparent purposes so that his efforts take on the significance that his more abstract statements sometimes obscure. The effort will be geared to, first, delineating his critical method which is generally unfamiliar to American social scientists and is the reason for much misunderstanding of what he is trying to say. I will then turn to an examination of his theory of repressive society, what

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[3] Alasdain MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a Polemic (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 19.

[4] Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 73-74.

its features are and how it came about, in order to prepare the foundation for a construction of a theory of repressive participation. If much of what passes in the American political process for participation is really repressive, what is the prospect for true, meaningful participation? We will, then, need to consider next Marcuse's answer in the "Great Refusal," which recognizes the tendency of even progressive movements to turn into their opposite to the degree to which they accept the rules of the game. Only under another socio-economic condition, one which resembles very much a modernized Rousseauan world, can true participation occur as a pattern of social action among self-developed and free human beings.

Marcuse's Critical Theory

What is "critical theory?" What is its philosophic basis? How does it distinguish itself?

Those identified with the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, founded in 1923, refer to their framework as "the critical theory of society." The approach, it appears, has been more successfully developed in the European than the American setting. Much important writing remains to be translated from the German, and a systematic survey of the work of the school is not here available to my knowledge.[5]

"Critical" refers specifically to the critique of political economy which constitutes the core of Marx's efforts.[6] The thrust of the approach follows from the concept of historical change and the relationship of historically changing social structures to conceptions about them. An emphasis on this point, however, directs the critical school away from Marxists who claim to be more true to Marx (e.g., MacIntyre) in terms of accepting the role of labor (material necessity) in the conception of revolution. This proposition also separates the

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5 Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination - A History of The Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950 (Boston: Little Brown, 1973). This study is the first to become available.

6 William Leiss, "The Critical Theory of Society; Present Situation and Future Tasks" in Paul Breines, ed., Critical Interruptions - New Left Perspectives on Herbert Marcuse (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 76.

school from "traditional theory" which has failed to transcend its early reason for adopting the scientific (positivist and relativist) and objectivist status in its theory of knowledge. Traditional theory, philosophically, according to the critical school, separates its knowledge from guiding purposes through its method of study. "Failure" to make this analytic separation on the part of the critical school is neither arbitrary nor extraneous but necessary, according to the argument, in terms of the purpose of philosophy. Theory should not only be able to delineate the existing pattern of social relations but reveal the present historical possibilities, either for the direction of a transition to a more humane society or in the direction of increased barbarism.[7] To do this the "scientific" character of theory is not to be rejected. But scientific theory must be enlightened with critical/normative views--that is, with a purposeful goal whose content must be spelled out. The vocabulary of "freedom and happiness" and human needs, biological and aesthetic, have served this function in Marcuse's writings. Critique of empiricism, liberalism, and pluralism must flow from this view.[8] According to an analysis by Albrecht Wellmer in The Critical Theory of Society, this "mediating" approach transcends the social and ideological limitations of behaviorist social science and the inter-subjective approach of the position articulated by Peter Winch in The Idea of A Social Science (the study of subjectively intended contexts

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[7] Ibid., p. 79.

[8] See, for instance, Negations - Essays in Critical Theory (trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), chap. 3; and One Dimensional Man - Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), chaps. 4 and 5.

of meaning). These latter approaches are useless from the perspective of ideology-critique for changing society and bringing about the emancipation of men; for they are unable to deal with the tension between the "is" and the "ought."

What, then, are the sources for an understanding of real possibilities, according to the critical school's account? The answer lies in the school's characteristic view of history and consciousness. The error of idealism is that it separates the realm of ideas from conditions in which they develop, necessitating abandonment of the human condition in its struggle for justice, freedom, and happiness to another, unreal world. Marcuse observes:

> To the extent that philosophy has nevertheless made its peace with man's determination of economic conditions, it has allied itself with repression. That is the bad materialism that underlies the edifice of idealism: The consolation that in the material world everything is in order as it is.... The other premise of this materialism is that the mind is not to make its demands in this world, but is to orient itself toward another realm that does not conflict with the material world.[10]

Or,

> In idealism the individual protests the world by making both himself and the world free and rational in the realm of thought. This philosophy is in an essential sense individualistic.[11]

The critical school claims to be materialist, as opposed to idealist, in the sense that concrete historical experience embodies what is possible, what is connected to social experience. Another passage indicates what

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9 Allbrecht Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society (trans. John Cumming) (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 31-34.

10 Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory" in Negations, p. 153.

11 Ibid., p. 140.

Marcuse means here:

> To be sure, even the highest philosophical categories are connected with social facts, even if only with the most general fact that the struggle of man with nature has not been undertaken by mankind as a free subject but instead has taken place only in class society.[12]

Wellmer's study calls this recognition of thought as historically-contained, bearing within it a notion of the good life, the "draft meaning of history."[13] Marcuse's 1937 essay, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," places emphasis upon the need to rediscover the past, the links that the future has in the past.

To be sure, there is another dimension of fantasy or imagination, and also intuition and reflection. Fantasy has its place in being instrumental to obtaining the future. But to be useful fantasy must be connected with historical experience; otherwise, it will be boundless and dangerous.[14]

In One Dimensional Man Marcuse specifies the requirements of this kind of social theory so dependent on an initial set of abstractions more closely:

> In order to identify and define the possibilities of an optimal development, the critical theory must abstract

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12 Ibid., p. 148.

13 Critical Theory of Society, pp. 40-41. He writes: "Critical theory is derivable from a notion of the 'good life' already available to it as part of the socio-historical situation it subjects to analysis; which, as the notion of an acknowledgement of each individual as a person by every other individual, and as the idea of a non-coercive communal human life of dialogue, is a draft meaning of history already fragmentarily embodied in a society's traditions and institutions: A draft meaning which it applies critically in opposing a society and its dominant forms of self-understanding."

14 "Philosophy and Critical Theory," pp. 154-155.

> from the actual organization and utilization of society's resources, and from the results of this organization and utilization. Such abstraction which refuses to accept the given universe of facts as the final context of validation, such "transcending" analysis of the facts in the light of their arrested and denied possibilities, pertains to the very structure of social theory. It is opposed to all metaphysics by virtue of the rigorously historical character of the transcendence. The "possibilities" must be within the reach of the respective society; they must be definable goals of practice....[15]

In short, what is socially possible must be linked to historical trends, and that is the role of theory and the constructive conceptualizations of economic and political categories. The question of possibility, the limits of the possible, is imbedded as a fundamental consideration in the very dialectical logic of this approach.

The correctness of critical theory is only proved in practice and a posteriori; theory has only hypothetical status until tested. And time changes its applicability and appropriateness--hence, Marcuse's reassessment of certain ideas presented in the 1930's and 1940's is unabashed.[16] Similarly, in the Essay on Liberation there is no need for apology for modifying the pessimism about the potentialities for change during the mid-1960's. This is a flexibility in Marcuse's position that conventional political scientists see as a weakness in his system (because of the assumption of regularities of behavior in their work; only uniformities can yield the laws of generalizability that they are seeking).

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[15] One Dimensional Man, p. xi.

[16] See Leiss, pp. 87-88; and Marcuse in "Forward," Negations, p. xv.

The Theory of Repressive Society

The starting point for Marcuse's theory is the same as that for Marx: The conception of man that is to be realized. Both are concerned with the problem of what becomes of man under varied social arrangements. Our evidence for this concern in Marcuse appears as early as his 1932 essay on Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.[17] That essay emphasized the philosophic basis from which Marx's critique of bourgeois political economy and his theory for revolutionary change proceeded. It is a conception of man's being that must finally be arrived at when we ask, what is the ultimate subject of any ethical politics? Plato and Aristotle, Rousseau, Marx, Thoreau, Gandhi, Solzhenitsyn, Camus, the Berrigans--diverse figures such as these all give testimony to the naturalistic-humanist cause: Furthering in practical form the conception of man as a universal free being, the feature of which seems to be the struggle against the forces that limit his existence. What man can become is the question of Kant, of Hegel, of Marx, of Marcuse. It is the only significant drama, according to Schiller--the conflict between what man is and what he ought to be.

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17 "The Foundation of Historical Materialism" in Studies in Critical Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 1-48. This essay attempts to overcome several misinterpretations of Marx's definition of man (man as a sensuous being, and therefore a suffering being: The process of the objectification of this being, and man as a passionate being). Marcuse writes: "In developing this concept Marx and Feurerbach were in fact coming to grips with one of the crucial problems of 'classical German philosophy.' But in Marx it is this concept of sensuousness (as objectification) which leads to the decisive turn from classical German philosophy to the theory of revolution, for he inserts the basic traits of practical and social existence into his definition of man's essential being. As objectivity, man's sensuousness is essentially practical objectification, and because it is practical it is essentially a social objectification." p. 21. Here is the opportunity for the synthesis of Freud, and the accent Marcuse provides.

In short, we must begin with the contrast model of man as a potentiality in order to understand the features of Marcuse's theory of repressive politics. For, this is a theory which asserts advanced industrial society to have material, intellectual, and psychological features that are repressive of those potentialities. The theory must first account for such potentialities and indicate the specific features which diminish or prohibit the emergence of those potentialities in more than the exceptional case. Only after this can an effort towards a theory of repressive participation be undertaken.

In "The Foundation of Historical Materialism" Marcuse shows the central and original meaning of the position Marx derives from Kant, Hegel, and Feurerbach concerning "species being"--i.e., a being which has the species as its object. I want to sketch his account here briefly. Man was distinguished from animals because he could give shape to his existence; he could "produce himself." In this, he is a universal and free being. Man has the capacity to make the species of every being his object, and, therefore, could grasp the possibilities contained in every being. He is a universal being because he could appropriate nature for his needs, making it his own nature, his human nature. Labor was the specifically human life activity in the process of man's own objectification, his own self-realization.[18] And, work and praxis were the particularly human modes of self-affirmation. Alienated labor--the estrangement of man from himself, from nature, and from others--was a

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18 Marcuse sees the discussion of "self-actualization" and "autonomy" by post-Freudian revisionists as ossified sociology, for it fails to comprehend this relationship between man's condition and his being.

denial of man's humanity, his reduction to an animal or more appropriately, to a cog in a machine, by a particular perverse form of objectivication (i.e., reification, estrangement). This is what needed to be superseded. It is well to note here that Marcuse has consistently held on to this early Marxian model of sensuous man and the process of objectivication.[19] But he did amend it in certain crucial ways, to the irritation of certain latter-day Marxists such as Alasdair MacIntyre.

For instance, Freud seemed appropriate and suitable for synthesis to this early conception, for what Freud offered in his analysis of the ego was another--and more developed--explanation of the instinctive side of man. Marcuse writes: "Freud had discovered the mechanisms of social and political control in the depth dimensions of instinctual drives and satisfactions."[20] Instincts were, from this original standpoint, viewed as life determining forces subject to historical modification and illusion (as distorted communication) and had an important role in this process. In other words, psychoanalysis operated from a dynamic theory of mind.[21] It was a side that very much coincided with the tasks marked out by Marx's concept of the process of objectification. Marcuse develops the

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19 For the development of this discussion see the essay cited above, pp. 14-27.

20 In "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," in Five Lectures - Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 44. According to Marcuse, the individual once seen by Freud no longer exists.

21 This feature is well brought out in Richard Wollheim's study of Freud. Wollheim writes of the initial insight that triggered Freud's lifetime career in the following way: "(Charcot) started him off on a new career, and he endowed him with two gifts, which, transformed over the years by experience and by the ingenuity of Freud's mind, became the foundations of psychoanalysis. One was a form of therapy, which set out to remove the symptoms of mental disorder through the use of words, and the other was a diagnosis, according to which the symptoms of the disorder were traceable to the influence of ideas." In Sigmund Freud (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. xi.

significance of Freud in this way:

> His psychology does not focus on the concrete and complete personality as it exists in its private and public environment, because this existence conceals rather than reveals the essence and nature of the personality. It is the end result of long historical processes which are congealed in the network of human and institutional entities making up society, and these processes define the personality and its relationships. Consequently, to understand them for what they really are, psychology must unfreeze them by tracing their hidden origins.[22]

Of course, Freudian psychology has rested on the specific emphasis of the internal instinctual (sexual) conflicts of the child. The individual's superego and libidinal states took shape in the struggle of the ego against the father-figure. The effect of this struggle was what gave shape to the instinctual basis of behavior, but Marcuse's modification of Freud's theory lead to the rejection of the inevitability or necessity of domination by a primal father-figure. Marcuse's account reduced the universalized analysis of Freud to a characteristically historical-cultural one. And he expanded the number of opportunities which could effect the ego. Briefly, the father--displaced by the generalized, abstract and depersonalized administered structures of twentieth century society--had lost his paternal significance. The result was a weakened ego structure and a superego that was heavily conformist. Man was the subject of unnecessary repressive domination--unnecessary to the extent to which he was not allowed the conditions for realizing his full humanity, conditions which would allow the ego, in struggle, to become strong and autonomous (i.e., self-determining).

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22 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization - A Philosophic Inquiry Into Freud (New York: Vintage, 1955), p. 52. But Freud was not unconcerned with the "healthy" personality; see Paul Roazen, Freud: Political and Social Thought (New York: Vintage, 1968), pp. 273-289.

What these altered conditions were, and how they differed from earlier ones, remains to be made clear. What we must now note is that, for Marx and for Marcuse (as well as for Meadian social psychologists who help to illuminate the radical-liberal position) the analysis rests on the (insightful) observation that man is not autonomous from his fellow man and society in any complete sense. He is very much a reflection of such social relations. This being so, man cannot be free "on his own."[23] Man needs help to be free--that is, to be free of his class problems. He needs his culture, his institutions, his language ("Man needs 'a totality of human manifestations of life.'").[24] This requires the further recognition of man as a "social" being, a view that is denied in the bourgeois society which celebrates individualism.[25] It is for Marcuse, as it is for Lukacs and other critical theorists, this particular society which makes man solitary and for which solitariness is the typical human experience--in other words, a social phenomenon. The problem is the analyzing of this inter-relationship, this intersection, between specific social institutions and what man is and what he can become. The dialectic is particularly attuned to this broad task. Toward this end, the analysis of language, in the sense that there is a political economy of language (what the ordering of concepts is and how it is achieved), must also have some significant play.

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23 Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in Wolff, Moore and Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 86-87.

24 "The Foundations of Historical Materialism," op. cit., p. 23; Marcuse is quoting Marx here.

25 See, for instance, the argument of Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973).

Obviously, the view outlined so far (of what man is and can be; the role of instincts and their modification; the relationship of man to his society) is quite another position than that offered by the theorists of what has sometimes been called "the oversocialized conception of man" or of other views of man--for example, the Hobbesian view or the views of man dramatized in Orwell's Animal Farm and Ionesco's The Rhinoceros.[26] Western bourgeois political economy cannot (indeed, must not) regard alienation and estrangement as a sociological fact and starting point. It has not selected man as a starting point; at best the question of man's being is an afterthought. Marcuse is critical for this reason:

> Bourgeois political economy has to be basically transformed in the critique for this very reason: It never gets to see man and his history and is thus in the profoundest sense not a "science of people" but of nonpeople and of an "inhuman world of objects and commodities."[27]

Its starting point is somewhere else (e.g., the concern with how to achieve a "stable" society) and man takes his value from the world of exchange. Because of the necessity for the mystification of this essential premise (the theory of value at the core of bourgeois economy), bourgeois philosophy requires its non-subversive "analytic" categories and modes. (Perhaps these are useful under limited conditions, but they are never transcended and formulated into a more comprehensive construct.)

It is not strange, then, that from the bourgeois perspective, the lack of control over events is expected and explained by the "apparent over-powering forces beyond man's control" the concealed notion of inevitability.[28] In a certain sense that is very so. Man cannot be

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[26] Cf. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Empirical Political Theory and the Image of Man," Polity, 2 (Summer 1970):443-478.

[27] "The Foundations of Historical Materialism," op. cit., p. 9.

[28] Cited by Marcuse, "The Foundations of Historical Materialism," p. 18.

viewed as a controlling agent, a responsible agent in his own history; it is logically impossible (mutatis mutandis, utopian). This point can be brought out if we recall some previously noted theorists in this study. For instance, McConnell and Lowi cannot appreciate the value of what happens to man's autonomy in the socio-political structure. Socialization theorists using a systems framework accept and promote the established integration processes. No encouragement is ever offered, except in the purely rhetorical sense perhaps, for one to rise above one's mere existence; this can certainly be said of most human relations and management experts. As Marcuse expresses it, the problem of alienation allows the objectification of existence to turn into reification. Explaining away the larger problems of man's existence, and focusing only on the limited and technologically manageable ones, which seems to be the tendency of conventional social science, are two important ways to escape the larger and universal meanings of human existence. Not a very sweeping role is demanded for philosophy.

I have tried to suggest the senses in which a concept of man's potentiality is important to Marcuse's theory. We might now ask, in what way is advanced industrial society "repressive?" A brief review of Marcuse's application of the concept of repression from Freud's metapsychology is in order. This concept referred to the necessary and inevitable process of controlling the internally conflicting impulses of

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He comes back to this point in his criticism of Charles Reich's Greening of America in which it is asserted that "nobody is in control." Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 16 (1971), "The Movement in a New Era of Repression," p. 6.

the individual for the development and progress of civilization.[29] Marcuse accepted the fact, in line with Freud, that some aspects of life must necessarily be repressive. Indeed, this necessary repression--sublimation--was the mark of a civilized person. This was "basic" repression and was defined in Eros and Civilization as "the modification of instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization; these are the restrictions which mark the development of man from the human animal to homo sapiens."[30] What Marcuse uniquely asserted in opposition to both the pessimistic Freud and Freud's optimistic revisionists (who accepted the environment as a given) was unnecessary repression which was formed historically--i.e., surplus repression.

Like Marx's concept of surplus value, surplus repression was a concept meant to indicate magnitude--the magnitude of repression imposed on man by social institutions; it is "the quantitative sublimation of individual needs and wants basic to certain social forms but not for human existence and association."[31] It is that portion which is the result of social conditions sustained in the specific interest of class

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29 Wollheim's account of Freud suggests this was not a position rigidly adhered to by Freud, p. 261. See also, Peter Madison, Freud's Concept of Repression and Defense (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961) and Peter Madison, "Freud's Repression Concept," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 37 (1956):75-86.

30 Eros, p. 82.

31 Ibid., p. 81.

domination. The specific conditions of advanced industrial society introduce additional controls (over and above, or rather underneath the social conflicts) new strains and stresses in the individual; and these stresses and strains are part of the normal functioning of the society.[32] Specifically, surplus repression takes two forms: (1) As tendencies or forces that serve the requirements of the established apparatus of production, distribution, and consumption, and (2) as systematic manipulation and control of the psyche. Instances of surplus repression which Marcuse provides are the modifications and deflections of instinctual energies necessitated by the perpetuation of the monogamic-patriarchal family, or by a hierarchical division of labor, or by public control over the individual's private existence.[33] Social repression in our society, if I read Marcuse correctly, is almost always linguistic repression and this can take infinite forms.

How does this repressive process occur? Central to Marcuse's conversion of Freudian meta-psychology is his account of the Oedipus story for explaining the functioning of the superego as a moral structure. His account depicts the occurrence of an historical shift from the primal father as the object of authority to another stage in which there is a father-substitute in the generalized, abstract and depersonalized institutions of administered society. In the domination-rebellion-domination cycle that Freud postulates, Marcuse's interpretation suggests that the second domination is simply not a repeat of the first domination, but takes on a progressive historical character:

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[32] Negations, p. 251.

[33] Eros, p. 34.

> From the primal father via the brother clan to the system of institutional authority characteristic of mature civilization, domination becomes increasingly rational, effective, productive. At the end, under the rule of the fully developed performance principle, subordination appears as implemented through the social division of labor itself (although physical and personal force remains an indispensable instrumentality). Society emerges as a lasting and expanding system of useful performances; the hierarchy of functions and relations assumes the form of objective reason: Law and order are identical with the life of society itself. In the same process, repression too is depersonalized: Constraint and regimentation of pleasure now become a function (and "natural" result) of the social division of labor. To be sure, the father, as paterfamilias, still performs the basic regimentation of instincts which prepares the child for the surplus-repression on the part of society during his adult life. But the father performs this function as the representative of the family's position in the social division of labor rather than as the "possessor" of the mother. Subsequently, the individual's instincts are controlled through the social utilization of his labor power.[34]

The sequence has an extremely pathological feature, because the reification of the father-figure also transforms the character of guilt. At one time guilt's object was a concrete and manageable figure. Guilt in advanced industrial society would have to turn against the very object which also brings the benefits and pleasures that sustain the individual. The paradox is internal and self-contained, and the individual no longer possesses a sphere of private non-conformity. There is no longer mental space for developing himself against his sense of guilt, and for living with a conscience of his own. Any recognition of this process is controlled at the level of consciousness by society's institutions:

> Civilization has to defend itself against the spector of a world which could be free. If society cannot use its growing productivity for reducing repression (because such

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[34] Ibid., p. 81.

> usage would upset the hierarchy of the status quo), productivity must be turned against the individuals; it becomes itself an instrument of universal control.[35]

In this line of analysis, there is some real significance, for Marcuse, and for the purposes of our argument, to the loss of such traditional institutions as the family, religion, and small enterprises (not that these institutions are ipso facto good), which are progressively absorbed into large-scale impersonal groupings. Here is the loss of the conditions for the formation of the superego. Without these conditions the superego is lost to a social (mass-created and atomized) ego for the lot of the population. Now, under the rule of economic, political, and cultural monopolies, the formation of the mature superego seems to skip the stage of individualization: The generic atom becomes directly a social atom. The repressive organization of the instincts seems to be collective, and the ego seems to be prematurely socialized by a whole system of extrafamilial agents and agencies. As early as the preschool level, gangs, radio, and television set the tyrannical pattern for both conformity and rebellion. Deviations from the patterns are punished not so much within the family as outside and against the family. The experts of the mass media transmit the required values; they offer the perfect training in efficiency, toughness, personality, dream and romance. These are the fantasy forms that characterize class identification. With this form of indoctrination, the family can no longer compete; in other words, "the substance of the family too is cashed in by the society."[36]

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[35] Ibid., p. 85.

[36] Ibid., p. 88. The quote is from Aspects of Sociology by the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), chap. IX, "The Family," p. 137.

and, it is for this reason that Marcuse is derisive of the liberal notion that the present structure enables the development of autonomous, whole and valued beings.

According to Marcuse's writings and this review of the theory of the unconscious, there are, then social forces leading the individual psyche to act repressively; i.e., to put into the unconscious through the agency of the now-socialized superego instinctual and healthy desires that might otherwise disrupt the prevailing and ongoing sets of interests of dominant institutions. The family, the school, and religion become, for instance, important transmitting agencies. In this sense, then, the process of repression is both social and political as well as individual. How the mechanism functions is considered a matter of conjecture at this time; but that there is repression, "that people forget things and that there is an ascertainable motive for forgetting them," is indubitable.[37]

There may be some senses in which these repressive forces can be meaningfully distinguished. First, the materially repressive forces of the economic structure may be indicated; specifically, the capitalist economic structure is implicated. The American productive-consumptive society's progress depends, for its very logic, upon a growth in destructiveness. As Pilisuk and Hayden put it: "Our concept is more nearly that American society <u>is</u> a military-industrial complex."[38] Within this

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[37] J. O. Wisdom, "Psychoanalytic Theories of the Unconscious," <u>Encyclopedia of Philosophy</u>, 8:189-194.

[38] Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden, "Is There a Military-Industrial Complex which Prevents Peace?: Consensus and Countervailing Power in Pluralistic Systems," in <u>Bias of Pluralism</u>, p. 152.

ruling economy, labor is not self-selected and does not satisfy individual needs or faculties. The alienation of labor from what is productive and satisfying is hidden by the veil of affluence; this is the illusory meaning of a "higher" social status.[39] By the very nature of this structure, only politically insignificant minorities suffer the conditions of poverty; this is what has been denoted by Claus Offe as "the permanent welfare class."[40]

Secondly, the intellectually repressive features of this historical stage of society are best captured in the dominant ideology which Marcuse refers to as "technological rationality." The society camouflages its irrationality---at a conscious level--through a specific form of "rationality" which celebrates a commodity fetishism, and in its "affirmative" character postulates an eternal idea of happiness in place of real gratification.[41] At higher levels, this rationality is also intended to set the limits within which means-ends decisions are made. Habermas has continued this analysis fruitfully in his essay "Technology and Science as 'Ideology.'"

Thirdly, the psychologically repressive features of this society, perhaps distinct only in ambiguous ways from intellectually repressive

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39 This theme is developed further in Marcuse's essay "Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial Society," in Negations, pp. 248-268.

40 Claus Offe, "Advanced Capitalism and the Welfare State," Politics and Society, (Summer 1972):479-488. In numbers this group may not be so significant; depending on the definition and the source, the number in this class ranges from one-fifth to two-fifth's of the American population.

41 Marcuse's essay is "The Affirmative Character of Culture," in Negations, pp. 88-133.

features, embrace forces addressed at the unconscious level of instincts, especially sexual ones. Simply put, sexual and other instinctual drives are exchanged or converted for some other more socially-desirable form of behavior--for example, more labor power. As the nature of capitalism's dynamics changed, for instance, the dynamics of the sexually-repressive process changed from an overtly repressive puritanism to the more oblique one embodied in hedonism and which Marcuse terms "repressive desublimation," for in the modern commercial world consumerist and sexual liberation are combined.[42] According to Marcuse, "repressive desublimation" has the appearance of freedom, but its essential quality is one of perpetuating the "divided self" (in Laing's terminology) or a false individualism, which is Slater's theme in The Pursuit of Loneliness. There are other non-symbolic forces affecting the psychic economy--lack of any real free time. The time for solitude and reflection, is one of them. According to V. J. McGill in The Idea of Happiness, contemplation seems to be a clear omission in Bentham's construction of the pleasure principle.[43] If we recall our Rousseauan paradigm, this was a condition essential to the development of the reflective process; it was a condition vital to the examination of one's authenticity.

In combination, these repressive forces constitute the warp and weft of the heavy imposition official and unofficial social agencies place on the whole sensing being of the mass of individuals in the present historical

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[42] An interesting passage is provided by Walter A. Weiskopf, Alienation and Economics (New York: Delta, 1971), pp. 114-115.

[43] Weiskopf, pp. 71-79, discusses this interpretation.

period of advanced industrial society. Some do escape it as we shall see.

The important significance of the concept of repression to a theory of society can be better brought out now. Marcuse, in his account, is contending that social needs have become individual needs at the very level of instincts. More precisely, the way the instincts express themselves has been set in certain ways. There is, in the Freudian terminology, the usurpation of the Pleasure Principle by the historically-specific reality principle, the Performance Principle. Advanced industrial society has successfully mitigated the recognition of the purpose and the price that must be paid for this exchange. In this account Marcuse is implicitly suggesting the inadequacy of Marxist theory. As Robinson's study of Marcuse suggests: "Marxism had proved inadequate not because it was overly abstract and revolutionary, but precisely because it was not revolutionary enough. The social criticism of the future, Marcuse felt, would have to be both more negative and more utopian than even Marxism."[44] Marcuse's critique is distinctive just because of his insistent effort to unravel the dynamics of this split between individual and social needs at their interface--the level of consciousness and consciousness-modification. And this is what is seen by Habermas, for instance, as perceptive about the synthesis of Marx and Freud, even though--as it becomes apparent--Marcuse may not have been completely successful in the synthesis himself. Habermas writes:

> Marx had developed the idea of the self-constitution of the human species in natural history in two dimensions: As a

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[44] Paul A. Robinson, The Freudian Left (New York: Harper Colophon, 1969), p. 179.

> process of self-production, which is impelled forward by the productive activity of those who perform social labor and stored in the forces of production and as a self-formative process, which is impelled forward by the critical-revolutionary activity of classes and which is stored in experiences of reflection. On the other hand, Marx was not able to provide an account of the status of the science that, as critique, was supposed to reconstruct the self-constitution of the species; for his materialist concept of the synthesis of man and nature remained restricted to the categorical framework of instrumental action. This framework could account for productive knowledge but not reflective knowledge. Nor was the model of productive activity suited for reconstruction of power and ideology. In contrast, Freud has acquired in metapsychology a framework for distorted communicative action that allows the conceptualization of the origins of institutions and the role and function of illusions, that is of power and ideology. Freud's theory can represent a structure that Marx did not fathom.[45]

The end product of this repressive process that Marcuse has drawn is a figure who is inescapably the conformist, the role-player, the subservient. These are men and women who will play the game within an authoritarian and hierarchical structure of servitude. There is a tragic dimension here, because these individuals sense the necessity to conform in order to survive within the institutions they find themselves. Their identity has failed to crystallize through no fault of their own.

Marcuse's case, and that of the radical position more clearly, involves the dialectical claim, that, in more than the exceptional case, there are possibilities for human development, principled action, and creative expression--despite the human condition's tragic dimension.

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[45] Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), chap. 12, "Psychoanalysis and Social Theory: Nietzsche's Reduction of Cognitive Interests," pp. 281-282. Habermas makes the point that, "Marx was not able to see that power and ideology are distorted communication, because he made the assumption that men distinguish themselves from animals when they began to produce their means of subsistance." p. 282.

The Marcusean argument, which is, for this reason, very much within the Rousseauan tradition, underscores and projects the native but vague possibilities in natural man for growth and autonomy when assisted by certain features of a social setting that provides conditions of equality, mutual respect, solitude, and conversation.

Marcuse brings into his work, however, some of the weaknesses in Freud's conceptual baggage--namely, his static, analytic theory of the mind, a simplistic and mechanistic model. This problem is readily amended by a more flexible concept which has been proposed by some of Freud's successors who have postulated an Hypothesis of Degrees of Repression, "that forgotten ideas are unconscious in differing degrees, because as one idea becomes more acceptable to consciousness than it was, the idea next to it is less removed from the threshold of consciousness."[46] This hypothesis as to degree is viewed as an essential premise for psychoanalysis to be practiced and to succeed at all.

On the positive side, the point cannot be overemphasized that Marcuse's amended theory offers a more commanding analysis than that offered by the socialization theorists. Contemporary socialization theorists, such as David Easton and Edward S. Greenburg, perceived surely correctly part of the human situation, the socializability of man as a creature of symbolism. But they failed to ask, What can man become that is true to his very nature and more than merely the reflection of the needs of the established institutional arrangements? What can man become in terms of the best possibilities? If an individual is given a chance to become a "social" being in the more meaningful and sufficient sense,

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[46] Wisdom, p. 190.

will he? The question is unanswered. These theorists' inability, as well, to deal with the other side of power, of conflict and confrontation and anti-social behavior, suggests another shortcoming. Must not a worthwhile social theory provide some account as to whether the society is evolving in a generative rather than degenerative form? Again, the answer is not to be found, because they assume what must be proved. As I shall later suggest, a proper and full account must examine the function of language in establishing class differentials in the society. Marcuse, in his theory of repressive society, has lead us to a definition of tasks yet to be undertaken.

To summarize, Freud's work had allowed the possibility of exploring the barriers, as well as supports, for making men and women more free to be genuine masters of themselves. Culture, in its positive and negative forms, had direct bearing on the defense mechanisms individuals employed for overcoming, or failing to overcome, aggressive tendencies. As Roazen points out of Freud's work, "Culture is not conceived only as a necessary evil providing a variety of compensations, but also a useful buttress in providing its members with a needed sense of direction."[47]

Such, then, is the Marcusean viewpoint which, in accord with our Rousseauan model, recognizes, "All art is right which simply enlarges, but none is right if it distorts us."[48] The manifest result of Marcuse's work in One Dimensional Man and essays of that period was to show that

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[47] Roazen, p. 209.

[48] Quote from E. H. Wright as cited by Peter Gay in his: Introduction to Ernst Cassirer's The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1967 [1954]), p. 20.

the mass culture of technocratic society had little to offer for fostering the development of self-defining, relatively free and expressive human beings and in one essay there was the critical thesis that Freud's concept of man had been made obsolete by the growth of certain pathological social tendencies. But that pessimism need not lead to the view that possibilities for change have become frozen or petrified. There are conceptual problems in Marcuse's analysis which can be overcome through a synthesis of his ideas, as amended and developed by Andre Gorz, particularly, and the model set out by the radical-liberals. Before suggesting that synthesis, I will turn next to developing a Marcusean theory of repressive participation.

Toward a Theory of Repressive Participation

Politics in advanced industrial society is repressive--that has been the main thread of Marcuse's argument so far. Let us now attempt to set out the concept of repression in terms of a theory of participation and clarify it.

Repressive politics is a structure of power and a form of political language that employs a broad spectrum of techniques to maintain a narrow consensus that will support the infrastructure, which is the productive, distributive, and consumptive system that defines the dominant class interests. The chief mark of a repressive style of politics is its effect on consciousness--specifically, the effect is to diminish, or force into the unconscious, the range of options that are available to the dominated class and make them appear to be the full range.

The techniques of a repressive style of politics are familiar to the readers of the literature.[49] There may be the slights of ignoring minority claims or demands for such apparently inconsequential things as a streetlight or a housing code; frustrated human experience becomes channeled into either apathy or violent confrontation.[50] More carefully organized grievances from an outgroup stand the chance of being "swalled up" in

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[49] For instance: Tom Hayden, Rebellion and Repression (New York: Meridian, 1969); Issac D. Balbus, The Dialectics of Legal Repression--Black Rebels before the American Criminal Courts (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973); Alan Wolfe, The Seamy Side of Democracy - Repression in America (New York: David McKay, 1973).

[50] The example is from Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism: A View from the Botton," Journal of Politics, 32 (August 1970):501-530.

the elastic limits of a "tolerant" system; assigning a problem to a special study committee predictably assures that some will forget the original issue. There is also the ideological effort waged by political elites to manipulate people's motivations and consciousness through the socialization processes so that they accept the ruling ideology and distrust and refuse to be moved by competing ones; the profit incentive, for instance, has become just such a sacred cow. Or, social reality can be made to appear confusing and uncontrollable; one's reconstruction of reality is eschewed when information is not proferred, or made difficult to obtain, or manipulated, or censored, or scrambled altogether. This was the widely misunderstood point of Marcuse's essay "Repressive Tolerance:"

> All points of view can be heard: The Communist and the Fascist, the Left and the Right, the white and the Negro, the crusadors of armament and for disarmament. Moreover, in endlessly dragging debates over the media, the stupid opinion is treated with the same respect as the intelligent one, the misinformed may talk as long as the informed, and propaganda rides along with education, truth with falsehood. This pure toleration of sense and nonsense is justified by the democratic argument that nobody, neither group nor individual, is in possession of the truth and capable of defining what is right and wrong, good and bad. Therefore, all contesting opinions must be submitted to "the people" for its deliberation and choice.[51]

The process is all the more successful when the ideology is able to have itself reproduced on a massive scale by the educational, advertising, news and entertainment media. State violence, the use of final coercive power through limiting legislation, partial judiciaries, and a highly centralized and bureaucratized police system (against the backdrop of a public lassitude toward the violation of basic human rights)

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[51] "Repressive Tolerance," p. 94.

is, however, the ultimate means of controlling the limits of political action. Marcuse shows what he is concerned about in a speech at the University of California at Berkeley on February 3, 1971, entitled "The Movement in a New Era of Repression: An Assessment:"

> We are far from a fascist form of government, but some of the possible preconditions are emerging. They are well known and I will just give you a list: The courts, used more and more as political tribunals; the reduction of education and welfare in the richest country in the world; anti-democratic legislation, such as preventive detention and the no-knock laws; economic sanctions if you are politically and otherwise suspect; the intimidation and self-censorship of the mass media....[52]

Marcuse's charge has been that the prevailing, narrow, consensus in which political discourse and non-discourse occurs is socio-historically produced. The process by which it has developed has shaped the range of available options, and the insights that might alter important and key political decisions have been limited, modified, denied, or effectively neturalized. The mechanism by which we might unlock ourselves is repressed. The completion of the passage cited above from "Repressive Tolerance" conveys the point:

> ...the democratic argument implies a necessary condition, namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating and choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must have access to authentic information, and that, on this basis, their evaluation must be the result of autonomous thought.
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> In the contemporary period, the democratic argument for abstract tolerance tends to be invalidated by the invalidation of the democratic process itself. The liberating force of democracy was the chance it gave to effective dissent, on the individual as well as social scale, its openness to qualitatively different forms of government, of culture,

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52 In Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 16 (1971):8.

> education, work--of the human existence in general. The toleration of free discussion and the equal right of opposites was to define and clarify the different forms of dissent: Their direction, content, prospect. But with the concentration of economic and political power and the integration of opposites in a society which uses technology as an instrument of domination, effective dissent is blocked where it could freely emerge: In the formation of opinion, in information and communication, in speech and assembly.[53]

Our ability and confidence in ourselves as sensing creatures--searching for the effective concepts, the valid concepts by which to live, has been frustrated. Without constructive, compatibly-ordered concepts, people cannot organize their energies effectively, either as individuals or as socially-constituted groups. When the society prevents the insights as to what is needed conceptually, the individual's energies can be dysfunctional to himself and, hence, to the long-term interests of the society. This is, for example, the plight of the Iks of East Africa in Colin M. Turnbull's account, The Mountain People, as it is for the victims of Alvin Toffler's Future Shock.

Marcuse has applied the term "repression" to many aspects of society. Liberal tolerance is thus "repressive tolerance." The society's tacit sanctioning of previously tabooed practice is "repressive desbulimation." These forms of tolerance and desublimation are "repressive," for they have the effect of weakening and further obliterating from the senses the alienation suffered, and they become, instead, instruments of a system simultaneously of social disintegration and social cohesion.

The term "repressive participation" is not found in Marcuse's writings but was coined by George Kateb in raising some critical comments on a

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53 "Repressive Tolerance," p. 95. Emphasis added.

paper by David Braybrooke. Kateb asked: "In organization and institutional life, what is the relation between increased participation and the power of the established leadership or authority? How much real power is usually given? May participating under many circumstances, provide the best cover for manipulation by authority, in the style recommended by Elton Mayo? Is there such a thing, then, as 'repressive participation?'"[54] The possibility provides an altogether different perspective on participation than heretofore considered.

According to the Marcusean variant of radical thought, there would be some analytic fruitfulness to characterizing certain political forms such as voting, which is enjoined for a majority of the population in liberal democratic society, as repressive. Marcuse, writing in "Repressive Tolerance" would point us in this direction:

> ...The exercise of political rights (such as voting, letter-writing to the press, to Senators, etc., protest demonstrations with a priori renunciation of counterviolence) in a society of total administration serves to strengthen this administration by testifying to the existence of democratic liberties which, in reality, have changed their content and lost their effectiveness.[55]

This is participation that has the effect of diminishing rather than contributing to the growth of the human personality and, more generally, the consequence of perpetuating the prevailing class divisions. The individual in important ways in engaging in voting may be acting irrationally as his actions may become an instrument of his own domination. For,

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[54] The question is posed and not further explored in a paper by George Kateb to appear in the forthcoming volume Participation in Politics: Nomos XVI (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1975).

[55] "Repressive Tolerance," p. 84.

as Wolfe has observed: "The ultimate goal of ideological repression is to help people support their own repression."[56]

Toward a definition of "repressive participation" I will propose the following one: "Repressive participation suggests the notion of the performance of some political (state) function, such as voting or conforming to other legitimized modes of political behavior, at the expense of the real, long-term interests (needs, wants, purposes, pleasures) of the individual, group, society (of humanity and nature, in general) under pressure of external and internal processes of restraint, constraint, and supression."[57] There are several implications in this formulation that must be pointed out:

1. Here, it should be noted that the problem of the flattening of human consciousness is not located in human nature but in the nature of

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[56] Wolfe, p. 133.

[57] Part of this definition is based on Marcuse's own definition of repression in Eros and Civilization, p. 7. Alain Touraine in The Post-Industrial Society--Tomorrow's Social History: Classes, Conflicts, and Culture in the Programmed Society (New York: Random House, 1971) proposes a comparable concept in his formulation of "dependent participation." Its emphasis is on alienation, which, I feel, misses the dynamics of the conscious and unconscious. Touraine's definition of "dependent participation" is suggested in the following passage: "A man is alienated when his only relationship to the social and cultural directions of his society is the one the ruling class accords him as compatible with the maintenance of its own dominance. Alienation means canceling out social conflict by creating dependent participation. The activities of the alienated man make no sense unless they are seen as the counterpart to the interests of those who alienate him. Offering the workers, for example, participation in the organization of an industry without their having authority over its economic decisions leads to alienation, unless they consider such participation a strategic move in their conflict with the managers of industry. Ours is a society of alienation, not because it reduces people to misery or because it imposes police restriction, but because it seduces, manipulates, and enforces conformism." pp. 8-9.

the setting, which is a manipulated and limited one. There is a significant difference in saying--as for instance, Stouffer does and others who share his perspective--that the average voter does not have a high level of competence and, in fact, the claim that they cannot develop this competence. This latter claim is not what those studies attempted to prove, and it thus remains unproven. Some studies do seem to support our claim.[58]

2. This tentative definition assumes that some interests are more defensible than other ones, and thus it involves a rejection of the mixed pluralist claim that asserts that all interests and all classes of individuals are able and should compete relatively equally in the political arena. This amounts to the rejection of utilitarian ethics.[59] Ultimately, this is a rejection of nihilism with respect to values.

3. There is also a grey area: Does the definition recognize--at least, dimly--individual acquiescence or compliance in his own domination? Should it? I suggest that the Hypothesis of Degrees of Repression allows some limits within which human responsibility can be attributed. Otherwise, responsibility for an individual's action could never be claimed or liabeled. Compliance suggests, at a very superficial level of insight, that the individual is willing to make a recognizable tradeoff between

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58 For example, Lewis Lipsitz, "Work Life and Political Attitudes: A Study of Manual Workers," American Political Science Review, 58 (December 1964):951-962.

59 A nicely-framed argument on this is provided by Alasdair MacIntyre in "Against Utilitarianism" in Leslie Brown, ed., Aims of Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1970), pp. 1-23.

future and present consequences. The individual may or may not, however, feel "free" to make this tradeoff (but they ought to be obliged to "see" the wider range of choices before them). Marcuse's work on repressive society would indicate such a role for compliance. For instance, in his brief critique of Charles Reich's Greening of America Marcuse wrote: "Persons are directly responsible for the decisions that are made to bomb in Vietnam; and it is these positions that must be identified and attacked."[60] Or, in Eros and Civilization he remarks: "Repression disappears in the grand objective order of things which rewards more or less adequately the complying individuals and, in doing so, reproduces more or less adequately society as a whole."[61]

The point about repressive participation is that it is a style of political activity that becomes unmeaningful to the self as a process of cognitive and affective growth. Repressive participation is characterized by a dominant class controlling the behavior of a dominated class through control of the very mental processes that would enable the individual's freedom. The individual is shut-off from perceiving the limited self that he/she is, and is becoming. The style of political discourse is closed, the participant-citizen under these conditions has as atrophied mind no longer capable of grasping the contradictions and

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60 Herbert Marcuse, "Charles Reich as Revolutionary Ostrich," in Philip Nibile, ed., The Con III Controversy, (New York: Pocketbooks, 1971), pp. 15-17.

61 Eros and Civilization, p. 42; also in Negations, p. 132: "In affirmative culture, renunciation is linked to the external vitiation of the individual, to his compliance with a bad order."

alternatives. Critical faculties for articulating real interests have been deadened and the wise handling of public issues smothered. In the one dimension, as Marcuse expresses it, the Happy Consciousness comes to prevail.

The repressive participants may be more readily identified, in some measure, by distinguishing them from various segments of the class-structured society. The following schema may be helpful initially, and I intend to develop and consider it further in the next chapter. The schema includes identification of: (1) The oppressed and dissident members of the population. They are clearly distinguished from the repressed, because members of this group recognize their oppression. They well recognize their exclusion from the ongoing political process, the rhetoric to the contrary. This category usually includes the self-conscious minorities, as well as the truly independent intellectual and artistic elements. (2) Another group, identified as the disconnected, are the politically weightless. They are outside of the political system by virtue of some economic and/or sociological characteristic--e.g., their unemployability by virtue of being unskilled or technically obsolete, their age, their geographic mobility. In other words, they do not matter to the economic structure.[62] (3) A sizable sector remains: The employed working and middle classes--the blue- and white-collar wage-earners, the rentiers and small property owners mortgaged for a lifetime. These are the potential objects of an ideologically repressive system. (4) Following the original supposition of this study, there exists a small group of

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62 Some of these groups are discussed in Penn Kimball, The Disconnected (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). Also, see the work of Claus Offe.

individuals with inordinately more directing influence and power on the pattern of human behavior than any other group; this is the promoter class. This elite, or combination of elites, defines the main contours of the prevailing ideology at any historical time.

While this elite or ruling class shapes the prevailing consensus "to fulfill the needs of those who rule," those in the middle level of power are usefully and correctly, I believe, identified by Wolfe's analysis as serving the function of "transmission belts."[63] These are the ones who fill out the contours of the ideological schema to be reproduced. The growing role of the public relations industry, and its auxiliary in the information storage and retrieval system of the computer-centered industry, bespeaks its significance to our economy and language structure. This public relations industry has now entered every important phase of advanced industrial society--most particularly, the national and multinational corporations and the government at all levels. Perhaps the most notable and questionable example of the use of public relations technology is provided by the U. S. Department of Defense's effort to promote and sell its version of military policy.[64] Also integral to the economic and political structure is its lawyer class--the John Dean's and Hugh Sloan's to draw on contemporary cases. This is, in general, the class that survives by being adroit and fluent as symbol manipulators, directing its efforts to whatever the assigned goal.

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63 Wolfe, p. 65; and chap. 3, "Who Benefits from Repression?", pp. 60-89. Also pertinent is C. Wright Mills' essay, "Man in the Middle: The Designer," in his Power, Politics and People (New York: Ballantine Books, n.d.), pp. 374-386.

64 One account is provided by J. William Fulbright's The Pentagon Propaganda Machine (New York: Vintage, 1971).

At the lowest range are the office workers, petty technicians, and assemblyline operators, and laborers of various kinds. The fractured nature of the work tasks of this segment makes its members seriously limited in its ability to perceive and comprehend the interconnections and implications of a complex and comprehensive social process. Class differentials in educational opportunities and limited opportunity at meaningful dialogue compound the problem.

The critical interpretation suggests that this segment--the working class, but more especially what is called the affluent working class--cannot allow itself to comprehend its social situation, its alienation. Affluence and a manipulated consumptive orientation have made doubtful the expectation Marx had, for instance, of the working class becoming conscious of its own alienation and struggling to throw it off. The work of Marcuse, Habermas, Touraine, and Gorz cast this Marxist proposition into doubt.[65] Their claim is that the ideology of advanced industrial society, technological rationality, prevents the concepts through which people can feel and communicate this alienation. Some careers are not likely to be liberating ones, while individuals in others are not in a position to critique the sets of interests that dominate.

For purposes of illustration, we may note that administrators and

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[65] This has been termed "the embourgeoisement thesis," and an important sample survey of affluent English workers was made to study the validity of the proposition. The researchers claim that little such embourgeoisement can be discovered. John H. Goldthorpe et al, The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (England: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For a critique see, James W. Rinehart, "Affluence and the Embourgeoisement of the Working Class: A Critical Look," Social Problems, Fall 1971.

managers, bankers and investors, accountants, marketing experts, designers, lawyers, engineers, and technicians of various kinds, as well as many in education and research, are all impelled to not question their roles because they are the immediate beneficiaries of a war economy that must manufacture napalm, nuclear weaponry, anti-ballistic missiles, billion dollar submarines, and more and more sophisticated air- and space-craft, and sell $8.5 billion annually in military equipment to foreign nations to keep its economy precariously afloat. We can note even the spinoff effect for florist shops from the termination of the Vietnam War, so deeply are the interests vested in the society. The interests that these various occupation groups are immersed in, then, make it highly unlikely for them to want to question the overall dynamics of the system of which they are a part. As Marcuse's theory maintains, ideological structure has worked so well institutional needs have, in fact, become individual needs. As Touraine says it: "What dominates our type of society is not the internal contradictions of the various social systems and the needs of individuals."[66]

The selling of the candidate for public office, in the manner of selling everything else, has radically changed the nature of the American party system in the past century.[67] Part of the process of the depersonalization of politics which was initiated by the Progressives' nonpartisan

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66 Touraine, p. 61.

67 The changed nature of the party system is the interpretation of William Dean Burnham in Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970). Also see the work of Samuel Hays.

efforts was extended in the more thorough isolation of the candidate and elected officials from one another and from their constituencies by mass media techniques. As the process proceeded, key features of citizenship were dropped along the way, and voting and party identification became an emptied ritual. Most participants in the American political scene in recent years would have no recall of the forms of participation that occurred at the apex of the political party in the nineteenth century, acknowledging the limitation of the franchise at thet time. Voting has been devalued and ritualized as other more leisure activities have become highly prized. Some people may vaguely sense that there is not much significance to the voting decision and respond out of civic duty or social pressure. Others fail to respond at all. As Andrew Hacker brings out, many corporate employees, belonging to the new propertyless middle class, are in no position to be active in politics; they have neither the interest nor the inclination to identify themselves with politics.[68]

I believe it can be successfully shown that the students of voting behavior helped to give credence to the increasingly impoverished role for citizenship. Marcuse's work provides two specific accounts of the deflation of the meaning of participation in contemporary society. Marcuse's treatment suggests that the definition of participation that this school assumes, in fact, purveys a single meaning and any other meanings escape them, because their interests foreclose any other possibility. The studies Marcuse examines are now old ones but they are classics; the one on political activity was conducted by Roper and

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[68] Andrew Hacker, "Politics and the Corporation" in Hacker, ed., The Corporation Take-Over (Garden City: Anchor, 1964), pp. 253-254.

Woodward, the other is a study in industrial sociology, the famous Western Electric or Hawthorne experiments. Both still have their followers, and contemporary counterparts to these studies are available. For example, the professionally-acclaimed study by Verba and Nie, Participation in America - Political Democracy and Social Equality, follows the same narrow definition of Roper and Woodward. The analysis and conclusions in the "human relations" study are followed by the mainstream of public administration.

So it is not too remote for our purposes to review the arguments Marcuse sought to make about these selected studies. The direction of his critique is guided by his conception of the term "concept," as open textured. Marcuse provides a cursory definition of "concept" as designation "the mental representation of something that is understood, comprehended, known as the result of a process of reflection."[69] Marcuse views concepts as abstract and general, "Because the concept comprehends more and other than a particular thing--some universal condition or relation which is essential to the particular thing, which determines the form in which it appears as a concrete object of experience...."[70] Concepts have "excess" meaning, they have a transitive nature by virtue of this trait. They do not merely denote one particular, concrete thing. But this is just the what the empirical researchers, in the unwitting separation of methodological from philosophical concerns, do. In their operational concepts and indices, they have created "reduced concepts." These, then, come to govern reality; they lead to a false sense of

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[69] One Dimensional Man, p. 105.

[70] Ibid., pp. 105-106.

concreteness, and, thereby, achieve a political function. For Marcuse, "the therapeutic and operational concept becomes false to the extent to which it insulates and atomizes the facts, stabilizes them within the repressive whole, and accepts the terms of the whole as the terms of the analysis."[71]

The Woodward and Roper studies were a series carried out over a period of five years by the Public Relations Department of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey "to find out how the company stands with the American public."[72] In order to distinguish people who are relatively active in relation to political issues from those who are relatively inactive, the researchers developed a procedure by which to formulate an operational index of "political activity:"

> The procedure followed was to write a large number of questions, the answers to which would presumably throw light on an individual's political behavior and then try these questions out in personal interviews with a test national sample of American adults. Some of the questions are found not to work well in doorstep interviews, and were discarded. Others were found to yield results so closely intercorrelated that one question could in effect stand for several others.[73]

One of the problems here is one that all survey studies exhibit--asking respondents what they do (and that within a fairly closed structure of the interview schedule), not observing what they do. This introduces a bias based on the respondent's need to protect and develop a flattering

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71 Ibid., pp. 107-108.

72 From: Julian Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activity of American Citizens, American Political Science Review, 44 (December 1950): 872-885.

73 Ibid., p. 872.

self-image as he perceives is expected of him, indeed, the attempt to respond may become "a neurotic situation for the person answering."[74]

Political activity, according to this derivation nevertheless, means: (1) Voting at the polls, (2) supporting possible pressure groups, (3) personally communicating directly with legislators, (4) participating in political party activity, (5) engaging in habitual dissemination of political opinions.[75] For Marcuse, these might be taken as the paradigmatic cases of repressive participation, because they so unreflectively and uncritically accept the established parameters of conflict (i.e., the issues to be debated) and drop so much else that may have bearing on the facts of political activity (e.g., the tendencies for a two-party system to move toward a mid-point of consensus on many important issues; the role of big publicity media in shaping opinion; the differing weights various political interest groups have in the system; the significance of influential contacts had between members of various elites). With this empirical formulation, Marcuse, suggests, many of "the determining, constitutive facts remain outside the reach of the operational concept."[76]

While the Woodward and Roper studies suggest the staging of a meaning for political activity, the Western Electric studies illustrate the case in which an unwarranted meaning is concluded from the set of facts. (To some extent the way the facts are arranged certainly help to do this.)

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74 From, Theodore J. Lowi, "A 'Critical' Election Misfires," Nation (December 18, 1972).

75 The argument critical of the reduced meaning of political activity is illustrated as well in Marcuse's comments on Marvick and Janowitz's paper, "Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent," pp. 114-118.

76 One Dimensional Man, p. 119.

From the same facts another meaning is readily arrived at when the point of view taken is different. Marcuse, for example, looks at the analysis of worker complaints about working conditions and wages. The researchers took the general form of the complaints and translated them into concrete and particular referents. For instance, the statement, "wages are too low," can be seen, as Marcuse views it, as a statement that in its generalized form is meant to transcend a single individual's experience and indicate a relation relative to ojbects of the same class; but for the empirical researcher assigned to treating these complaints, complaints which cannot be treated as a class because the remedies would be so radical, these complaints must be regarded in particularized forms, as an individual's unique grievance. The solution might be to provide a loan for a worker, for instance, Marcuse writes: "The general form was dissolved into statements identifying the particular operations and conditions from which the complaint was derived and the complaint was taken care of by changing these particular operations and conditions."[77]

Hampden-Turner makes the same point when he reviews the researchers' study of the women in the Relay Assembly Test Room experiment. This was sometimes called "a bad experiment" by those who found their research framework cast into doubt; human, subjective factors had been extraneously introduced. It was discovered that workers' production increased not because of any of the altered conditions of the environment but because in the process of setting up the experiment the women had become involved in the decision-making process. Two women were enabled to

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77 One Dimensional Man, p. 109; for this discussion, see pp. 108-114.

select four others to work with them, and the foreman had been removed. According to the account:

> With the foreman removed the girls became so "cheeky" that even the academics became miffed. Eventually two ringleaders were returned to the shop floor. But later in the experiment there was no longer any question of discipline. The "independent variables" were discredited. It was the girls who had the power now. They knew why they were working more effectively and the researchers were asking them for the reasons. "We have no bosses here!" cried the girls, sounding not unlike the Wobblies, and they were correct. The researchers, eager to discover any scrap of evidence that would explain the climbing productivity, hung on the girls' words, and immediately relented when the girls demanded veto power over any feature of the experiment they did not like.[78]

Aside from this participatory role, the young women had sensed their importance now as co-experimentors; they were no longer merely workers. Nearly every conclusion the researchers came to, was voiced by the young women and was not expressed in their "variables." But when the findings came to be institutionalized, the workers had lost control. The eventual outcome was to set up a counseling program involving figures of a "motherly" sort, and this program was finally phased out.

I want to turn now to the development of a model of repressive participation, guided by the insights and theory of repression that Marcuse provides. Then, I plan to show its utility by applying it to a number of controversial areas. For instance, can we make some assessments as to the character of participation in elections? The suggestions that can be drawn from the model will, undoubtedly, prove controversial, but the benefit from undertaking this examination is that it will force theorists from other perspectives to state more explicitly how they reach their

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78 The account is given in Charles Hampden-Turner, Radical Man - The Process of Psycho-Social Development (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1971), pp. 215-222, quote p. 218.

assessments according to specific, justifiable criteria.

The following paradigm of repressive participation, which draws from our foregoing discussion, is constructed. Participation becomes repressive to the extent that:

1. Fewer and fewer persons affected by public decisions are involved in the significant decision-making;

2. the political and social importance of the issues becomes more and more limited and the issues themselves are more and more particularized, vague, confused, or mediated by some limited and instrumental point of view;

3. the methods for arriving at informed, humane, and just decisions are mitigated through the control and access of necessary information and the shaping of the conceptual processes of the participants;

4. an exchange of intersubjectively-achieved meanings between affected members is limited;

5. conformity to dominants cues is obtained through a system of penalties and rewards so that the act of participation is not performed for intrinsic and autonomous reasons. Moreover, the contradictory situation of participants, when power relations are suspended in one issue area for one period of time but not on others, must be perceived and recognized. There must be the recognition that the basic relationship of subordinate to authority will persist in other areas for some time and have consequence for the forms of action taken;

6. policies and decisions arrived at are not, in fact, carried out and fulfilled.

From these features, we are enabled to examine instances of participatory activity in terms of the degree to which they may fit or relate

to this paradigm. Not every feature would be present in every instance for us to be able to speak of "repressive participation."

The limiting case in which repressive participation would be at its extreme would probably occur under the totalitarian structure. The role of members of the Soviet Russian political system would seem to indicate most of these aspects.[79] Voting, which is the only apparently political act open to non-Communist Party members, has the most ritualized features on several counts: (1) Only elite party members take part in the nomination of candidates; (2) candidates seem to be party members, receiving nominations for their exemplary performance; (3) the ballot lists only one candidate for an office but, on occasion, a candidate can be rejected by scratching his name off; this act could call attention to oneself, but apparently one percent of the population is non-conformist in this way; (4) all voters are expected (through a system of penalties and rewards) to cast their ballot; one would have to be "artful" not to; (5) information is controlled by the party agencies and press; (6) a generalized, random state of terror reinforced conformity under the Stalinist period, while persecution of minorities and dissidents achieved the same coercive tone in the post-Stalinist years. The chief consequence for the members of Russian society is the inability to discuss freely personal troubles that might be handled socially and politically, and the need to find ways to remain inconspicuous or most exemplary to the commissar becomes crucial.

The situation is little different in the "total institution," which Goffman defines in terms of what becomes of their inmates.[80] These are

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79 This section draws on the article by Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent," American Political Science Review, 62 (September 1968):814-826.

80 Erving Goffman, Asylums--Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York: Anchor, 1961).

places like prisons, asylums, and army training camps, where few rights are upheld for their inmates. To one extent or another, all features of the paradigm would fit, with perhaps the exception of (4) which may be limited to the capacities and ingenuity of the inmates. There is apparently in these places a higher emphasis on a system of rewards and penalties which satisfy basic physical and psychological needs, needs which are less controlled and easily obtained outside the institution. Until recently, such institutions operated their internal affairs without much interference from outside public authorities. Matters have been slowly changing as courts and legislatures are more concerned to secure its inmates basic human and procedural rights. This outside pressure may account for the simulacrum of participation which some institutions practice, in the form of encounter groups or in other ways. Here inmates are asked their opinions, "consulted," but at the same time they are treated as reduced beings in some defined respect and control over conditions, including self-determination to come and go as one pleases, is beyond reach. Goffman's point was that the most important factor in forming the character of persons in such institutions was their reactions and adjustments made to its structure. In "total institutions" the inmates may make primary and secondary adjustments, but the conditions disallow prisoners and army recruits, for example, from developing images of self-respect and the cognitive and moral insights needed to make social decisions once they have departed from the institution to rejoin the community.

The structure in which constituents of a political machine in the early style of Mayor Daley of Chicago find themselves may not be

strikingly different from some practices in a total institution. Feature (5) of the paradigm is most highly emphasized and other features are not likely to receive as much attention from the machine, largely because the populations were new immigrant groups with language difficulties. In an important way, however, the city controlled by a political machine is not the same as a total institution, it is not cut off from the general society and has regular, commercial, social, legal and other ties with an open society and a critical press. With conditions supporting machine politics apparently disappearing, this form of repressive participation may become more negligible.

The situation with which we must be concerned is the national Presidential election. To what extent do these elections approximate the features of "repressive participation" in the paradigm? The continuing declining voter turnout should be noted, perhaps as a sort of secondary adjustment. The 1974 Gallup and Roper polls regard this decline as related to the disillusionment with "Watergate" politics, but the decline has been taking shape over many years as the political parties continued to lose party identifiers. Many of the features of the paradigm appear applicable: Feature (1) is manifest in several ways. While more individuals have the opportunity to become involved in national politics at the caucus, primary and convention levels, the chances are not uniform, and elite control of local party organizations has been a dominant factor in the exclusion of all interested groups. Elite-made strategic decisions tend to determine nominations and platforms. Choices are limited between two look-alike candidates; sometimes general elections at the state level are not even competitive in this narrow sense. Feature

(2) is approached to the extreme. The general parameters of the agenda for political debate are seldom challenged in a visible way. When they are, as was the case during the 1968 Democratic Convention, efforts were made to discredit its proponents. In the two elections where clearest distinctions, ideologically, could be made between the candidates, turnout approached new lows. Cross-cutting issues and the emphasis on personality helped to confuse the process of choice. In the case of the 1972 McGovern candidacy, I suggest it was as much the unfamiliar social vocabulary of the candidate as it was any other factor that explains his failure to engage a broader following. To this extent feature (3) was operative in deep ways. Efforts to control the press by Spiro T. Agnew as a matter of policy, the appointment of a Director of Communications as part of the White House Office, the alleged use of the Internal Revenue Service to harrass news reporters, and other intelligence-gathering activities, all attest to the attempt to control and manipulate public opinion in other ways as well.[81] Less important are features (4) and (5) except that other settings which could provide for the development of conceptual processes do not permit and encourage political transactions, generally. Feature (6) is also satisfied in varied degrees. Common usage acknowledges political "rhetoric" in terms of the degree to which promises are not carried out or not carried out to the extent necessary to make it more than token (for example, Nixon's 1968 secret "plan" to end the Vietnam War upon his election).

Whatever interest there is displayed at national elections, there

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[81] The story begins with Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward's account, All the President's Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).

is even less exhibited at state and local elections. This pattern of dropoff has usually been attributed to the nationalization of politics during the 1932 Depression and the politics of the New Deal. Factors such as industrialization and urbanization contributed to the tendency. As community power studies seem to suggest, the difficulties of coping in face-to-face situations with elite social and political dominance may also be a factor. Following the 1964 Office of Economic Opportunities legislation and later the Model Cities legislation, attention was refocused on this local level for citizen involvement. But it brought with it conflict by actively involving outgroups while the elected officials own constituencies were not broadly involved. Mayor Daley's outrage, for instance, expressed a sensed loss of control. Nevertheless, the general problem, as many observors and participants themselves noted, was that the community action boards were cooptive.[82] The minority representative more often than not played the role of an Uncle Tom caught in an ambiguous position. Neither a solely recommending role for the boards nor determination of issues by the majority rule principle gave much sense of power and self-respect to the emerging, politically-conscious poor. Especially is this so in the cases where their own representatives were appointed by the mayor, not by themselves. The politicians, were, in the end, not at a loss for protection their interests. In mild ways features (2), (3), and (5) of the paradigm are in play. The way the community action boards were put to use, in certain instances, was to buy off and divert the aggrieved, the same

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82 For example, Kenneth B. Clark and Jeannette Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty - A Study of Community Action Programs and Observable Social Change (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 245-248.

principle that was at work in the "human relations school." Unless the minority groups saw their role as a struggle against the existing structure and its established values, such agencies limited ways for the fullest development of its participants.

As the Western Electric studies show in regard to management of the firm in American society, management's solution to production problems and the problems of alienation is, usually when it can be afforded, the solution of therapy, informing, and consultation (from some critics point of view,--placation). It is management's role in its power of carrying out the intent of ownership to set the parameters of conformity in the firm. This is the most basic condition limiting the autonomy of the employees and workers. The firm, moreover, also has ties to the society such that its rights and prerogatives of ownership are legally sanctioned and upheld. The problem of control may be more constrained in non-union and company-union settings, but even in the unionized setting of advanced industrial society there are, therefore, significant constraints. As Touraine points out: "In liberal societies, it is appropriate to say that unions' objectives are mostly within the company itself since the power of economic decision-making remains private and the intervention of the unions is on the level of organization and institution, either directly or by means of mixed or representative consultative bodies."[83] The union when it exists has become a pressure group among pressure groups, having to bridge the contradictions between

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[83] Touraine, p. 185.

its needs for survival within the firm and the desire to expand its power base from outside the firm. Rights and procedures are a matter of generosity of the firm; workers may feel self-important in being consulted and sometimes their recommendations may be followed.[84] But, in the main, there seems to be no federal law that requires them to be listened to, just as there has been no application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the private workplace. The important decisions made by management--budgeting, personnel, objectives--as well as union decisions, are still out of control.[85] To some extent or another, depending on the particular characteristics of the workplace and the union, one or all of the features of the paradigm apply. But consistent frustration of the worker, in terms of the contradiction between being consulted and not listened to, can lead to his/her politicization.

As we are coming to see, just in those settings where Dewey suggested the opportunities existed for individuals to become more experienced and intelligent in the making of social decisions, the opportunities are limited or denied altogether. That is true of the opportunities in the local setting as much as in the workplace; it is true as well for the educational system--at the primary, secondary, or university level; private or public. The public secondary school model, which was exemplified until recently by the New York City School Department, was highly

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84 The beneficial results from increasing working involvement--both to the morale of the worker and for the sake of production--is recommended by the Report of the Special Task Force to the Societary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Work in America (Cambridge: MIT Press, n.d. [1973]).

85 Stanley Aronowitz examines this structure in close detail in False Promises - The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973), chap. 4.

centralized and in the hands of a politically-appointed school board who was not representative of the various constituencies in the city or cognizant in any rationalized fashion of their peculiar needs.[86] Those affected by their decisions were the most ignored and furthest removed in the important processes of budgeting, personnel, and curricula programming.

Such was true, as well, in the university structure, whether privately or publicly controlled--a strange situation, for the students were in a good position to see the contradictions between the destructive-nature of the production demands of the society upon the university and the traditional function of the university to be intellectually independent and critical.[87] Student complaints exhibited the role of feature (3) particularly: The attempt to shape a conforming consensus, in effect, boards of trustees had final power as to what speakers might have access to the campus and could inhibit associational activities in other ways--by controlling funding and the selection processes of speakers, as well as by its faculty appointments and granting of tenure. Moreover, according to some complaints, curricula was fragmented, uncritical, and not geared to finding ways to address and resolve social problems. Where the opportunities of developing the processes of conceptualizing and developing information for forming knowledge are most important, they are severely impeded. The significance of such efforts at suppression was not lost on

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86 The work of Marilyn Gittell is helpful here; also, Mario Fantini and Marilyn Gittell, Decentralization Achieving Reform (New York: Praeger, 1973), chap. 3.

87 The structure is examined in Habermas' Toward a Rational Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), chaps. 1 and 2, and in Touraine, chap. 2.

some student elements, and so the one feature that would make this setting peculiarly repressive (3), the shaping of conceptual processes, is not achieved.

Conclusion

Marcuse's attention to the Freudian theory of repression and his unique effort to apply the concept of repression historically to advanced industrial society has proved useful. We have been enabled to draft a contrast model to the dominant conception of participation in political science today. As a critical model, the paradigm of repressive participation establishes a set of questions that must prompt the liberal-pluralists to reexamine their empirical and normative theory of participation. They must now demonstrate what they have so readily assumed, if they wish to be taken seriously. For others, it might compel more rigorous investigation into qualities of participatory forms in various settings and the social trends developing with regard to these forms.

A Marcusean theory of repressive participation, nevertheless, remains negative in character. Theorists of diverse perspectives have identified this particular problem--of negation--with Marcuse's philosophic approach. The point is that the critical approach Marcuse applies does not successfully lead out of a conceptual impasse. It seems not to be able to transcent itself. As Jeremy J. Shapiro, a student of Marcuse, critically suggests: "Marcuse's retention of the two-dimensional model combined with the biological trend of Freudian theory lead him to look for forces of negation outside the very system which he has shown to have no outside. This prompts fluctuation between pessimism about the lack of a revolutionary agent and optimism that sometimes leads to an almost uncritical identification with existing anti-authoritarian forces."[88] Similarly,

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[88] Jeremy J. Shapiro, "One Dimensionality: The Universal Semiotic of Technological Experience" in Critical Interruptions, p. 185.

A. MacIntyre and Peter Clecak also detect the problem but without seeing his significance and dismiss him prematurely, I believe. MacIntyre, for instance, in his polemic concludes that "Marcuse underrates most men as they are; the false contempt for the majority into which his theory leads him underpins policies that would in fact produce just that passivity and that irrationalism with which he charges contemporary society."[89] Unfortunately, MacIntyre himself fails to see that his own position lacks a view of the human being as a language-constituted being which Marcuse's work embraces. For another example, Clecak dismisses Marcuse by charging him with being a "utopian Marxist;" his critical theory becomes "primarily a mode of therapy" and "a myth of consolation."[90] If we were to take careful measure of Marcuse, it would be clear that the problem of Marcuse's work is his involuted and metaphorical style. His style is not essentially analytic but literary, and this feature is severely in evidence in the last part of Eros and Civilization and also in Counter-revolution and Revolt--perhaps in these two pieces more than elsewhere. It may be conjectured that this style is explained by Marcuse's commitment to the view that language that is not interest-dominated is essentially open-textured. We can gain this view from, for instance, his comment in Essay on Liberation: "The new sensibility and the new consciousness which are to project and guide such reconstruction demand a new language to define and communicate the new 'values' (language in the wider sense which includes words, images, gestures, tones....)."[91]

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89 MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse, pp. 105-106.

90 Clecak, p. 199.

91 Essay on Liberation, pp. 32-33.

The least ambiguous recommendation Marcuse makes toward a strategy of change was expressed in his notion of the "Great Refusal," the negation of the negation. The notion was first proposed in One Dimensional Man and has been reasserted elsewhere. It was the notion that individuals and groups must step outside the established system and "reject the rules of the game that is rigged against them." It appears the concept originally was more negative than the one applied toward the end of the 1960's. In the Essay, for instance, Marcuse began to hint that students and other liberation movements could develop intervening structures and successful counter-institutions. His rejection of established settings, which was the basis for change for the radical liberals, was premised on the view that established institutions would become cooptive and that there was no way to preserve one's integrity and autonomy by continuing relationships with established structures. By the early 1970's, it seemed, Marcuse was reverting to his earlier pessimism, doubting the possibility of these movements to overcome the force of dominant structures.

It has been my claim, however, that there are some latent possibilities lurking in the philosophy of Marcuse. Marcuse supplies, in effect the "bridge" away from a society of limited participatory forms toward a more humanized and participatory society. And this is a possibility while simultaneously we are members of the society undergoing reconstruction. Importantly, Marcuse works with a dynamic philosophy of mind. His concept of man is that of the active and creative agent, the fabricator of his own history. And implicit in his thought is the vision of a qualitatively different society, a society that is rooted economically in socialism. His ideal society could very well be a Rousseauan, participatory society,

whose conditions are those which approach economic, social, and political equality.

Marcuse's philosophy, therefore, lends itself to a synthesis with the pragmatic tradition of thought, its theory of knowledge, and view of man as the active agent, or agent-patient. There is here a basis for a synthesis between the radical-liberal perspective of Dewey, Bachrach, and Kaufman and the critical perspective of Marcuse. For, what the radical liberal contributes is its appreciation of the growth of knowledge in terms of active persons in experiential settings trying to discover the principles to guide social living. The problem thus becomes one of developing a strategy of change and of identifying structures of change. One group has been more affirmative in this regard than Marcuse, and has been recommended by Bachrach and Kaufman. These are the options provided in the settings of the community, labor unions, schools and universities, and the workplace (e.g., co-determination and self-management).

What becomes clear, if we apply the significance of Marcuse's theory of repressive society to settings for participation, is that the meaningfulness of participatory settings only develops when participation approaches the paradigm of "communicative interaction." In the style of good conversation, political discourse must be based on the mutual respect of all participants; discussion must pertain to important issues; and deliberation must lead to a reasonable attempt to fulfill and realize the intent of the decision. Language, as the primary structuring force of human consciousness, becomes the force for further scrutiny, for it is this factor that can limit--indeed, prohibit--the participatory role of some groups in advanced industrial society. However, even if language

is open-textured, it does not mean that we can do without concept-ordering and concept clarification. The purpose of the next and concluding chapter is to suggest the relationship of language as a structuring force in society to forms of participation and non-participation.

C H A P T E R V I I

PARTICIPATION AND THE LANGUAGE-STRUCTURED SOCIETY

This project began with two explicit purposes: (1) To illuminate some basic uses of the term "participation," and (2) to consider whether, theoretically, a defensible case for a politics of participation in advanced industrial society could be adduced. By way of conclusion, I want to summarize the main distinguishing uses of the term under investigation and, then, draw up the arguments for an enriched conception of participation. I want to clarify my notion of a humanized, moral participation in terms of a particular feature of advanced capitalist society, which is the language-structured character of its social groupings. It is this particular feature of society which has been hinted at in my critique throughout, and I wnat now to bring it out more forthrightly.

My analysis attempted to be, broadly, contextual. It was my working assumption that a theorist's concept of participation was related to other features characteristic of his perspective and explanatory approach. Below, I summarize the usage of the term within each of the five interpretations examined:

1. The Classical Conception

According to the classical conception, members of a community are required to be self-realized, moral agents. Emphasis was placed on the need to determine the "public interest" through widely-engaged in processes of debate, reflection, and deliberation. No one might be excluded from this civic obligation. Individuals were expected to sublimate self-interests to the interests of the community. The expectation was that

only in such a way might the individual achieve "freedom" in civic society, for rancor, of particular wills, have been controlled rationally.

2. The Liberal-Pluralist Conception

"Participation" is one of the many roles assigned to individuals in democratic society. Its members are "free" to engage in a range of political forms, including voting, campaigning, and running for office. They also may choose not to participate in these ways (but are not justified in choosing other ways to express their interests). In a pluralist society it is appropriate to consider expanding opportunities for citizens to participate. But prospects for expanding participation (say, as voting) among the working class is regarded as unlikely in view of their more private-regarding interests. When one "participates," one is indicating one's personal or subjective preferences on alternative choices. It is meaningful to claim that the choices an individual makes in his role as one voter among many other voters effectively constitutes control over the political process.

3. The Constitutional Republican Conception

"Participation" is a hortatory word, successfully used by the liberal-pluralist to manipulate the electorate. One important way it is manipulated is in the local setting where elites have the power to set the agenda and induce compliance to programs and proposals that fail the test of constitutional legitimacy. Citizen politics to reform the political parties has proved counter-productive. Advisedly, a policy of non-participation, of refusal to participate on the grounds of principle, is advocated. A crisis of legitimacy will impel reform.

4. The Radical-Liberal Conception

"Participation" provides the best promise for a revitalized and

socially just polity. But the narrow usage which dominates social science research, and political rhetoric, must be rejected in favor of the classic conception. Essential to the advancement of this enterprise is the view of the individual, not as a role-player but as an active, creative human being capable of redirecting history in important ways. The settings for participation must be expanded beyond the political parties and processes to include the workplace, trade unions, the schools and universities, and the local neighborhoods. Special effort must be given to provide meaningful opportunities for sharing in decision-making processes to those who have heretofore been excluded from conventional political processes. Such forms of participation must require the deliberation, debate, and determination of issues of significant impact on one's life. Despair of success can only lead to defeat, and so an important component of the radical-liberal case is the practical maxim that success is in part constituted by belief in its possibility.

5. The Radical Case of Marcuse

Conventional forms of participation in advanced capitalist society (for example, voting and being consulted) are "repressive," and this repression is unnecessary. Social and political arrangements compel forms of thinking and behavior, through psychological defense mechanisms, on the part of the great mass of individuals so that they are unable to reflect critically upon the alienating and destructive character of their life. Life is irrational, instrumentally and substantively. The needs of the technological society have become primary, not the needs for growth and autonomy of the human being. The condition is so dominant that it is not likely that more than a few elements of the population will be

able to perceive the social malaise (e.g., blacks, poor, feminists, and radicalized students). Their strategy should be the "negation of negation," a deliberate attempt to break the established structure of thought and behavior. Under some conditions acts of protest may be appropriate.

From the review it becomes clear that far from having a simple and clear-cut socially-established meaning, the term "participation" is complexly related to a theorist(s whole structure of thought.

I would like to turn now to the basis for grounding an enriched conception of participation for advanced industrial society. The task is controversial since the failure of the New Left's rhetoric to either capture or hold the public mind to the significance of a participatory democracy.[1] Nevertheless, I believe the failure of the rhetoric and the resistance of corporate and political institutions to advance opportunities can be coped with in steady and constructive ways and that the human benefits, in terms of the reaffirmation of liberal values like free speech and free press, warrant the continued effort in this direction.

It seems to me that the compelling moral justification for expanding participation is best set out by that tradition of ideas beginning with Rousseau, but tracing itself out in the arguments of Dewey and Kaufman, on behalf of fundamental human rights. Participation is a right that follows from the fundamental human right of "respect for persons." The argument for equal consideration for every person defeats the claims

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[1] The doublebinds of radical analysis is the subject of Peter Clecak, Radical Paradoxes - Dilemmas of the American Left: 1945-1970 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). This study, however, may overstate the failures of radical analysis; this surely seems to be the case with the exposition of Marcuse's ideas.

of the technocrat at the start.

It is easy to give verbal homage to the notion of expanded participation. We can note how closely this fits in with liberal-pluralist rhetoric without effecting the quality of life significantly. For, social and political arrangements may go in important directions to modify, limit, and deny its own promises. It seems to me that Marcuse's analysis of the specific structure of contemporary false consciousness is substantially correct, because what he points to is how actual social practices conceal the dehumanizing nature of capitalist-consumer society. I believe his insight into the superfluously, or historically specific, repressive features of society is theoretically significant. There may be difficulties in rigorously investigating repression sociologically, but it is a critical conception which it would be unfortunate to give up just because it is intractable.[2] It can be suggestive in this way. What it prompts us to focus on is how the limits of human conduct can be institutionally proscribed in subtle, unjustified ways--linguistically. But Marcuse does not develop a theory that would guide action generally. At least, the notion of the "Great Refusal" does not seem to satisfy this criterion very clearly.

The radical-liberals would seek to expand more developed forms of participation than have been generally practiced heretofore during the twentieth century. But their most outstanding critics suggest that a participatory politics, even though sustained by radical pressure, underestimates the resistance of the large, established economic and

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[2] This claim is asserted by Robert Paul Wolfe, "Marcuse's Theory of Toleration," Polity, 6 (Summer 1974):474-475.

political institutions, and the only resolution to this difficulty is a politics of militant socialism. There are several difficulties with this recommendation. It is by no means evident that this strategy is any more precise and clear-headed than the one advocated by the radical-liverals; nor is it clear that the present social conditions are appropriate to a meaningful hearing of its claims; finally, it is not so certain that a socialist society necessarily realizes universal social justice and freedom. There is an arrogance of vision and means betrayed in the approach that is lacking in the pragmatic approach to inquiry. I believe that we can frame an enriched theory of participation which combines the best of the Marcusean and radical-liberal perspectives. The problem of socializing at least some segments of the economy stands as important but not as primary, then.

One way this might be done is as follows. The focus of our attention is on the nature of "action," since the word "participation" belongs to the family of "action" concepts. To participate means "to take or have a part or share of or in; to possess or enjoy in common with others; to take part; to have a part or share; to share (Oxford English Dictionary)." Implied in the common usage of the verb, to participate, is a "shared" community. In what way can we say that the range of activities of members of a community is constituted by this community?

An answer to this problem resides in the conception of the human being which a political theory assumes. My review of the political interpretations in this study has been critically linked to a conception of the human being not as a behavioral mechanism in conformance with laws

but as an active, creative being informed by rules.[3] The contention has been that the conception of the human being in a system of explanation to an important extent limits the possibilities a political theory is able to envision. This was Rousseau's significant insight. A culture is in good measure characterized by what a people believe they are. The constraints are not primarily biologic but mental. Contemporary social science in its behavioral orientation has supplied a limiting and distorted view of political possibility in advanced industrial society and, it may even be suggested, seals itself off from self-corrective possibilities. We need to correct this distorted conception that conventional political science has resorted to by developing alternative interpretations rooted in an understanding of man as an agent, an active being engaged in various forms of practice.

If, under this conception, the human being can be defined as a being that has intentions, then how those intentions arise and are formed becomes a most important subject for political inquiry. This is the common ground shared between radical-liberals (e.g., Dewey-Kaufman) and a critical-radical like Marcuse. They shared the concern with the way "objective interests" are formed in advanced industrial society. I think Touraine's conclusion in his study of Post-Industrial Society is essentially correct in this regard: "What we need most urgently is not an analysis of social behavior but of society, considered no longer as a situation but as a

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[3] See Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press, 1959); Alasdair MacIntyre, "Emotion, Behavior and Belief" and "Rationality and the Explanation of Action" in Against the Self-Images of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971); and Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973), chap. 20.

system of action, a network of cultural orientations and power relationships."[4] Jurgen Habermas and Claus Mueller significantly undertake this sociological task; and I believe this work follows up the critical insights of Marcuse in fruitful ways.[5]

Consciousness in advanced industrial society is mediated and controlled by language. Social language serves not only as the repository of cultural traditions and as the instrument by which individuals establish links between themselves and others; it also has a sociopolitical function for securing legitimacy. Control through predictability is not obtained coercively in a physical sense in those places which have highly developed communications and information apparatus, but by the structuring of roles. And this is accomplished linguistically in various ways. The ways, it seems apparent, are related to some extent to class position. Since language is the vehicle for sharing in the life of a community as much as it is the vehicle for self-reflection and individuation, an individual's language development sets the limits of his

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[4] Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 229.

[5] From Habermas I found particularly helpful "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'" in Toward A Rational Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 81-122; Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); and "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind" in Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973). Habermas seems to have been directly influenced by Dewey and the pragmatic model of inquiry.

And, Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication - A Study in Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

action. Distorted communication becomes a question of considerable importance to the extent that it interferes with open political communication, "since the intentional and unintentional distortions...preclude the articulation of demands as well as an unobstructed discussion of specific issues."[6] I want to sketch some possible connections between language-structuring in society and some forms of participation and non-participation. I am trying to show that it makes a difference what concepts we load the political environment and the political socialization processes with. And this sketch may, ultimately, make clearer the relationship between Bachrach and Kaufman's ideas and Marcuse's critique, and I will point to some further directions for social and political analysis.

The idea I want to suggest is schematized in Table 1. What the table does is chart participatory (and non-participatory) forms, already identified in the main text, in terms of participants' level of understanding of language. There is established six corresponding roles of language as the vehicle of self-understanding. The stages are progressive in terms of the capacity for language; they would seem to be invariable. I wnat to quote Mueller to the point here: "If the semantic, vocabulary, and syntactic levels of his language are limited, the individual is not likely to develop his full potential."[7] The perspective of this schema is historically-specific and critical; that is, it doubts the capacity for present socio-political arrangements to effect the cognitive and

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[6] Mueller, p. 16.

[7] Ibid., p. 17.

emotional development of most human beings. But it does not deny that possibilities are available. As Mueller's analysis suggests, the absence of effective legitimating rationales is a problem to which the political system has no answer. "It is precisely this problem that undermines," Mueller argues, "a political system tenuously held together by material benefits."[8]

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[8] Ibid., p. 182.

1. Non-Participation Excluded groups; oppressed; isolated and unmobilized; latent protestors	Language functions as expansive rhetoric and token action
2. Non-Participation as Acquiescence Vague recognition of costs of non-conformity; these individuals see themselves without complex needs or rights--as objects; accept roles as defined; sometimes too confused to make much meaning out of them	Language functions to deny one's own features, to repress; simple language forms satisfy
3. Participation as Role-Playing Individuals get some returns-material rewards or some modicum of security; liberal style and image may be attractive; sees relationship to system as a social contract; Performance Principle dominates the Pleasure Principle	Language functions with myths and illusions to develop a complex, anesthetic rationality to protect established structure of interests (property derived) gives cues to penalties for non-conformity
(a) Dependent Participation - voting, performance of civic duties, etc. Has a well-developed rationality for hiding irrationality (b) Cooptive Participation - (CAP), collective bargaining, human relations programs Elites attempt to ameliorate alienation through consultation and limited opportunities for self-determination	(Sham experience may provoke reassessment of one's role)
4. Non-Participation as Refusal Individuals refuse to play by the rules of the game; reject the settings of politics as usual; problem here is that such activity may remain unconnected to the political process and so do nothing to reform or change it	Language functions as critique; language contains referents to limits of the possible; "language of authenticity"
5. Protest Ex. strikes, parallel and counter-institutions; Cohn-Bendit's "march through the institutions"	Language serves as guides to action; importance of strategic concepts
6. Participation as Becoming Worker's Control; community control corporations; characterized as developing an articulate notion of principles needed in public decision-making; capacity to identify with position of others; to operate with foresight; to uphold authentic ideals; non-repressive culture	Union of thought and action-Praxis; attention is directed toward improving his, and otners, life-condition

1. Non-participation is a widespread feature of advanced industrial society, and for some it is a non-selected pattern of response to the political environment. It is simply the natural condition and predicament of that segment of society which remains isolated or marginal (e.g., Appalachians, migrants, ghetto poor, urban aged). These are the underprivileged who do not even form a social class because the economic system does not profit from their labor. They are virtually irrelevant, and as Habermas points out, their demands have merely an "appellative" character. At this primary language level, the opportunity for sharing in a wider social community is minimal; the language code is "restricted." Liberal rhetoric to participate does not even stretch to meet this disadvantaged segment of the population. This is best exhibited by the nature of governmental programs under a liberal administration targeted to this group. As in the War on Poverty program, these were conceived of as "training" programs intended, at most, to provide a minimal skill. To quote Mueller again: "The absence of sufficient conceptual development and of certain value predispositions, which is related to both socialization patterns and language codes, can prevent the individual from understanding the political code of society."[9]

2. At the next stage, non-participation may be more nearly a form of acquiescence based on the vague recognition of the structure's penalties for non-conformity. These individuals see themselves without complex needs or rights--more particularly, as objects rather than equals among equals. They believe they must accept the limited roles available to them. Their language code is, again, properly regarded as "restricted,"

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[9] Mueller, p. 17 and chap. 2.

to apply Basil Bernstein's distinction. But I would want to detach this conception from the author's apparent anti-working class bias, for some working class groups have highly developed linguistic structures and some middle class groups, if we accept the repression thesis, are, indeed, impoverished in their communicative capacity.[10] The language content here may be one of resignation (e.g., "You can't fight city hall."). Perhaps individuals joined in this class have felt victimized by the manipulation of words by the politicians and other interest groups. Power is not perceived, however, as connected directly to the manipulative factor of specific language forms.

3. With the opportunities for widespread public school and higher education and the pervasiveness of the mass media, a large segment of the population has gained a general fluency of language. But language as a vehicle of communication has become sophisticated at the level of logic, not at the level of conceptualization. Perhaps the concept of "language-game" becomes helpful here, where individuals are able to apply the rules of the language-game in appropriate ways but they are unable to step out of the structure of social reality it creates to investigate it with objective criteria.[11] Habermas is helpful here in the distinction he draws between the model of "purposive-rational activity" and "communicative interaction." The key feature of the pruposive-rational model is the absence of norm-guided principles. Science and its mode of justification leads to the (false) equation of all human problems to technical

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[10] Harold Rosen, Language and Class - A Critical Look at the Theories of Basil Bernstein (Bristol, England: Falling Wall Press, 1972).

[11] The notion of "language-game" has been helpful to me; it is discussed in, for instance, Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), chap. 9.

problems. A language without a norm-guided principle manipulates consumers and also manipulates participation forms by robbing language of its political meaning. In the critique of Dahl's conception of participation, and of other behavioralists generally, I tried to point out the effort to hypostatize one notion of participation as real, based on a scientistic argument. As Mueller argues, "...vast segments of the population are integrated into the political order because their capacity to engage rationally and symbolically in public discourse is severely limited by their linguistic environments."[12] We have noted, for instance, how little face-to-face dialogue occurs between voter and candidate in recent election years.

Several particular developments might be expected from the social process which depoliticizes and limits interactive forms of communication. Language-games may proliferate in order to cover the diverse fancies of "individualized" groups (e.g., Yippies and other kinds of subculture groups). This is an "inverted" individualism, for what is accomplished is the fragmentation of the collective energies of the social community. Promotions are rampant. As well, the language as the vehicle of self-reflection and individuation may become impoverished in grammatical ways and the shared vocabulary still more constricted, repetitive, and redundant. It seems, many cultural critics are now concerned with the quality of the English language itself. It may be that this is what must occur for the purposive-rational model to predominate; in all ages it seems, institutions have a need to transfix language.

4. If the suggestion to this point is correct, that forms of

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[12] Mueller, p. 12.

participation are directly related to language capacity of the participants, then it becomes important to a theory of a participatory society that language capacities be advanced and distorting structures be identified. Marcuse's recommendation to overcome the problem of repression was to remove one's self from the ongoing structures of society, the process of "negation of the negation." What he did not directly express, but what, I believe, was implied in that formulation, was some sense of a linguistic breakthrough or transcendence. This can occur, for instance, when individuals begin to share their common experiences as in the case of the Vauxhall plant, in the account of Gorz.[13]

The notion of a language-game is of that order of insight, a linguistic breakthrough, for it suggests a reflective understanding through language.[14] That it is our language, and it goes a good deal toward shaping our world. Attention is directed to the level of conceptualization, of developing criteria by which to inspect the shared community's rules and standards and interests.

It would be an interesting subject-matter, I think, to study the

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[13] Andre Gorz, "Workers' Control is More than Just That," in Hunnius, Garson and Case, eds., Workers' Control: A Reader on Labor and Social Change (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 332-335. This was the setting for the Goldthorpe survey of workers which found them individually resigned to, if not reconciled with, their condition. Gorz writes: "And as they discussed things, they found out that they all felt alike: They felt apathetic but frustrated; they were apathetic because, as individuals, in their individual isolation and loneliness, no one could do anything to change things. But when people start talking about their loneliness, their frustration, their powerlessness, they cease to be isolated and powerless. They start melting into a group which holds immeasurably greater power than the individual power of all those who compose it." p. 334.

[14] Wittgenstein is quoted to this point: "We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike." Kenny, p. 166.

conditions which would bring about this insight. One of the points I believe Bachrach and Kaufman were suggesting about forms of cooptive participation was that the disjunctions experienced in this form of participation might prompt some such reevaluation of the established cultural language.

This fourth stage is a critical one, then, because it begins to question and invalidate the cultural language-game an individual has been initiated into. Individuals refuse to play by the "rules of the game," and language has begun to serve as the vehicle of a critique of established authority relations.

5. Language now viewed in an objective sense may lead to a paradoxical situation. It allows individuals to control others; but it also allows them to join with others in the use of language at the level of communicative interaction. It can reinstitute communication as the search for the realization of practical goals. "It is governed by binding consensual norms, which define reciprical expectations about behavior and which must be understood and recognized by at least two acting subjects. Social norms are enforced through sanctions. Their meaning is objectified in ordinary language communication. While the validity of technical rules and strategies depends on that of empirically true or analytically correct propositions, the validity of social norms is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding of intentions and secured by the general recognition of obligations."[15] At this level language opens up new possibilities for participation, and I think these are suggested in such experiments as the "free universities"

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[15] Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" p. 92.

and worker's control movements. As Touraine points out: "Alert educators have replaced the idea of a worker-literature or a worker culture with the much more realistic and fruitful description of workers participating in the total culture--which may mean participating in a movement of overall social and political opposition."[16]

6. The paradigm case of developed language capacity would be non-distorted communication, "communicative interaction."[17] Thought and action are related synergestically. Language is dialectical and conceptual; there is an appreciation of developing socially, strategic guides to conduct. Individuals at this level, ideally, would have achieved a moral sense, and these individuals' lives would be bound up with the life of the community. Characteristic features of the personality would seem to include the capacity to identify with the position of others, to act with foresight, and to uphold authentic human ideals. Hampshire provides a rich characterization at this level which I feel merits citation:

> That the thought which guides action may attain to different degrees of explicitness, and may correspond to different degrees of self-consciousness, has been a constant theme of this book. The more explicit a man is in formulating to himself the ends of his action, and the grounds upon which his decisions rest, the more he is aware of himself as having made choices between specific possibilities, choices that are always subject to revision. The more self-conscious he is in his criticism of his own intentions and activities, the more he is aware of the limits of his habits of classification, limits that determine the possibilities open to him. He becomes aware also of the limits set by conventions of communication and classification into which he was born. He can begin endlessly to

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16 Touraine, p. 196.

17 See Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" pp. 92-94, and Mueller, p. 20.

> question and to criticise the vocabulary and the form of language which he has learnt always to use in considering alternative ends of action. He cannot any longer consistently think of his more specific judgments of ultimate value as timeless truths, insulated from his practical intentions, or of his practical intentions at any time as disconnected from his opinions about the essential powers and interests of men. His moral and political opinions, and his practical intentions, are two phases of a single process of thought that always revolves in his mind around his idea of the activities that are essential to men, of those that are essentially destructive and that prevent men from realizing their potentialities as human beings.[18]

Communicative interaction would be guided by the purpose of forming a non-repressive culture that aims at the harmonized relation between emotions and reason. Sublimation is of a non-repressive kind. Participation is represented in the idea of "becoming," or in Dewey's notion of the realizing self. The life of action is characterized as a process. Participation is no longer a fractured-segmental, assigned and instrumental role. It is a style of conducting one's life in a community. Participation conceived as "becoming" can avoid the problem of moral claims turning into empty, manipulative rhetoric. The study of participation can become the study of political biography: "In the future, ideals will not be communicated by attempts to describe them, which inevitably distort, but by the models of an appropriate conduct in life."[19] This was also the point of Tolstoy's stories. I believe that we have some examples of such communities of participants so that this ideal is

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[19] Paul Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, With a Memoir (New York: Horizon Press, 1968), p. 135.

not practically impossible; the Quaker meeting may be suggested, and so might the Amish community. Gandhi's ideal of the "satyagraha" campaign is also appropriate.

Obviously, this is only a very general and hypothetical sketch of relationships between language-structuring and forms of participation and non-participation. I believe it offers some advantages. For one thing, this model overcomes the limitation provided by one recommendation that suggests "we increase the cognitive appeal of propaganda." It does not lean heavily on flamboyant rhetoric or utopian visions and avoids political paralysis. In other ways it may be of benefit. It may begin to offer some clues for developing constructive strategic guides to a more radical, humanized process of social change. By focusing on language capacity, we have focused on the root structuring principle in contemporary society. Social and economic equality have been seen as essential conditions for the reform of society in Rousseau and Marx, while not much attention has been directed to the need for linguistic equality, the implicit insight Marcuse gained from psychoanalysis. The symbolically-satiated environment and the growingly impoverished nature of social interaction in the United States, for example, presently ought to be a disturbing situation for persons concerned with sustaining and extending humanistic values.

Participation would promise to provide a meaningful mode of activity for the advancement of this purpose. I shall sketch here, now, my model of a humanized participation:

1. It involves individuals acting as moral agents, who have become conscious of the demands meaningful, purposeful participation places on them.

2. It will begin at the local setting, close to the lives of most individuals and where it can be expected that individuals will begin to relate specific local, contradictory problems to the general condition of society.

3. Rationality, as dialogue and action in the service of social justice and human dignity, will be achieved by virtue of the application of a broader frame of mind to public problems developed through expanded public discussion via the media, socializing agents, and through other creative ways.

4. This will require that our theory of participation be connected to some more fully articulated account of the place of language in group and community interaction. There will be a need to investigate and distinguish "technical" from "promotional" languages.

5. In compromising settings participants must have a mode of analysis, a set of meaningful explanatory concepts, that helps to explain the structure of relations.

6. Finally, members of communities must have opportunities and settings to develop and confirm these capacities, the significance of which Marcuse missed. I doubt that all the opportunities to expand humanized forms of participation have been seized. Especially important, as Andre Gorz and others bring it to our attention, is participation in the workplace (e.g., worker's control structures) as an advancement to practices of industrial democracy and collective bargaining. E. F. Schumacher, for another, reports on the imaginative experiment of one owner of a profitable business firm in England who transfered ownership in 1951 to his employees. The Scott Bader Commonwealth continues as a

highly successful venture, expanding worker satisfaction, as well as contributing to many charitable purposes outside the organization.[20]

There are other possibilities to consider. Starting at the local level of government, there are many places for the imaginative constitution of a participatory style of politics. Planning boards and zoning boards are in urgent need of reform. In metropolitan areas neighborhood control corporations provide an excellent remedy to urban decay and poverty.[21] The experiments in community control of the schools, with firm recognition of the need to eliminate racism and parochialism and with a participatory role for faculty and students, remains an option.[22] Metropolitan areas are suffering from housing blight, and this also is an opportunity for members of a housing community to organize its own management system. This solution may even be the one that forces itself upon residents of buildings and housing complexes where the landlord has abandoned property claims.[23] Hospitals and other organizations lend themselves to democratic participatory governance, though this has not been widely tried.

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20 For this interesting story, see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful - Economics as If People Mattered (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973), pp. 258-266.

21 Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government: The Local Foundations of Political Life (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969). Also, Charles Hamden-Turner, From Poverty to Dignity: A Strategy for Poor Americans (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974).

22 Mario Fantini and Marilyn Gittell, Decentralization: Achieving Reform (New York: Praeger, 1973).

23 "Crime and Fear Decline as Tenants Take Over Housing Development," Wall Street Journal, April 18, 1973.

At the regional level, planning districts, where technical, engineering, and real estate decisions all too often predominate, have a need for the inception of popular participation.[24] The same could be suggested for environmental councils. At the national level the re-establishment of a constitutional politics requires that those shut out from political party structures--for example, various groups at party presidential conventions--should persist in their endeavors to advance their just claims to participate, and this can be legally achieved. One might imagine public convocations on national policies and the initiating of a comprehensive, long-term plan of controlled growth for the country. Perhaps a new constitutional convention is in order.

There are also movements in the process of establishing their claims --the woman's movement which is pressing claims for equal dignity and opportunity, for example. There is, as well, an active "public interest" and consumer movement growing in this country. Launched by Ralph Nader, it envisions the inception of widescale public citizenship, of people who will hold government and corporation publicly accountable.[25] There are, as Nader recommends, the possibilities for opening up boards of trustees and independent regulatory commissions to public representation.[26]

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24 Recognizing the need to decentralize planning, through the influence of Jane Jacob's study Death and Life of Great American Cities, the New York City Planning Department has rejected its earlier commitment to a master plan in favor of miniplans. Paul Goldberger, "Why City is Switching from Master Plan to Miniplans," New York Times, June 27, 1974; and Glenn Fowler, "Community Boards Assert Growing Influence on the Financing of Capital Projects," New York Times, September 22, 1974.

25 Bo Burlingham, "Popular Politics--The Arrival of Ralph Nader," Working Papers, Summer 1974. And also, John W. Garner, In Common Cause (New York: Norton, 1972).

26 Eileen Shanahan, "Reformer: Urging Business Change--Ralph Nader the Consumer Advocate Calls for Federal Charter for Corporations, and Much More, In A Plea for Business Reform," New York Times, January 24, 1971.

Finally, both public and private bureaucracies might be re-conceived in terms of the demands of a "public interest."[27] These are some of the more apparent possibilities which may offer opportunities to broaden sectors of the population to become engaged in political dialogue as the first step toward the more participatory society.

Mobilizing the participatory society will also require the directed and conscientious efforts of social scientists and governmental leadership; the assistance of corporate leadership would be an asset but unlikely. The role of governmental agencies will be to establish and further the opportunities for wide-spread public participation. Re-invigorating the party organizations in a more populist direction will probably be required. The role of responsible social scientists will be to examine participatory styles and to explore the possible avenues for developing cognitive and affective capacities that will make participation in various settings a more meaningful, self-realizing experience.

The participatory life and the participatory style of politics, in conclusion, presents itself as a just and firm alternative for resolving the contradictions of an advanced industrial-capitalist society which places more claims on consumption than useful production, which makes more claims on the human mind to conform than to seek autonomy, and which institutionalizes poverty amidst affluence. The problem of finding specific ways to encourage a self-realizing participation remains.

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[27] One argument is that of Kenneth A. Megill, The New Democratic Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1970), chap. 7. He suggests: "By rejecting the distinction between policy maker and policy implementer, the new democrats have opened up the possibility for the development of control institutions in an advanced industrial society." p. 116.

To this point we have recognized that the synthesis of the radical-liberal case for participation and the radical critique of Marcuse rests on the recognition that social reconstruction is not exclusively a task of addressing material conditions. The symbolically-satiated environment and the growingly-impoverished nature of social interaction in the United States pose the particular problem of discovering and fostering those conditions that develop the linguistic and conceptual capacities of all persons, and this is the engagement of all in the ongoing human dialogue we know as politics.

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